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My dissertation builds and estimates models of competition for the U.S. motion 
picture industry. The motion picture industry provides a rich setting for exploring the 
effect of competition. First, there is a rapid refresh cycle with new titles being the 
mainstay of industry activity. Modeling new releases adds to estimation complexity 
due to more stringent data demands. Second, the industry sees seasonal changes in 
demand and competition. The frequent entry of new products leads to an emphasis on 
release timing and pricing. Third, the presence of multiple generations of 
technological formats leads to time varying cannibalization and substitution across 
channels.  While I study the motion pictures industry, insights generated and methods 
developed are generalizable to other industries with multiple-channel distribution, 
critical entry and pricing decisions, and technology platform transitions. 
 
Specifically, I model three elements of competition in this industry.  In essay 1, I 
model how movies compete with other movies in the same channel and other channels 
(e.g. theaters, rentals, purchases, etc.).  I allow for movies within any channel to be 
substitutes or complements for movies in the same and other channels. In essay 2, I 
model how release date and price matter for movie competition; the application is to 
DVD sales channel. In essay 3, I model how studios compete in format wars.  The 
application is to studios planning whether to release movies in DVD and/or VHS and 
 at what price, in the days when the DVD format was growing, and studios had the 
choice of waiting for the rivals to do the work of subsidizing the new format. 
 
My dissertation delivers insights on managing marketing mix variables across formats, 
accounting for seasonal demand, competition and cost differences. The models both 
allow inference of payoffs, and provide counterfactuals for future actions of managers, 
accounting for competition. The model frame works described provide methodological 
advances for model specification and estimation in other industries allowing 
generalizability. In particular, I contribute to the literature in dynamic games by 
introducing partial and complete information estimators for games with multiple 
potential equilibriums played in the data. 
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CHAPTER 1 
FORECASTING IN RAPIDLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS: 
AN APPLICATION TO THE U.S. MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY1
The application is to the U.S. motion picture industry.
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Industry watchers and researchers have discussed how a growing number of industries 
are facing rapidly changing environments. Example drivers of change are technology, 
globalization, capital market pressures, and new ownership structures via mergers and 
spin-offs. In changing environments, long histories for a product are unavailable or not 
reliable in changing environments, managers in such industries face difficulty in 
forecasting what lies ahead. Our goal in this paper is to provide a tool for sales 
forecast in rapidly changing environments using relatively short histories. 
2
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 This essay is co-authored with Vrinda Kadiyali, a Professor of Marketing and Economics at the S. C. 
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, 385 Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853. We 
thank seminar participants at Cornell University for comments. We also thank Nielsen EDI, Paul Kagan 
and Associates, Nielsen VideoScan, and Home Media Retailing for providing data for this study. 
2 While our application here is to movies, our model is equally applicable to other products with similar 
characteristics.  Examples include television shows (on television, off-network syndicates, and home 
videos), music (audio and video singles in hard copy, on-line, as part of an album and then in broader 
compilations), and even books (hard bound and then in paperback and e-books.).  The fashion industry 
also has similar characteristics of short lifecycles, seasonality, and cross-channel competition. 
 The high costs of movie 
production and frequent failures at the box office raise the stake in forecasting movie 
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revenues. Several factors make forecasting movie sales inherently difficult: the 
difficulty in quantifying what makes a movie successful (the role of unobservables in 
the data), short lifecycles of the product, and facing different competitive sets each 
week. Changing consumption patterns, driven by improvements in technology, reduce 
the usefulness of historical data in forecasting.  
We build a model that forecasts revenue for movies before they are launched and in 
four separate channels:  theatrical release, DVD sales, VHS sales and rentals, by title, 
by week.  Our model extends the Multiplicative Competitive Interaction model of 
Cooper and Nakanishi (1988) to account for unique features of this market.   
Specifically, we account for (1) observed and unobserved movie characteristics, (2) 
seasonality of demand, (3) competition within and across multiple distribution 
channels, (4) market expansion, substitution and/or complementarity between movies 
inside and across distribution channels. This involves significant data efforts.  This 
also involves overcoming an important methodological issue. We allow for general 
correlation in error structures to do (4). Therefore, we cannot use movie characteristics 
in one channel as instrumental variables for movie performance in another channel 
because characteristics of a movie in one channel are likely to be systematically 
correlated with error terms in the other channel.  Therefore, we modify existing 
methodology (Chiou, 2007) to estimate our model.  We find that our model improves 
forecasts in the sequential distribution channels, with lower mean squared error in out 
of sample validation than extant models. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we discuss issues in 
forecasting revenue in the movie industry.  Next, we provide a literature overview.  In 
section 4 we discuss our model in greater detail. In section 5, we provide details on the 
empirical application. The last section concludes. 
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2. Issues in Forecasting Movie Revenue 
As mentioned in the introduction, movies are highly differentiated products, and it is 
nearly impossible to gather enough data to explain all the determinants of revenue 
success. For example, genre is likely to be a useful (observed) characteristic of a 
movie in any forecasting exercise.  However, a movie’s plot likely also matters for 
revenue forecasts.  However, data on plots is not easy to quantify as an explanatory 
variable. We want to model competition among movies within and across channels. 
This raises additional issues related to unobservables. Some movies may be 
complementary; the release of a popular movie on DVD may increase visits by to 
retailers, and hence increase sales of other titles. Promotions for titles with similar 
plots might have positive (or negative) spillover effects across titles. In our model, we 
control for unobservables and in modeling competition across channels, allow for 
market expansion (or contraction), complementarity and substitution within and across 
channels. 
Consider next the issue of short-life cycle of a movie in theatrical release, and the 
large number of alternatives available in theatrical and across other channels.  This 
leads to intense market share competition (Epstein, 2005).  Consumers who do not 
watch a title in a channel, may either substitute the title entirely and never watch the 
title, or watch the title in a different channel, substituting across channels. The short 
life-cycle in the primary channels increases the need for accurate forecasts of revenue 
for the first weeks post release.  Should forecasts of demand be inaccurate, there is not 
much time to improve non optimal promotion and distribution strategies. 
Further, the large proportion of sales in the first weeks post-release (Ainslie, Dreze 
and Zufryden, 2007), causes data constraints in forecasting.  In more prevalent 
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approaches in marketing focused on established brands and products, long data 
histories are used to estimate brand-specific parameters when forecasting future 
demand.  A managerially relevant forecasting model for the movie industry must only 
use the set of observables known to a manager at the time of forecasting and cannot 
use prior weeks’ revenues to forecast later week revenues. Thus, our goal is to forecast 
sales by title using data available prior to release of the title in the channel.  
 
Figure 1: Aggregate Weekly Revenue 
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Another issue in movie forecasting is the seasonality of demand for movies in both 
primary and secondary channels (see Figure 1). Studios account for this seasonality in 
their theatrical and secondary channel distribution (see Einav 2003), with the most 
highly awaited movies released in weeks of peak demand. For accurate forecasts, it is 
important to account separately for changing seasonal demand and market expansion 
due to new releases. That is, are more movies released in a high-demand season 
because of the high demand, and/or do they cause demand to increase given the 
greater variety (and possibly quality) of movies available to viewers in these weeks?  
Our model separately controls for both effects in each distribution channel. 
Over the last 2 decades, the movie industry has faced a rapidly changing environment. 
The advent of the video cassette (particularly VHS) in 1984 and then the Digital 
Versatile Disc (DVD) in 1997, made home-viewing possible. These technologies led 
to new channel partners (and new complementors via merchandizing deals), altering 
competitive landscapes. Secondary channels and merchandizing deals grew in 
importance to the industry.3
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 In 1980, the industry made approximately 30% of its revenues from the domestic box office, and 7% 
of its revenues from home video (including rentals and sales); in 2000 the industry made approximately 
15% of its revenue from box office and 38% of its revenue from home video (Vogel, 2004). 
 Expectedly, the entry of new players in the industry 
landscape, led to changes in pricing and distribution policies in channels.  For 
example, in the period of 1996-1999, the introduction of a new rental revenue sharing 
mechanism reduced inventory risk allowing rental chains to keep more copies of a title 
in stock (see Mortimer, 2004).  Other changes include the growth of the online rental 
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and sales channels, and peer to peer movie piracy (Smith and Telang, 2006).  
We build a model taking in to account the issues mentioned above.  Empirically, the 
time period for which we forecast the secondary channel revenues are the last 4 
months of 2001. Rapid change in an industry environment implies that the window of 
past data useful in forecasting is likely to be small. Cognizant of the data limitations 
imposed by the changing environment in the movie industry, we estimate and 
benchmark models using the data from January 2000 to the last week of June 2001.  
3.  Literature Review 
The movie industry has invited considerable attention from several marketing scholars 
(see Eliashberg, Elberse and Leenders, 2006, for a summary). We organize our review 
below as models of single movie performance, models with competition within a 
channel, and models with competition across channels.  Our model is in the final 
category. 
Consider papers that examine single movie performance with no competition within 
and across channels. Sawhney and Eliashberg (1996) propose a model (BOXMOD) 
for box office performance.  Eliashberg, Jonker, Sawhney, and Wierenga (2000) 
propose a model (MOVIEMOD) for predicting pre release awareness, adoption intent 
and cumulative penetration in consumers. Neelamegham and Chintagunta(1999) and 
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Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) focus on international box office receipts.4
Consider next papers that model model within-channel competition. Three approaches 
have been used here.  Swami, Eliashberg, and Weinberg (1999) study multiplex screen 
allocation decisions and formulate a model to optimize exhibitor scheduling. Ainslie, 
Dreze and Zufryden (2007), hereafter ADZ, build on the BOXMOD model and study 
the lifecycle of a movie at the box office, measuring the substitution effects of 
competition within a channel. Einav (2007) presents an empirical analysis of release 
timings in the U.S. movie industry, studying both seasonality and competition. In a 
 These 
papers model sales as a function of observable characteristics (such as budget) and 
past performance of a movie. Our formulation for market attractiveness is informed by 
these papers, and we compare our model performance to BOXMOD, modified for the 
sequential channels.  
Other single-movie papers have modeled other important industry features. Shugan 
(1998) looks at the impact of the production team on box office success. Krider and 
Weinberg (1998) discuss competition when faced with seasonal demand variations. 
Radas and Shugan (1998) outline an approach for including seasonal trends in 
estimating demand curves by taking a transformation of time. Important insights from 
this literature for our model are the decline of receipts over weeks post release, and the 
impact of print and advertising expenditure on box office performance. 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Lee, Boatwright and Kamakura (2003) draw upon single movie prediction models and specify a 
hierarchical Bayesian model, to forecast sales of music albums, prior to their launch. Whilst the 
industry of their study is different, the research question and modeling challenges faced are similar. 
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companion paper, these estimates are used to study the timing game, and optimal 
timings calculated for the industry (Einav, 2003).  
Our model is similar to ADZ and Einav (2007) in allowing for flexible competitive 
structures and seasonality. Expanding on these models, we include market expansion 
and allow for more flexible revenue patterns beyond the two-way classification of 
steady decay blockbuster movies and sleeper movies. It is not clear ex-ante if only two 
types of patterns are present in secondary channels, and how the primary channel 
revenue patterns might change when we consider the substitution/complementarity of 
secondary channels and the longer availability of a title in a channel. Therefore, our 
model can be seen as a general case of their model.  Also, unlike these papers, we 
cannot use long datasets to estimate relatively stable traits like seasonality, and our 
model of competition within and across channels poses additional data gathering and 
methodological tasks. 
A third relevant stream of literature examines competition across channels.  Here, 
researchers have examined competition for any given movie across channels, without 
modeling competition amongst movies within a channel.  An example is Lehmann and 
Weinberg (2000), who develop a model of the optimal time to enter a second channel 
for any movie. They calculate optimal release timings in rentals accounting for the 
cannibalization of sales from theatrical release.  They do not study cannibalization 
across the secondary channels. Prasad, Bronnenberg, and Mahajan (2004) use an 
analytical model to study the effect of consumer expectations on optimality of the 
timing decision. The duration between releases is treated as an unwritten covenant of 
the industry, shaping customer expectations. In contrast, the optimal timing policy for 
a distributor depends on current expectations, leading to an impetus to cheat and 
release early. Luan and Sudhir (2007) model the impact of cannibalization of sales and 
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rentals of movies, on box office revenues, accounting for forward looking behavior of 
the consumer at the theatre.  
Two papers study movies in a multiple channel setting. First, Hennig-Thurau et al, 
2007, use individual level discrete choice data to study the effect on studio 
profitability of different configurations of sequential distributional channels, 
optimizing release timings across these channels. As their goal is to study hypothetical 
configurations vastly different from current market conditions, they use conjoint data 
to model channel substitution, without accounting separately for either 
complementarities or market expansion. Second, Chiou (2007) models seasonal 
demand variation in secondary channels, controlling for competitive interactions 
within the rental revenue channel and in DVD and VHS sales.  While Chiou’s model 
is the closest to ours, we cannot use her estimation methods in a multi-channel setting 
where unobservables across channels might be correlated. Therefore, we develop 
methodology more appropriate to our setting.  More on that in section 4 below. 
4. Revenue Prediction Model 
We first outline the market attraction function. Second, we describe our model of 
market share across channels. We conclude by describing the estimation methodology 
needed to forecast revenues.  
4.1: Market Attraction 
In the MCI model, the market share of a product is a function of the ratio of the market 
attraction of the product to the sum of the market attractions of all products.   We 
define our market attraction a for movie m, in channel k, in week w, year y as below: 
 ln( ) ln( )mkwy mkwy kw mkwya δ τ ξ= − +  
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The components of the attraction are as follows. The deterministic component ( mkwyδ ) 
is a function of observed variables. The specification of this function and a description 
of its components in our empirical application, are provided in section 5.2. kwτ  is a 
weekly unobservable shock common to all products in a given channel and week. It is 
likely that the opportunity cost of watching a movie in the theatre, and/or on video 
rental, varies by week. For example, opportunity cost is low during holidays and 
higher during working days. In the summer, the costs of driving to a store can be 
considerably different from that in the winter. Unobserved product attributes are 
modeled as product specific shocks mkwyξ . These include movie plot, and the 
psychological and informational setting of a consumer (Eliashberg and Sawhney, 
1994, and Neelamegham and Jain, 1999).  
We do not specify the distribution of unobserved characteristics, mkwyξ . Instead we 
only restrict its first moments in a quasi likelihood specification for identification, 
setting | , 0,l wy mkwy kw l wyE xξ τ ξ ∈Ξ = ∀ ∈Ξ   , with wyΞ a vector of all product 
shocks is in week w, year y. Our specification is flexible enough to accommodate 
three important sources of covariance in the movie industry. First, we expect 
contemporaneous correlation between movie specific shocks in a given channel, in 
each week. For instance, movies released in summer might share similar 
characteristics. Second, shocks of movies of movies released in different weeks may 
show different contemporaneous correlation. For instance, while the older summer 
blockbuster titles in September would continue to exhibit summer-movie correlation, 
newer movies released in September might have fall-movie characteristics. Hence the 
unobservables of new releases will have a different correlation from older releases. 
Third, noting the rapid decrease in market attractiveness post release, and the 
simultaneous release of a title in DVD sales, VHS sales, and rentals, shocks from a 
 19 
title will exhibit serial correlations across different weeks of demand, and across 
different channels. 
Our quasi likelihood specification allows for these possibilities. Compare it to a 
(hierarchical) Bayesian specification, similar to Lee, Boatwright and Kamakura 
(2003). The latter requires explicitly modeling the covariance matrix of the 
unobservables. The likelihood of the observed data, a key component of such a model, 
cannot be formed unless one specifies the relationship between observations in 
different channels and across different weeks. Without significantly restricting degrees 
of freedom for the covariance matrix, the limited number of observations on each 
movie makes for imprecise estimates of this matrix. Instead, we choose to use a more 
flexible specification that provides less efficient but consistent estimators. 
4.2: Market Share Model 
Let kwy be the choice set of movies in channel k, week w, and year y. In MCI, the 
market share of movie m (denoted mkwyms ) is written as 
 
( )
( )
exp ln( )
exp ln( )
wy
mkwy
mkwy
ikwy
i
a
ms
a
∈
=
∑

 
Our model applies to any nesting structure with as many channels; in our empirical 
application we model four channels for which we have data. For each additional 
channel, the number of coefficients grows linearly. We write the in-channel market 
share, percentage of cumulative sales of all movies in the channel of movie m in 
channel k, week w, year y (denoted |mwy kwyms ) as 
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We allow the attraction functions of new title releases to be correlated. Thus we 
account for complementarities between titles, for instance if such titles were sequels, 
and crowding out/ negative externalities exerted by simultaneous releases.  We 
constrain kρ  to be strictly between 0 and 2 to maintain consistency with the literature 
in discrete choice models.  The cumulative market share of all titles in a channel k is: 
 
{ }
1 1
11
k k
j
kwy kwy
kwy
wyjwy
j Channels
D D
ms
DD
ρ ρ
ρ
− −
−
∈
= =
+ ∑
 (1) 
kρ is a channel nesting parameter that controls market expansion, cannibalization and 
substitution. The release of a new title in channel k increases kwyD , with (1) 
determining the new total channel revenue after market expansion. The market 
attraction function is scaled by the channel nesting parameter in the market share 
model, thereby controlling substitution of movies within a channel. Between the 
values of 0 and 1, the derivative of the market share function with respect to the 
nesting parameter is positive, suggesting an increased sensitivity to differences in the 
attraction functions. Between the values of 1 and 2, the derivative of the market share 
function is negative; suggesting that the market share function reverses direction. 
Cannibalization is controlled by the nesting parameters of the channels that the title 
has been released in. Release of a new title into channel k increases kwyD  with (1)
determining the new total channel revenue for channels in which the title was 
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currently available, after cannibalization. 
4.3: Deriving the Revenue Forecasting Equation 
To forecast revenue we have to account for both kwτ  and mkwyξ . We develop a novel 
forecasting model in two steps. First we integrate product shocks, mkwyξ . Second, we 
substitute for channel specific, unobserved time shocks, kwτ .  
Define wyEq as the expected aggregate volume of titles bought or rented (across all 
channels) in week w, year y; kwyEq as the expected aggregate volume of titles bought 
or rented (channel specific) in channel k, week w, year y; mkwyEq as the expected 
volume of movie m, bought or rented in channel k, week w, year y.  
We predict revenue by setting mkwy mkwyEq Ems M= . While M is set to a large number 
and never observed, mkwyms is a function of stochastic variables{ }mkwyξ . Note that 
( )mkwy mkwyms ξ  is strictly monotonically increasing in mkwyξ , continuous and 
differentiable everywhere. The first order Taylor expansion around
0,l wy l wyE ξ ξ ∈Ξ = ∀ ∈Ξ   leads to [ ]( ) ( )mkwy i wy mkwy i wyE ms ms Eξ ξ ∈Ξ ≈ ∈Ξ  . 
Hence, we substitute the expected unobserved product shock for the unobserved 
product shock in the first step. In the second step we substitute for the unobserved 
time shock. Index channels as B for box office, D for DVD sales, V for VHS sales, 
and R for rentals. Define:  
 
11 1
1
ln( ) ln( )
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1
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exp
1
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R
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Thus we write 
 wywy
Rwy wy
Eq M
γ
τ γ
=
+
 (2) 
The goal of this paper is to derive a model for predicting the sales of a title, in a given 
week, in a given channel, before release of that title in that channel. The above 
expressions derive total sales in a week, summed over all channels, as a function of the 
total market size, M, and unobserved parameter Rwyτ .  
First, noting that this parameter, Rwyτ , is the same over a particular week in the two 
year sample, we substitute for the unobserved terms in the equation for the second 
year, to get: 
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Next, we re-arrange and derive an equation for the total sales in a week, in a given 
channel.  From (2) and (3), we write: 
 
1
2 2
2 11 1 1
2 2 2 2
1
2
2
2
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
R
VB D R
R
Rw w
Rw
Bw Dw Vw Rw
Rw
w
w
D EqEq
D D D D
Eq
ρ
ρρ ρ ρ
ρκ
γ
−
−− − −
−
=
+ + +
=
 (4) 
Next, we derive the final equation for sales of a title, in a given week, in a given 
channel. Without loss of generality, consider forecasts for movie m, in rentals channel 
subscripted by R, in week w, year 2. Using (4), we get: 
 
( )
2 2 1
2
1 1 1 1 2
ln( ) ( )exp
(1 )
R
mRw Rw w
mRw
R w w w
M EqEq
M Eq Eq
ρδ κ
ρ γ γ γ
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=  − − + 
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To predict revenue we replace expected sales in year 1 with observed sales in year 1. 
 
( )
2 2 1
2
1 1 1 1 2
ln( ) ( )exp
(1 )
R
mRw Rw w
mRw
R w w w
M qq
M q q
ρδ κ
ρ γ γ γ
− 
≈  − − + 
 (5) 
Our final forecasting equation (5) can be used for long term forecasts, predicting 
revenue on a set of movie characteristics and observables available months earlier, 
prior to the release of the movie in that particular channel. Note that when using a 
longer dataset, (5) can be used for each preceding year and an estimate formed from 
the (weighted) average. 
4.4: Two-Step Estimation for Endogenous Choice Sets 
Our nested MCI model is similar to a formulation by Chiou (2007) where (1) leads to: 
 0 |ln( ) ln( ) ln( )mkwy wy mkwy k mwy kwyms ms a msρ= −  
The last term, in-channel market share, |ln( )mwy kwyms , is endogenous and correlated 
with the product shock in the attraction function. Commonly, attributes of other titles 
in the channel that affect the in-channel share and are not correlated with the market 
attraction, are used as instruments. For instance, Chiou (2007) uses the sum of the 
characteristics of other products, as instruments. 
This estimation strategy requires the attributes of other titles in the channel to not be 
correlated with the product attraction shock. As discussed earlier, studios time the 
release of the best movies to be in periods of highest demand. The number of movies 
released in a given week as well as the cumulative budgets of all movies in the 
channel in a given week, show strong seasonal patterns.  Hence, attributes of films 
released in the same week are strongly correlated. For instance, blockbusters in 
theatrical, sales and rentals, are all simultaneously released in the same weeks in 
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December. Therefore, characteristics of movies in one channel cannot be used as 
instruments for a market-share model for another channel, as the unobservables might 
be correlated across channels (e.g. summer-themed movies are released in theatrical 
and sales channel in summer and winter-holiday themed movies are released in 
theatrical and sales channels around the winter holidays).   
Thus, the release timing game implies that the assumption of exogenously determined 
choice sets is likely to be inaccurate, biasing the described instrumental variable 
estimator. For instance, movies released in a peak summer week have systematically 
larger budgets, and systematically larger average product attractions as they were 
picked by studios to be summer releases. Conversely, movies with smaller product 
attraction shocks, should on average, be released in weeks with less competition. 
Instrumental variable estimates of the nesting coefficient are biased in both cases.  
In addition, channel coefficients are identified through the variance across the 
characteristics over the years, for the same week. Due to the release timing game and 
the underlying stability of seasonal patterns, such variance remains limited when 
compared to variance across weeks in a year. For instance, holiday weeks across years 
have similar cumulative budgets over all releases in a week, as all big budget movies 
of the year are released in this period. These concerns are amplified when using a 
shorter dataset, as in our problem, where there are far fewer overlapping weeks over 
which one can identify the channel coefficients. 
Given the issue with instrumental variable, we use a two-step estimation process. In 
the first stage, we identify the market attractiveness function to scale by regressing a 
function of market shares on characteristics. In the second stage, we estimate channel 
nesting parameters by minimizing an objective function formed through prediction 
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errors of the forecasting equation. 
Let jkts be the market share of movie j in channel k, in week w, year y, in quantities. 
Define the geometric mean of in group market shares as
1ln( ) ln( )
kwy
g
ikwykwy
kwy i C
s s
N ∈
= ∑   Then from(2):  
 1 1ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
kwy kwy
g
jkwy jkwy ikwy jwy ikwykwy
kwy kwyi C i C
s s
N N
δ δ ξ ξ
∈ ∈
− = − + −∑ ∑ (6) 
In the first stage, coefficients from (6) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares5
Having estimated the first stage on the first 84 weeks, we use the next 4 weeks to find 
channel nesting parameters that minimize the sum of squared errors in the prediction 
sample.
 
and used in the second stage to find the channel nesting parameters.  Conditional on a 
guess of channel coefficients, we calculate differences in the response to mean price 
and the seasonal change in demand. Using(5), we can predict the total revenue of a 
channel in the future weeks. 
6
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Clustering errors by week and using White’s correction for heteroskedasticity does not improve fits 
and/or predictions. 
6 The sum of squared errors and the sum of absolute errors led to similar estimates and predictions. 
  As our objective function does not have analytical derivatives, we utilize a 
Nelder Mead simplex search followed by the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shannon 
method (with numerical derivatives), to find the minimum. While we do not prove the 
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existence of a unique global minimum, varying starting values we find the algorithm 
converges to a unique parameter vector. Robustness tests indicate that our prediction 
results are not affected by the size of the market, as long as we choose M larger than 
the maximum total quantity of entertainment products sold. 
Thus, we develop a new estimation algorithm to account for systematic correlation 
between weeks of peak demand and the release schedule of better performing movies, 
and face the burden of estimating without movie-specific parameters. Note that our 
model of competition is reduced-form. A full structural model of competition that 
accounts for substitution, complementarity and market expansion is beyond the scope 
of our research question. Instead, we build a model that has a flexible competitive 
structure and market attraction formulation, without attempting inference on 
competitive structures.   
5. Empirical Application: Forecasting Weekly Movie Revenues 
We describe the data used in our empirical application, forecasting movie revenues in 
the U.S. motion picture, the operationalization of the forecasting model, and present 
our results. 
5.1: Data 
We use data from three distribution channels – the primary channel i.e. theatrical 
release, and two secondary channels, rentals and sales.  As mentioned previously, the 
data are for January 2000 through December 2001.  
We obtained data from Nielsen EDI for nationally aggregate theatrical revenues (and 
distributional reach) in the first ten weeks of theatrical release for all movies released 
on box office. In the dataset there are about 40 movies being exhibited across theaters 
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nationwide in any given week.  Nielsen Videoscan collects DVD and VHS sales data 
from retailers at the point of sale.  We use data (including weekly sales and price) for 
the top 500 selling movie titles in each channel, which covers all movies that sell over 
300 copies in a format, in a particular week nationally. Other researchers have used 
this dataset to study movie VHS and DVD sales (Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).  
There are significant differences in lifecycle, pricing and other competitive issues. 
Therefore, we model the two formats separately.  The data does not include Walmart. 
In our period of interest, Walmart was a major retailer of DVD and VHS that carried a 
smaller inventory of possible titles than comparable national retailers. Hence, our 
sample may understate the importance of larger titles and overstate the importance of 
smaller titles. 
Rental data comes from Video Store Magazine’s Rental Charts. This source tracks 
weekly national revenue by title for the top 50 selling titles that week. Video Store 
Magazine constructs estimates from a panel of suppliers and retailers. Therefore, 
compared to the sales data from VideoScan, these data might be more inaccurate but 
relatively unbiased if the panel of suppliers and retailers is representative.  Also, 
unlike the sales data, rental data is not divided by DVD/VHS format. 
Pricing policies differ across channels. In movie theatres and home video rentals, 
prices are almost always uniform (Einav and Orbach, 2007), and revenue shared 
between the exhibitor/rentailer and distributor We assume a mean box office ticket 
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price of $6.00 per title, and a mean rental price of $2.50 per title for the duration of the 
study (Hettrick 2000, Vogel 2004) and find our results robust to a range of price 
means.7  In DVD and VHS sales, we observe the weighted average price for a title 
(reported by week, by title) sold in all Discount Mass, Drug & Grocery stores, which 
account for about 43% of all units sold in the dataset, and assume it to be equal to 
mean price of the movie across all reporting retailers.8
To enrich the forecasting model, we gather data on additional variables by title.  We 
obtain data on print and ad spending (P & A) for each movie at the box office stage 
from Paul Kagan and Associates. We also use user ratings from Internet Movie 
Database (http://www.imdb.com) to proxy for user reported quality. We complement 
user ratings with a summary measure of critics’ ratings. Available at Rotten Tomatoes 
(http://www.rottentomatoes.com), the Tomatometer, captures the percentage of 
positive critics’ reviews for a title. Additionally, sales of a movie may be influenced 
by the “star” power of the actors and directors involved in the movie (see Elberse, 
2006 for a summary of studies on star power). Ulmer (2000) published a list of the top 
200 actors and top 10 directors in Hollywood, measured on their “bankability” at the 
  
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Two major retail pricing schemes existed in DVD and VHS. First, in “sell-through” pricing, retail 
prices were set with the expectations of direct purchase by consumers and rental stores, and the title 
distributed widely to media retailers. Second, in “rental-window” pricing, a movie was priced above the 
average retail price of other VHS or DVD available at retailers, and distribution curtailed to rental 
stores. While DVDs were introduced in 1997 with “sell-through” pricing, “rental-window” pricing was 
the norm for VHS cassettes through the late nineties. Further information on theatrical contracts can be 
found in Einav (2007), and on rental contracts can be found in Mortimer (2004) and Chiou (2007).  
8 A number of retailers, including Target and Kmart but excluding Walmart, are included in the 
category. 
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box office, through an industry wide survey of Hollywood professionals. We gather 
data on all actors and directors featured in a movie, and check if those actors were 
included in the top 200 and top 10 lists respectively.  
Table 1: Summary statistics by channel9
  
 
Box Office DVD Sales VHS Sales Rentals 
Channel Gross (in $) 3,278,381 (8,270,558) 
97,127 
(23,577) 
82,045 
(47,888) 
2,030,033 
(2,495,021) 
Box Office (in $) 
(for sequential channels) n/a 
80,941,000 
(74,159,950) 
91,119,160 
(75,999,900) 
46,447,260 
(54,094,390) 
Screen-Weeks  
(for sequential channels) n/a 
14,490 
(6,725) 
15,666 
(6,548) 
10,503 
(7,260) 
Budget (in $) 26,554,000 (30,896,000) 
47,234,000 
(35,774,350) 
47,113,940 
(34,818,370) 
36,299,480 
(31,767,270) 
Print & Ad (P&A) 
(in $) 
15,715,000 
(14,620,000) 
27,978,000 
(13,039,970) 
29,342,490 
(13,128,040) 
22,828,910 
(14,316,330) 
Weeks in channel  
(in weeks) 
5.31 
(2.85) 
62.85 
(57.22) 
90.93 
(94.33) 
6.85 
(3.97) 
Inter release time n/a 87.43  (106.23) 
95.20 
(108.26) 
24.42 
(6.06) 
Price n/a 20.08 (4.15) 
10.76 
(3.43) n/a 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Mean followed by standard deviation in parenthesis 
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Table 1 presents key summary statistics. All variables reported are means across title, 
in the channel, in a week. For instance, the first row, channel gross, is the total sales of 
a title in the channel in the week. The average title running in theatres grosses 
approximately 3.5 million dollars each week of its run, while the average DVD in our 
dataset, has total sales of approximately 100,000 dollars each week. 
The second and third rows are only for secondary channels. Box Office is the 
cumulative box office (primary channel) gross of a title, now released in the secondary 
channel. Screen-Weeks is the sum of screens on which the movie showed, over the 
first 10 weeks of its theatrical run. Budget is the cost of making the film. Print & 
advertising spending measures expenditure on both advertising as well as the cost of 
creating prints for distribution. User Rating and Critic’s Ratings were described 
earlier. Weeks in Channel measures how long the movie has been in that channel post 
release, and Inter Release Time measures the time between primary and secondary 
channel release. 
5.2: Operationalizing the Deterministic Component of Attraction Function 
We discuss the mathematical form and variables used in modeling the deterministic 
component ( mkwyδ ), first in the primary channel, and then in the sequential channels. 
In the theatrical channel, Sawhney and Eliashberg (1996) proposed a three parameter 
gamma model (BOXMOD) for predicting box office revenue. After a meta-analysis of 
earlier movies, they predict first week, peak and decay of theatrical revenue over 
weeks. ADZ make the distinction between blockbuster decline (early peak), or a 
sleeper decline (later peak).  In the box office, we extend these two extant models to 
incorporate more explanatory variables, particularly P & A, user ratings and critics’ 
ratings, improving fit significantly. Suppressing subscripts denoting movie m, in 
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channel k in week w, year y, we write the deterministic component in box office as10
 
  
[ ] ( ) ( )1 3 4 5 62 lg( ) lg( ): log( ) k k k k k Rk k PA PA wRBB PAp x w e
β β β β βα βδ + +=  (7) 
where p is the price, BB is a set of dummy variables coded using 4 levels of print and 
advertising expenditure (henceforth P&A) to capture blockbuster status, PA stands for 
P&A, x is a characteristics vector and Rw is weeks spent in the channel post release.  
We assume that the price of a box office ticket remains constant over the length of the 
dataset. We interact of blockbuster status with P&A to allow for a non linear 
relationship between gross and P&A. While we observe the P&A for the theatrical 
channel, we do not observe the marketing mix used by the firm.  
For all channels, the characteristics vector x we include the following measures of 
differentiation among movies: studio dummies, dummies for genre, dummies for 
animation movies, MPAA ratings, and dummies for the presence of star actors and 
director. We also use user ratings to measure consumer reported quality and a 
summary measure of critics’ ratings. 
In the sequential channels, we interact movie characteristics time spent in channel and 
inter release time.  Suppressing subscripts denoting movie m, in channel k in week w, 
year y, we write the deterministic component in sequential channels as 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Comparing fits, we find little difference in using the logarithm of the price and characteristics, and 
the untransformed variables. 
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where BB is a set of dummy variables coded using 4 levels of box office gross  to 
capture blockbuster status, BO stands for box office gross, PA stands for P&A in the 
primary channel, Cw is weeks spent (inter release time) between the theatrical and 
sequential channels and other variables are as described for (8) above. 
As explained earlier, we assume that the price of a video rental remains constant over 
the length of the dataset, and use the mean price in sales.  As the price elasticity of a 
movie in DVD or VHS sales may depend on its box office gross and the time since the 
movie was released in theaters, we interact blockbuster status with price and time 
since theatrical release when identifying the price response coefficient.  
We observe the P&A for the theatrical channel, but not the marketing mix used by the 
firm. Lacking similar data at the sequential channels, we use P&A estimates from the 
box office stage to proxy for spend in promotions at the sequential channel.  
For sequential channels, there are other variables included in the x vector. Box office 
revenue captures the impact of unobservables and is a proxy for market size in 
secondary channels (Krider and Weinberg, 1998, and Lehman and Weinberg,2000).  
We use the number of screens a movie was show in during the first week, and sum 
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over the number of screens a movie was shown in during the first 10 weeks of its run 
(henceforth Screen-Weeks) to capture distribution effects.11
Cw
 Last, we use the ratio of 
budget to box office gross (henceforth Profitability Index), to differentiate between 
smaller budget and larger budget films with the same box office gross. Extant 
forecasting models have not considered multiple channels, and hence do not suggest a 
relationship  between the inter release time (number of weeks between release in the 
theatrical and sequential channels), , and the decay in revenue over the weeks post 
release.  
The complexity of the underlying cannibilization and dynamic decision making 
process, and the network effects in evaluating entertainment products would suggest 
non-linearaties in this relationship. For instance, a longer inter release time may lead 
to a saturation of the word of mouth, attracting more consumers in earlier weeks, and 
then showing faster decay post release? Alternatively movie with shorter inter release 
times may attract more customers in earlier weeks  because of the heavy advertising in 
the box office channel, and then show faster decay post release?  
5.3: Results and Model Comparisons 
In this subsection, first we discuss the coefficients estimated. Second, we present our 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Major studio typically release movies first in the theatres, and then for sale in VHS/DVD format and 
in rental stores. While the primary to secondary distribution channel gap has shrunk in recent times 
(Luan and Sudhir, 2007), the mean duration in our dataset is 24 weeks. Thus, it is safe to assume that 
few movies remained in theatres for 6 months. Hence, cannibalization of sales across sequential 
distribution channels will primarily occur through forward looking conjectures of theatrical consumers, 
and not due to direct substitution of a movie at the theatre with the same movie at a rental store. 
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predictions and compare them with other models. Table 2 reports coefficients 
estimated for the attraction function in each channel. Table 3 reports elasticities 
estimated at mean levels of variables. 
Table 2: Coefficients of Market Attraction12
 
 
Box Office DVD VHS 
 
Rentals 
 
log(Budget) 
0.208 ** 
(0.031) 
-0.037 ** 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.097 ** 
(0.014) 
log(Screens in Week 1) n/a 
0.115 ** 
(0.007) 
0.073 ** 
(0.007) 
-0.026 ** 
(0.007) 
log(Screen Weeks) n/a 
0.011 
(0.017) 
0.058 ** 
(0.019) 
0.116 ** 
(0.013) 
log(Print and 
Advertising) (P&A) n/a 
-0.155 ** 
(0.014) 
-0.227 ** 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
Profitability Index n/a 
-0.00002* 
(0.00000) 
- 0.00005** 
(0.00002) 
0.000002 
(0.000004) 
     
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 We do not report coefficients on animation, genre and rating. B1, BB2, BB3 and BB4 are the 
blockbuster status, in ascending order of P&A for primary channels and Box Office Gross for 
secondary channels. Significance codes:  0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '+' 
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Table 2 (continued) 
log(User Rating) 
1.110 ** 
(0.149) 
2.06 ** 
(0.053) 
0.633 ** 
(0.048) 
0.565 ** 
(0.063) 
log(Critics’ Ratings) 
0.377 ** 
(0.044) 
-0.180 ** 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.116 ** 
(0.017) 
Weeks since release 
(WR) 
0.388 ** 
(0.122) 
0.019 ** 
(0.001) 
0.006 ** 
(0.001) 
-0.215 ** 
(0.015) 
Inter Release Time 
(WB) n/a 
0.002 ** 
(0.000) 
0.005 ** 
(0.000) 
-0.034 ** 
(0.006) 
WR*WB n/a 
- 0.000003* 
(0.000001) 
-0.00002** 
(0.00000) 
0.001 ** 
(0.000) 
log(WR) 
1.610 ** 
(0.502) 
-0.725 ** 
(0.034) 
0.282 ** 
(0.033) 
0.352 ** 
(0.063) 
log(WB) n/a -0.024 (0.023) 
-0.195 ** 
(0.022) 
0.462 ** 
(0.165) 
Star Actor 
-0.115 * 
(0.052) 
-0.009 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
0.025 
(0.018) 
Star Director 
0.107 
(0.100) 
0.020 
(0.019) 
-0.162 ** 
(0.020) 
-0.061 * 
(0.029) 
BB1* Price n/a -0.047 ** (0.004) 
0.051 ** 
(0.005) 
n/a 
BB2* Price n/a 
-0.017 ** 
(0.005) 
0.047 ** 
(0.005) 
n/a 
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Table 2 (continued) 
BB3* Price n/a 
0.091 ** 
(0.015) 
0.035 ** 
(0.012) 
n/a 
BB4*Price n/a 
-0.124 + 
(0.064) 
0.003 
(0.055) 
n/a 
(WR+ WB)* log(Price) n/a 
-0.116 ** 
(0.012) 
-0.215 ** 
(0.010) 
n/a 
BB1*log(P&A) for 
primary 
BB1*log(Box office) for 
secondary channels 
1.250 ** 
(0.044) 
0.786 ** 
(0.026) 
0.961 ** 
(0.028) 
0.582 ** 
(0.019) 
BB2*log(P&A) for 
primary 
BB2*log(Box office) for 
secondary channels 
1.300 ** 
(0.041) 
0.694 ** 
(0.031) 
1.020 ** 
(0.030) 
0.526 ** 
(0.018) 
BB3*log(P&A) for 
primary 
BB3*log(Box office) for 
secondary channels 
1.340 ** 
(0.041) 
0.126 + 
(0.067) 
1.020 ** 
(0.038) 
0.550 ** 
(0.022) 
BB4*log(P&A) for 
primary 
BB4*log(Box office) for 
secondary channels 
1.350 ** 
(0.042) 
1.090 ** 
(0.236) 
1.100 ** 
(0.177) 
0.464 ** 
(0.028) 
WR*log(P&A) for 
primary 
WR*log(Box Office) for 
secondary 
-0.073 ** 
(0.014) 
-0.002 ** 
(0.000) 
0.001 ** 
(0.000) 
-0.031 ** 
(0.004) 
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Table 3: Elasticity of Market Attraction13
 
 
Box Office DVD Sales VHS Sales Rentals 
Price n/a 0.607 -1.09 n/a 
Box Office Gross n/a 0.436 -0.006 0.530 
Screen Weeks n/a 0.011 0.058 0.116 
Screens 1st Week n/a 0.120 0.073 -0.026 
Budget 0.208 -0.040 -0.006 0.097 
Print & Advertising 0.576 -0.160 -0.227 0.016 
Profitability Index n/a -0.00002 -0.00005 0.000002 
Time Since Release  -6.21 -3.03 -1.63 -4.92 
Inter Release Time  n/a 1.62 0.117 -0.164 
User Ratings 1.11 2.06 0.633 0.565 
Critics' Ratings 0.377 -0.180 -0.004 -0.116 
 
We find that market attraction is well predicted by the print and ad spending of a 
movie, the user ratings and critics’ ratings of a movie, all of which are positively 
correlated with larger box office revenues.  Larger number of weeks since theatrical 
release significantly decreases the attractiveness of the movie.14
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Elasticity computed using dataset means, and accounts for all significant parameters associated with 
the variable. 
 
14 We try different time specifications and do not see a difference in fit across different specifications, 
including higher order polynomials of time spent in channel.   
 As in Lehmann and 
Weinberg (2000), we find that performance measure from the primary channels help 
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improve fit and prediction in the secondary channels. Larger box office gross and 
greater screen-weeks exposure leads to larger secondary channel attractiveness. 
Similar to Luan and Sudhir (2007), we find that longer inter release times between 
channels, decreases market attractiveness. 
We compare three models that have the same deterministic specification for market 
attraction. Similar to ADZ, first write the generalized gamma formulation of 
BOXMOD as: 
 
1i
i i
t
mkwy iS t e
γ
β βη
−
=  
One can rewrite BOXMOD as:  
 2 31 i i
t
mkwy iS t e
β ββ=  (9) 
As the original model does not restrict the three parameters of the gamma function
( ), ,i i iη γ β , (9) is a re-parameterization of the original formulation. Comparing (9) 
with(5), our model has to additionally account for the inter release time and its 
interaction with the time spent in the channel. Hence, when modeling secondary 
channels, we modify BOXMOD to include time spent in channel and inter release 
time ( ,C IRt t respectively): 
 2 3 4 5 61 i i i C i IR i C IR
t t t t
mkwy i C IRS t t e
β β β β ββ + +=  (10) 
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To reduce computational complexity, BOXMOD can be estimated using a hierarchical 
two step approach: the three parameters for the gamma function are fitted separately 
for each movie and then the estimated parameters projected onto the observables of 
the movie. Substituting the linear model for each parameter and then taking logs on 
both side, yields the efficient estimator. Noting that (7) and (8) are the best fits15
 
 for 
this class of models and substituting in (9) and (10), we get: 
1ln( ) 1 ln( )Mmkwy mkwy mkwyS δ ξ= + +  (11) 
In the second model, we include a weekly seasonality dummy to allow for seasonal 
trends, and a yearly dummy to control for technology trends: 
 2ln( ) ln( )Mmkwy ky kw mkwy mkwyS t t δ ξ= + + +  (12) 
(11) and (12) are estimated by OLS. The third model is the efficient estimator model.  
This utilizes the methodology described above to predict both market shares and the 
aggregate rental revenue. While the first and second model outperform our model in 
the box office validation sample, our model has the lowest rMSE in all secondary 
channel validation samples. In DVD sales, VHS sales and Rentals, our estimator 
shows 2%, 4% and 6% lower rMSE respectively. 
There are two important reasons why this might be so. First, primary channels are less 
likely to be prone to cannibalization or complementarity from other channels when 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 White’s correction, clustering errors by time spent in channel, inter release time, and/or week of 
observation, do not improve fit. 
 40 
compared to secondary channels.  Our model places heavier demand on data to 
estimate this flexible competition model (within and) across channels, and therefore 
appears to not do as well in primary channels where this is less of a concern. Second, 
unobservables play a larger role in the box office channel model than they do in the 
secondary channel model.  Recall that in the secondary channels, the presence of box 
office gross controls for many of these.   Hence, all three forecasting models perform 
very poorly in the primary channel. 
Table 4: rMSE of models 
 
BOXMOD 
equivalent 
Seasonal 
BOXMOD 
equivalent 
Our model 
Box Office (training) 1.46E+06 1.56E+06 5.90E+05 
Box Office (validation) 3.99E+05 4.59E+05 8.43E+05 
DVD Sales (training) 1.21E+04 1.24E+04 1.27E+04 
DVD Sales (validation) 4.27E+04 3.27E+04 3.21E+04 
VHS Sales (training) 7.76E+03 7.91E+03 7.64E+03 
VHS Sales (validation) 5.74E+04 5.62E+04 5.38E+04 
Rentals (training) 6.28E+05 4.66E+05 4.38E+05 
Rentals (validation) 5.10E+05 4.58E+05 4.29E+05 
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6. Conclusion 
We describe, estimate and then benchmark a model to predict weekly rental revenue 
by title. Our model incorporates both seasonal demand variation and the market effects 
of better movies being released in periods of peak sales. To ensure managerial 
relevance, the model only utilizes data from available months prior to the week of 
interest. We find that prior channel performance helps predict future performance. 
However, we cannot and do not differentiate between causality and correlation. A 
larger box office gross might potentially lead to more word of mouth and hence more 
future revenues, or might simply indicate movies of higher quality.  Greater 
distribution (screen-weeks) might indicate a longer runs (better quality) or might 
capture increased cannibalization across channels.  Allowing for a general model of 
competition within and across channel keeps the model flexible without separating 
these forces. 
Additionally, we find that movies show decay in market share with inter-release and 
time spent in the channel, and that this effect is highly nonlinear. We find the 
interaction of these variables remains critical to good forecasts. The non-linearity of 
time trends in the market attractiveness function process hints both at the complexity 
of the underlying cannibilization and dynamic decision making process, and the 
network effects in evaluating entertainment products.  This is an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
Our model has some drawbacks.  First, we assume inviolate channel boundaries.  As 
different channels begin to overlap both in product and the timing of release, the 
model will be affected by endogeneity concerns and network effects. Second, our 
model does not include other sources of entertainment that compete with movies. Not 
including competitive sources of entertainment, such as television shows when 
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modeling rentals, increases forecast error. While we control for seasonal trends, 
including major entertainment events such as the Super Bowl, might improve 
predictive capabilities. Finally, in markets where long stable sales histories are 
available to marketing managers, our method will have limited usability. Using brand 
specific parameters and past sales should provide superior forecasts, but are 
unavailable or inappropriate in rapidly changing industries. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS OF DVD RELEASE TIMING & PRICING16
When deciding DVD release strategies, studios must consider the following. First, 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the U.S. motion picture industry, DVDs have increasingly become a major source 
of revenue for movie studios with total DVD sales growing from $1.9 billion in 2000 
to $16.3 billion in 2005. The release date and price of a DVD (or title, as it is called in 
the industry) affect profits because weekly DVD sales vary dramatically with peak 
weekly sales being seven-fold non-peak sales, and release prices for DVDs varying 
between $5 and $35 across titles, in the time period of our study, 2000-2005. 
Therefore, release timing and prices of DVD are important strategic variables. The 
focus of this study is the competitive dynamics of the setting of these two variables in 
the U.S. DVD industry in this period. Substantively our objective is to study the 
optimality of observed decisions. We investigate changes in DVD revenue and release 
costs due to time varying title and industry forces, and build managerial decision tools 
to predict future demand and competition levels. 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 This essay is co-authored with Vrinda Kadiyali, a Professor of Marketing and Economics at the S. C. 
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, 385 Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853. We 
thank seminar participants at Cornell University for comments. We also thank Nielsen EDI, Paul Kagan 
and Associates, Nielsen VideoScan, and Home Media Retailing for providing data for this study. 
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there is substantial difference in industry demand between peak demand (weeks with 
highest aggregate industry sales) and non-peak demand weeks. Cēterīs pāribus, any 
DVD will obtain higher revenues in a peak-demand week than in a non-peak week. 
Second, despite peak periods having the potential for higher revenues, any one DVD 
might not realize higher revenue.  This is because the higher revenue potential in a 
peak week is likely to attract more titles that also anticipate higher revenues. Higher 
competition in peak weeks is likely to reduce sales of the title, and might result in 
lower prices, resulting in lower profits. As more titles enter peak demand weeks, 
release costs in these weeks might be higher. For example, promotional allocations 
and slotting fees to retailers and the costs of advertising media might rise in weeks of 
peak demand. In addition, titles have their “shelf-life” clocks running from the time 
that they exit the theatrical channel. The third factor to consider is that deferring a 
DVD release (e.g. to a non-peak demand week) long after the movie’s theatrical run 
reduces the potential sales of the title in the channel. Studios must therefore make 
appropriate strategic choices of DVD release timing and pricing. Given these forces 
affecting release date and price decisions of any one title, how does the competitive 
equilibrium of release dates and prices evolve? There are three factors that complicate 
our modeling the equilibrium. 
First, key information describing the evolution of the industry is missing in our data. 
We know that studios consider various release date options as evidenced by their 
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intermediate release announcements.17
We do not observe the interim release announcements in our dataset, and only observe 
the final release date and time. We build a model that allows for the effect of the 
missing data on agent actions when finding the profit function, and show estimates 
from the model converge to the traditional full information MPNE estimator. An 
alternative choice is to build a model of the release timing and pricing decision taken 
at the last period prior to release, ignoring interim announcements. Such a dynamic 
game is fully observed and can be estimated using a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
 That is, studios can and do announce they will 
release on a certain date and price but the final date and price often turns out to be 
different. Various competitive dynamics are possible in these release date 
announcements.  For example, a title that was successful in the box-office might 
announce to pre-empt another successful movie of the same genre from releasing the 
same weekend. At the same time, seeing the release announcement by a high-revenue 
potential title might persuade a smaller title of the same genre to release in the same 
week, in the hope of free-riding off promotional monies spent by the larger title, 
especially if the peak demand favors the particular genre of movies. This might in turn 
deter another smaller movie of the same genre from announcing the same release date.  
Therefore, these announcements can serve to preempt, or coordinate release dates with 
rivals.  
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Cached web-pages accessed using the internet archive confirm the existence of a steadily changing 
set of announcements. However, we have been unable to find a data source for past DVD 
announcements of studios.  
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(MPNE) frame work. However, in general, a model ignoring the strategic variables of 
the game (release timing and pricing announcements) may be misspecified, and lead to 
biased profit function estimates.  
Hence, our paper contributes methodologically by describing an estimator for agent 
payoffs in a dynamic model with censored (or missing) information. Marketing 
researchers are often faced with datasets on forward looking firms in which a key 
strategic variable is unobserved or censored for a part or the entirety of the dataset. For 
example, firms might scout several locations before choosing a final location, or make 
a capacity decision and then alter it before reaching the final choice. A typical MPNE 
estimation needs complete data on current and future state vectors and actions taken 
by agents to identify the transition matrix and enable use of nested fixed point 
algorithms.  Our model is general enough to be applied to other industries with 
censored data. 
Second, the seasonality of demand and competition leads to time-varying strategy 
selection rules for firms. Each title is likely to have a release timing and pricing 
strategy that varies by week. For instance, a title may be more likely to release a DVD 
title if future periods have decreased demand, than if future periods have increased 
demand; the seasonality of demand leads to seasonality in the set of entrants. Also, in 
this market, there was an eight-fold increase in demand between 2000 and 2005.  The 
seasonality of demand itself changed over time (DVDs were gifted not just for 
Christmas but also increasingly for Mother’s Day, or graduation, or children’s 
birthdays). Hence, studio profits varied over weeks and over years. In our model, this 
implies that the states of the world do not follow a first-order stationary (homogenous) 
Markov process, as is typically assumed in MPNE models. 
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Third, it is plausible that our setting has multiple equilibria.  Release timing (and 
pricing) strategies in our model may be both the traditional strategic substitutes but 
also strategic complements. For example, a movie with small theatrical revenues 
might view a larger movie as a strategic complement if the larger movie can drive 
traffic to DVD stores. Two larger movies may see their timing strategies as strategic 
substitutes if the market stealing effect dominates. Allowing for strategic 
complementarity and substitutability brings about the possibility of multiple equilibria, 
a situation not tractable in extant dynamic model estimation methodologies.  
We describe a novel estimator for dynamic games based on a partial information 
model (i.e. where the announcement vector is unobservable).  Our model is analogous 
to the Oblivious Equilibrium (OE) model (Weintraub, Benkard and Roy, 2007). OE 
assumes that an “agent” (studio in our model) in a period is “oblivious” to the current 
states of others, and instead holds beliefs (distribution) over candidate states possible 
in the period. Similar to OE, in our partial information model, studios are oblivious to 
release announcements of other titles in past periods, and instead have beliefs that 
reflect the Perfect Bayesian distribution over possible release announcements. In 
appendix 1.2 we show that payoffs estimated in the partial information approach 
converge to those in a full information model. While our partial information model is 
unable to identify the drivers of an interim release announcement in the game, the 
model is able to identify the relevant components of studio profit functions and hence 
the trade-offs made by the studios between forces. 
The estimation methodology proposed in OE is not appropriate for our setting. Extant 
MPNE models, including OE, identify model primitives by using the revealed 
preferences of a firm in a period. The methods identify drivers of profit functions by 
comparing observed choices with computed best responses. The missing 
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announcements prevent us from using extant methods. We show that we can recast the 
equilibrium condition, as being a fixed point in best responses of agents across 
multiple periods; theorem (T1) shows that the optimal release announcement strategy 
of a firm leads to maximum future profits from release, and hence an optimal final 
release timing and pricing schedule. 
We show that a unique industry evolution pathway is consistent with our partial 
information model. We estimate a market outcome function that describes sales in a 
period, as a function of the time since theatrical and DVD release, seasonal demand 
and competition. Employing a logit formulation of market shares, we generate a 
sufficient statistic to approximate the evolution of the industry equilibrium which 
accounts for differences amongst titles and studios. We forecast industry evolution 
using the statistic, and compute payoffs to studios from different release timing and 
pricing choices. Last we maximize the quasi-likelihood of observed strategy choices, 
consistent with the other steps of the estimation, to measure the seasonal differences in 
release costs which rationalize observed actions.  
Our estimates of DVD market share are similar to prior findings.18
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Due to the high computational load of the estimation algorithm, results discussed are preliminary and 
have been estimated on data from 2000 to 2002.  We will shortly estimate the model on the entire 2000-
2005 data. 
 We find that net 
release costs are smaller for movies that were more successful in the box office, 
indicating that blockbusters both make more money on DVD, and face lower release 
costs than other titles. Increasing the inter-release time (time between theatrical and 
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DVD release) both reduces the sales potential of the title, and increases release costs. 
The model predicts competition levels in the industry with reasonable accuracy up to 
30 weeks into the future, providing a decision support tool for marketing managers in 
studios. Within sample, our model shows a good fit with higher prediction accuracy 
for future release dates and prices of DVDs than alternative model specifications. 
Finally, our policy simulations investigate how optimal Theater-to-DVD windows 
depend on seasonal demand, competition and release cost variation. The simulations 
provide a decision support tool for marketing managers in the entertainment industry, 
predicting changes in DVD release strategies should there be changes in the industry 
landscape (market expansion, change in seasonality, change in release costs, etc.). 
Our model generalizes the MPNE frame work used to study strategic decisions by 
multiple forward looking firms, and is applicable to competitive industries with time-
varying payoffs or with frequent entry of new products.  Examples include technology 
products, other entertainment products like music, and fashion products.  And as 
described earlier, the framework can be used in industries where researchers are 
unable to obtain data on firm actions/state space, and need to model using a censored 
dataset. 
2. Conceptual Overview of Equilibrium Forces 
As mentioned in the introduction, three forces affect the equilibrium. First, weeks of 
peak demand increase sales.   Second, intense competition in weeks of peak demand 
reduces market share and lowers margins. Relatedly, peak weeks might have higher 
costs of release. Third, deferring a DVD release (e.g. to a non-peak demand week in 
order to avoid competition) to a week long past the movie’s theatrical run reduces the 
potential sales of the title in the channel. In this section we present a conceptual 
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overview of our model, reviewing relevant literature and discussing each of the forces.  
2.1: Temporal Variation in Demand 
As mentioned in the introduction, demand for DVDs is time varying, affecting the 
optimal release timing and pricing of titles.  We first discuss how existing literature 
has approached seasonality, and then its impact on our model. 
In the economics literature, Einav (2007) and Chiou (2007) study the impact of 
seasonality on the demand for movies in primary and sequential channels respectively. 
Einav (2007) presents an empirical analysis of theatrical revenue in the U.S. movie 
industry, studying both seasonality and competition. Because his model is for 
theatrical releases, his research question does not include declining potential sales with 
deferral of entry dates. Chiou (2007) includes the effect of deferral of release dates, 
controlling for the endogeneity of release date selection, but does not model the 
process for the evolution of dates and prices. Both papers find strong evidence of 
seasonal changes in demand, and that firms’ account for seasonality in their strategic 
choices. 
The marketing literature has found that revenue in the movie theater, over the same 
weeks in different years, can be predicted. Krider and Weinberg (1998) discuss 
competition when faced with seasonal demand variations. Radas and Shugan (1998) 
outline an approach for including seasonal trends in estimating demand curves by 
taking a transformation of time. Luan and Sudhir (2007) model the effect on box 
office revenues of the theater-to-DVD window.  
Seasonal demand (and seasonal costs, as we will discuss below) cause seasonal 
variation in payoffs. Modeling these seasonal payoffs in the framework of dynamic 
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games poses a problem.  While dynamic games have been studied for a few years now 
(e.g. see Rust 1987, Ericson and Pakes 1995), most researchers have typically focused 
on mature and stable industries. Firms in these industry use time invariant strategy 
selection criteria, allowing the researcher to assume that the states of the world follow 
a stationary, first order Markov process. The stationary Markov process leads to the 
solution concept of a stationary MPNE, using the implicit assumption that profits are 
only a function of strategic decisions of firms, with no exogenous change in industry 
profits due to macroeconomic forces or technological change. 
The DVD industry in our period of interest showed a rapid increase in sales from $2 
billion to $16 billion in 6 years. The growth in sales did not occur symmetrically over 
various weeks in a calendar year, nor across various calendar years. For instance, the 
largest growth in DVD sales occurred in the Christmas holidays. Thus, neither over 
weeks of the same year nor in the same season across multiple years, were revenues 
and costs, hence profits and firm strategy selection criteria, constant as assumed in the 
stationary MPNE model. 
We utilize the Ericson and Pakes (1995) framework, and add to the MPNE literature 
by describing a non-stationary (time varying) MPNE model. Our model relaxes the 
assumption of time homogeneity for MPNE. In appendix 1.2, we discuss the 
relationship between the non-stationary and stationary MPNE in greater detail. In 
general, the theory does not guide us on how non-linearities of response functions may 
translate to decision making rules. We show that the non-stationary MPNE requires a 
“sufficient statistic” vector describing changes over time, which is essential for 
identification (see assumption A7 in appendix 1.2 for further details).  
Assuming the sufficient statistic for change over time, a non-stationary MPNE can be 
 55 
estimated using extant methods for stationary MPNE. However, the non-homogeneity 
of model primitives substantially increases the data requirements for estimation and 
decreases the rate of asymptotic convergence in extant models. In particular, the effect 
of seasonal change enters non-linearly in the continuation values of the MPNE (see 
Pakes and McGuire, 2001 for a discussion on calculating continuation values). In our 
partial (limited) information model, we impute changes in payoffs, through a demand 
function. The non-linear effects of seasonality are partially accounted for in the 
demand function. Hence the effect of seasonality enters linearly when calculating 
continuation values, decreasing computational and data requirements for estimation. 
We discuss the estimation algorithm used in greater detail in section 4.4.  
2.2: Temporal Variation in Competition 
Seasonal variations in demand are likely to result in seasonally varying levels of 
competition (Figure 2). Both revenues and costs seasonally due to changes in 
competition, leading to seasonally varying profitability. We now turn to more detailed 
discussion of this phenomenon. 
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Figure 2: Total DVD Sales and New Releases 
 
Consider first papers on the impact of competition in movies. Swami, Eliashberg, and 
Weinberg (1999) study multiplex screen allocation decisions and formulate a model to 
optimize exhibitor scheduling. Ainslie, Dreze and Zufryden (2007) build on the 
BOXMOD model and study the lifecycle of a movie at the box office, measuring 
competition within a channel. Einav (2003) models the release timing game in 
theatrical channels as a sequential game of imperfect information. Foutz-Zhang and 
Kadiyali (2007) model the release timing game in the theatrical channel and find that 
pre-announcements of release dates for movies serve a strategic function to deter entry 
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into holiday weeks. 
Studios can mitigate competition by making (interim and final) release 
announcements19
Allowing for strategic complementarity and substitutability brings about the 
possibility of multiple equilibriums Announcements in our model carry the ability to 
both coordinate and/or pre-empt release timings and pricing. Depending on which pair 
of competitive interactions are being studied and depending on the revenue potential 
of the week, strategies in our model may be both strategic substitutes and/or strategic 
complements. For instance, implicit price collusion due to grim Nash reversion, can be 
sustained in the model through the presence of a punishment state (low release price), 
with the Markov kernel capturing the probability of agents entering and exiting the 
, which allow the studios to compete and cooperate on release 
schedules. There may be early/late mover advantages to announcing. For instance, as 
mentioned in the introduction, a title with large theatrical revenue might announce that 
it is releasing in a high-demand week. This might deter a title of the same genre (and 
that had a worse theatrical performance) from announcing a release in the same week.  
Or the similar title might announce the same release date, but set a lower price to 
undercut the first title. Smaller theatrical-revenue titles might prefer to announce a 
non-peak demand week where competition is less intense.  
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19The release announcements are not made in consumer outlets and hence do not serve to inform or 
influence potential consumers. They are reported in industry websites like videoeta.com. Although 
complete cached data on the history of these announcements is not available, there is strong evidence of 
titles changing announced release dates and prices. 
 58 
punishment regime. Strategies in this model are strategic complements in the collusive 
regime, and strategic substitutes in the punishment regime. 
While recent advances in game theoretical modeling have lead to estimation 
techniques for static models with multiple equilibriums, to our knowledge this is the 
first paper to allow multiple equilibriums to be played in the data. The non-stationary 
MPNE model allows “equilibrium switches” in a single path of play, as the Markov 
kernel is not restricted across multiple periods. That is, in each period, agents can 
choose to play strategies leading to a different equilibrium. Optimal strategies played 
in the data, are not restricted to being the same across different seasons and different 
years. For instance, equilibriums played over the summer may be different from 
equilibriums resulting in the holiday season. Our method describes a consistent 
estimator for payoffs in a dynamic multi-agent game, accounting for randomization 
between equilibriums. A caveat is that we do not distinguish between potential 
equilibriums and cannot identify the probability of choosing a given equilibrium in a 
period. The Perfect Bayesian evolution of the industry is the result of the equilibrium 
conditional on equilibrium choice, and the equilibrium choice probabilities.  
An important point to consider is whether these announcements reflect actual 
intentions of titles’ release timing and prices, or whether they are strategic lies or 
simply cheap talk.  In formulating a competitive dynamics model for release timing 
and price, we do not require firms to take decisions influenced by competitor 
announcements. For instance, if announcements are cheap talk, then in our model the 
Markov density will reflect the lack of information in the announcements. On the 
other hand, it is possible that announcements are not cheap talk, and are instead costly 
commitments to particular strategies.  In this case, our model provides consistent 
estimates of parameters of DVD profits, while allowing for the competitive and 
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cooperative incentives of the release timing game. Thus, the model nests cases where 
announcements do not shape release and pricing schedules observed, while allowing 
for the strategic importance of these decisions. 
In the literature, entry and post-entry competition have mostly been modeled 
separately with  extant papers on entry and entry timing, typically using two period 
static entry models (Mazzeo, 2002) in industries where the researcher observes the 
release of new products (Einav, 2003), or the entry of a firm in multiple locations 
(Seim, 2006), but not sales post release. A notable exception is Ellickson and Mishra 
(2007), who use market outcome models to enrich the description of payoffs in a static 
game.   
Our model draws on both product choice and dynamic entry models to recover studio- 
and season-specific release costs, providing a richer description of the industry. Prior 
models of release timing in movies have focused exclusively on the seasonality of 
consumer demand and competition in the week as a source for time-varying profits, 
and the explanation for observed seasonality in studio actions (Einav, 2003).  There 
are several reasons for expecting unobserved releases costs to vary over the course of 
the year. 75% of studios’ marketing budgets on average are dedicated to broadcast 
media (Galloway, 2004), where the cost of advertising varies over the course of the 
year. DVD release costs may vary as a function of the total sales in the week of 
release, as channel partners may be able to demand a better share of profits in weeks 
of high demand. The increased competition between DVDs may spill over into within-
store promotions (e.g. end cap displays) and other retailer promotional resources. 
Lastly, the growth in total DVD sales may lead to a change in release costs and retailer 
margins. We measure how release costs vary over studios, and over time, and 
incorporate the effect of changing release costs when conducting counterfactuals and 
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simulations, and compare model fits with and without release costs.  
2.3: Perishability 
We mentioned in the introduction that the lag between a title’s theatrical run and its 
DVD release (which we term inter-release timing) is likely to have implications for the 
title’s profitability. Movies lose appeal as they spend longer times between sequential 
distribution channels, a demand feature we call inter-release perishability. 
Additionally, movies lose appeal after release in a channel, a feature we call within-
channel perishability. Below, we discuss how researchers have modeled perishability 
and explain our conceptualization in our competitive equilibrium framework. 
Luan and Sudhir (2007) model the impact of cannibalization of box office revenues by 
sales and rentals of DVDs, accounting for forward looking behavior of the consumer 
at the theatre. While cannibalization of theatrical sales provides an incentive for a 
studio to increase inter-release times, the need to release a movie fresh in the minds of 
a consumer provides an incentive to decrease inter-release times. Thus they study the 
underlying tradeoffs between earlier and delayed releases in secondary channels on 
theatrical revenues.  
Three papers study optimal firm actions to maximize revenue in the sequential 
channel, when considering the perishability of a title. These papers suggest that word 
of mouth, advertising wear-out effects, and network effects can explain perishability. 
Hennig-Thurau et al. (2007) use conjoint data to study the effect of different 
configurations of sequential distributional channels on studio profitability, optimizing 
release timings across channels. Lehmann and Weinberg (2000) develop a model of 
the optimal time to enter video rentals for a movie, accounting for the cannibalization 
of sales from theatrical release. Prasad, Bronnenberg, and Mahajan (2004) use an 
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analytical model to study the effect of consumer expectations on the optimality of the 
timing decision. In their model, the duration between theatrical and DVD releases of 
earlier movies, shapes the beliefs of a forward looking-customer for a new movie. The 
studio’s decision depends on current beliefs, making it profitable to deviate from the 
industry standard, and release early. In each model, firm actions in a title are studied in 
isolation of the presence of other titles, and of seasonality.  
Movies in theaters only exhibit within-channel perishability, Ainslie et al (2007) 
separate revenue patterns in movie theaters into blockbuster patterns and sleeper 
patterns. Blockbusters peak early in the first weeks post release, and then decline in 
revenue. Sleepers peak later than blockbusters, and subsequently decline in revenue. 
Revenue patterns in DVDs are more complex as DVDs exhibit both forms of 
perishability. A consumer’s dynamic decision making process and the network effects 
in evaluating entertainment products lead to non-linearaties in the relationship 
between inter-release perishability and within channel perishability. For instance, 
longer inter-release times may lead to a saturation of the word of mouth, attracting 
more consumers in earlier weeks, and then showing faster decay post release. 
Alternatively shorter inter-release times may attract more customers in earlier weeks  
due to advertising in the box office channel, and then show faster decay post release. 
In our paper, we do not separate effects leading to wear-out and instead adopt a 
flexible 3-parameter gamma specification in the demand formulation. 
Managerially, our model can be used to understand the effect of shorter/longer average 
theater to DVD windows on DVD profits, by simulating the competitive equilibrium 
in the industry for different DVD release strategies. Extant research on the window 
between channels has focused on the change in revenue in a particular title, without 
accounting for seasonality and competition (Luan and Sudhir, 2007). Our paper 
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focuses on the competitive and seasonal aspects of release timing, and their effect on 
DVD profits. The results from simulations in our model may differ from the inference 
in models that ignore seasonality and competition. For instance, Indiana Jones 4 was 
released in theaters on May 22, 2008. A model that ignores seasonality may find that 
shorter theater to DVD windows are optimal and hence suggest a date in August or 
September 2008 for Indiana Jones 4.  However, seasonality in different channels 
suggests that optimal decisions differ based on time of theatrical release. Indiana Jones 
4 may be better served by waiting for the Christmas Holidays, postponing the DVD 
release by a period longer than the industry average theater to DVD window. 
3. Data and Model 
3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Our data comprises release dates, quantities and prices of titles per week after release, 
as well as title-specific descriptors (e.g. box office revenue, etc.) for all DVDs released 
in the United States between 2000 and 2005. We describe below the sources of these 
data and issues with them.  We also describe data we are unable to obtain, and the 
restriction this places on our model formulation and estimation. 
Nielsen Videoscan collects DVD sales data from retailers at the point of sale.  We use 
the weekly sales and price of all DVDs sold in the United States, aggregated 
nationally. Other researchers have used this dataset to study DVD sales (Elberse and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2007).  The dataset does not include Wal-Mart. In our period of 
interest, Wal-Mart was a major retailer of DVDs that carried a smaller inventory of 
possible titles than comparable national retailers. Hence, our sample may understate 
the importance of larger titles and overstate the importance of smaller titles. We 
supplement this dataset with estimates of print and advertising expenditure on movies 
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at theatrical release from SNL Kagan. We lack data on print and advertising 
expenditure (P&A) by studios on DVD. Therefore, we use production cost, P&A in 
the theatrical channel and box office revenue that are likely to be closely correlated 
with DVD P&A. 
We do not observe release costs in our dataset. Costs in the motion picture industry are 
comprised predominantly of the production costs of a movie and P&A. Production 
costs are borne upfront prior to release of a movie in the theatrical channel, and do not 
affect the release  timing of the movie. P&A costs vary seasonally, over time and by 
firm, and thus affect the release timing of the movie. In our model, we assume that 
release costs may be incurred by a studio both as a fixed fee for in-store promotions, 
and through retailer margins. For instance, the fixed release costs of releasing titles on 
DVD include the cost of in-store promotions in the post-release weeks. In-store P&A 
might cost more in weeks of peak demand, when retailers face maximum demand for 
in store advertising and shelf space. We assume titles do not face distribution 
constraints; this assumption is clearly more appropriate for this market than for the 
theatrical release market. More importantly, for reasons of tractability, we assume that 
the retailer plays no strategic role.  Another piece of missing data is that we do not 
observe the weekly release announcements of studios in our dataset. Our model 
approximates an MPNE with announcements, without data on the announcements of 
studios. 
Similar to Luan and Sudhir (2007), we restrict our study to titles released in theatrical 
channels prior to release on DVD to reduce computational load. We drop older titles 
released prior on VHS and re-released on DVD, from our sample. Some titles with 
smaller revenues, either low production cost sequels or children’s titles, may be 
released direct-to-DVD and are dropped from our sample as we expect the dropped 
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titles have a limited competitive effect on the release timing and pricing game.20
Table 5: Price Regression
 From 
2000 to 2002, the subset of data used currently for estimation, we observe the release 
of 512 titles with 5339 observations of price and quantity post release. 
In our model, prices (and release dates) are chosen by firms, given seasonal demand 
and release costs, and their rivals’ announced and actual release dates and prices. 
There is considerable price variation in DVDs that cannot be predicted from title 
characteristics; a regression of price against title characteristics has an adjusted r-
squared of 0.2237 (Table 5).  
21
 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error 
Intercept 3.29E+01 *** 5.82E-01 
Weeks Since Release (WR) -3.29E-02 *** 9.09E-03 
WR^2 5.61E-03 *** 1.64E-03 
WR^3 -2.73E-04 ** 8.45E-05 
log(Box Office) 3.72E-01 *** 2.74E-02 
 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 We can incorporate the effect of dropped titles in the model. However, the computational cost of 
additional data is overwhelming and the lack of observables on smaller titles makes demand estimates 
noisy. 
21 We suppress coefficients for movie characteristics, weekly fixed effects, distributor fixed effects. 
Signifiance codes:  '***'  0.01 '**'  0.05 '*'  0.1  
Multiple R-Squared: 0.2263,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2237  
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The strategic role of price is an important distinction between DVD releases and 
theatrical releases. In movie theaters, the price of a ticket is fixed regardless of the 
popularity of the title (Einav and Orbach, 2007). Hence, the two opposing forces when 
setting theatrical release dates are the lure of a peak demand week and the competition 
expected in that week. In our paper we study the joint evolution of two strategic 
variables (controls), release dates and prices, set simultaneously. The trade-offs 
between two strategic choices leads to outcomes that may appear to be anomalies 
when considering either variable independently. For instance, consider two movies: a 
blockbuster and a small independent movie (indie). The blockbuster is released in a 
week of peak demand, and the indie on a week of lower demand. Intuitively, we might 
expect the blockbuster to be priced higher than the indie. However, we find a negative 
correlation (-0.15) between total DVD sales in a week and the average release price of 
a new movie in the week. Thus the indie may be released at a higher price than the 
blockbuster. The joint modeling of strategic decisions allows for an explanation. In 
weeks of lower demand, there is lower short run competition. Hence, titles released in 
these weeks have higher release prices while those released in higher demand weeks, 
have lower equilibrium release prices. 
Two empirical facts simplify our analysis and estimation. First, the (retail) price of a 
DVD at release is maintained over the first few months after release, with no 
significant decrease after release. This is significantly different than previous findings 
for prices of video games and other entertainment media, where the prices of titles 
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after release decrease over time (Nair, 2007)22
In our model, each title released in the theater is a potential entrant in the DVD 
channel. In each week, a potential entrant may choose to either announce a price and 
week of release of a title, defer the announcement or change its previous 
announcement, including withdrawing the announcement altogether. Titles update 
their decisions simultaneously every week. The state of the industry is described by 
announced release dates and prices and actual release dates and prices. Pre-order 
forms from the Video Software Dealers Association indicate that final release dates 
and prices for DVDs are circulated to video stores, 4 weeks prior to the release of the 
DVD. Hence, we assume that the final release date and price decision is taken 4 weeks 
. For instance, regressing log price 
against time after release and other explanatory covariates, finds that the price of a title 
decreases by 6% on average over the course of the first 12 weeks (Table 1).  
The second industry feature is that prices for DVDs are well approximated by discrete 
levels, allowing us to treat price as a discrete variable rather than a continuous 
variable. In appendix 2, we discuss relaxing this assumption and treating price as a 
continuous variable.  Before we begin a formal discussion of the model, we discuss 
the timeline of firm actions. 
3.2: Timeline of firm actions 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 There are two explanations for the uniform price of a DVD for the first months, post release. 
Decreasing prices may lead to forward looking behavior from customers, who may wait for a price 
decrease and not purchase the DVD at the time of release. Store price guarantees, typical of retailers of 
home entertainment media, might make it unprofitable for a retailer to decrease prices after release. 
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prior to the observed final releases in our implementation but suppress the period in 
our notation.  
A limitation of our study is that we specify a model at the level of a title, and ignore 
portfolio optimization concerns of a studio: cannibalization, the effect on release costs 
from multiple releases and the effect of strategic decisions on other formats and 
channels (such as the theatrical channel and rentals). Studios managing multiple titles 
may choose to spread DVD release dates to mitigate the effect of cannibalization and 
substitution, and/or choose to cluster DVD release dates to lower release costs. We 
measure payoff changes with earlier/later release, independent of revenue on DVD, to 
capture the net effect of the release decision over all channels. However, we cannot 
disentangle between the sources of the payoff variation: substitutability with the 
theatrical channel, changes in future revenue streams, etc. While our framework and 
estimation methodology allows for these issues, the additional computational burden is 
overwhelming in our application. Last, we ignore the role of the retailer, and model 
the studio as the profit-maximizing agent responsible for release strategy choices. 
In the model, the value of a choice of an announcement implicitly includes the 
strategic value (either cheap talk or serious signaling) of making announcements, and 
accounts for both cooperative and competitive incentives. Titles maximize profits by 
choosing optimal announcements of release date and prices, in the presence of 
seasonally varying payoffs, leading to time-varying best responses for any title (as 
described in the previous section). For instance, a title may be more likely to release a 
movie if future periods have decreased demand, than if future periods have increased 
demand; the seasonality of demand leads to seasonality in the set of potential entrants 
(see Figure 2). In our model, incumbents face no strategic decisions. That is, once a 
title enters the DVD channel, it becomes part of the absorbing state of the Markov 
 68 
process in the release timing game. In our dataset, a DVD on average collects 75% of 
revenue in the first 20 weeks post release with post-DVD release. In this period, the 
price remains remarkably steady, decreasing by less than 10% of the release price (see 
Table 1). Hence, it is sensible to model only release price setting.  
Inter-release perishability implies that a studio only considers a finite number of 
periods after theatrical release for the DVD release of the movie.23
There is an important different between timing models and geographic competition 
models (see Seim (2007) and Vitorino (2007)). Both “classes” of models are interested 
in separately identifying the effect of (inter temporal and/or geographic) differences in 
profitability, and the role of competitors. However in a geographic competition game, 
two agents in a time period, either do or do not have a competitive effect on each 
other. This effect does not depend on when they entered, and is solely a function of the 
identity of each agent. In a timing game, competition is asymmetric inter-temporally. 
Movies released early do not face competition for the first weeks post release, from 
movies to be released later. Movies released later, face competition from movies 
 Our model does not 
assume that all titles must be released on DVD and is general enough to identify titles 
released in theaters which cannot be profitably released on DVD. Thus, while we 
assume that all titles play the release timing and pricing game, we allow titles to 
choose to not release on DVD.  
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Inter-release perishability implies that despite seasonal demand variations for any cost vector it is 
never profitable to release an unreleased movie after a finite number of periods. See assumption (A7) 
and lemma (L2) for a more complete treatment. 
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released early in the first weeks post release. The level of the competition faced 
diminishes with the gap between the release dates: older movies have a limited effect 
on newer movies. 
To summarize: in our model, studios evaluate the value of release announcements in 
terms of resulting release schedules. The model nests a degenerate case of cheap talk 
where announcements communicate no information between studios. The costs and 
benefits of announcing are the changes in the industry landscape due to coordinating 
and competitive responses of other studios. We identify trade-offs between higher 
demand, competition, release costs and perishability by the choice of a studio to 
release the title on DVD, concluding the release timing and pricing game.  
Our model specification is applicable when agents (firms) adjust dynamic decisions to 
changing industry landscapes. While unforeseen shocks, are accounted for in dynamic 
models that consider forward looking behavior (including our model), systematic 
industry changes of the nature described lead to a non-stationary MPNE. Other 
examples of such predictable shocks include market expansion, new product diffusion, 
changes in public policy, and release of complementor products. In the next section we 
describe the model specification. 
3.3: Studio payoffs 
We estimate the profit function per title per week. Profit is estimated in the expected 
two parts- revenue and cost.  To identify the costs of releasing a DVD, we need to 
separate between the positive effect of pricing on profits from the negative effect of 
price on quantity sold. Reduced form profit functions based solely on the release 
timing schedule do not allow us to separate the profit into these components. We use a 
market outcome model to separate the effect of underlying seasonal shocks and 
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competition on demand, from the seasonality of release costs. 
In developing the sales (market outcome) model, we have two choices. We can model 
consumer demand from first principles of utility, accounting for dynamics in 
consumer demand (as did Luan and Sudhir, 2007).  Alternatively, we can use a 
reduced-form capture of demand.  We choose the latter for the following reasons. 
First, the focus of this paper is dynamics on the supply side. Researchers in this area 
typically use reduced-form models of revenue to simplify estimation (Bajari, Benkard 
and Levin, 2007). A model of firm market share in a period, allows for a parsimonious 
mechanism to account for the effect of competitors on per period profits.  Second, our 
specification captures the relevant dynamics of inter-release and within-channel 
perishability, which are the two key dynamic elements that studios consider when 
setting release timing and pricing.24
In appendix 1, we specify our non-stationary MPNE framework, and describe 
assumptions on model primitives and the resulting equilibrium. Our operationalization 
of the general frame work is presented below. Let 
 Finally, our data are aggregate, not individual-
level (unlike Luan and Sudhir, 2007), making it less suited for structural demand 
estimation. 
,dwt dwtp x be the price and 
characteristics vector of DVD d, released in week w in time t.25
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 We are unable to account for cross-channel substitutability; that is outside the scope of this paper. 
25 For convenience we index time as number of weeks since the first week of January 2000. 
 To allow for 
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competitive effects while ensuring computationally tractability,26
dwtms
 we model the market 
share of DVD d in week w and year y,  as: 
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 where log( ) log( )dwt dwt dwt dwtp xδ α β ξ= + +  (7) 
The market share model allows us to present a richer description of the industry. In 
estimating dynamic models, the effect of other agents is approximated by a linear 
function. In practice, the assumption either leads to an exponential increase (due to an 
increased number of agents) in the number of estimated parameters. Or symmetry 
restrictions on the profit function: competition being determined by state and not by 
identity. The use of a market share (market outcome) model alleviates data and 
computational requirements. In our application, we use descriptors of titles (box office 
revenue, genre, rating, and studio/distributor identity) when calculating the 
asymmetric competitive effects of titles.  
Profits from releasing a DVD accrue post release. We write profits to a studio in 
period t from releasing a dvd d in week w as 
 ( ) ( )( ), ,dwt dwt dwt dwt dwt dwt dwtp q x p f q x pπ = −  (8) 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Market expansion (e.g. Einav (2007)) and/or a random coefficients version of the market share model 
improve predictive capabilities but increase computational burden. In general, a model that fits the light 
tail conditions described in the paper can be used instead, without affecting the proof of convergence. 
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where ( )( ),dwt dwt dwtf q x p is the marginal cost for dvd d, released in week w in time t. 
In our empirical application, we interact the movie and studio characteristics in a 
linearly additive specification: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),dwt d V dwt dwt dwt t wp x ms x p f Qπ λ γ= −  (9) 
where ( )d V dwtp xλ γ−  is the net average studio margin for dvd d, and with quantity 
calculated using the market share model and total weekly sales, ( )t wf Q . 
Perishability of the movie impacts both title payoffs and the competitive impact of the 
title. We account for diminishing appeal when calculating both the payoffs for th 
studio and the competitive impact of the movie on other titles. Further, as our titles 
differ across periods, the model adjusts to the changing sets of titles released. 
The majority of a DVD’s revenue is garnered in the first months after release. In this 
period, competition and seasonality are major determinants of sales. Sales into the 
future are affected by competition from other movies released in the same week, but 
not from newer releases coming into the market in later periods. Hence, we model 
residual sales in remaining periods post the first 12 weeks, as a function of the 
seasonality of the week of release, the competitive set of the week of release and the 
observables of the movie. Thus, total payoffs to a studio from a title come from the 
first 12 weeks of profitability and a residual value of the movie: 
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where ( )d wκ is the residual sales and ( )F dw w wx f Qγ  the release costs for dvd d, in 
week w. The general model allows dwυ to be correlated across movies and weeks dwυ
.27
As mentioned in the introduction, we face three challenges in solving for the MPNE in 
our model. First, we lack intermediate release announcements of studios, and only 
 
Our model payoffs are firm-specific. Ericson and Pakes (1995) specify a payoff 
function that depends solely on the number of studios in a particular state, and not the 
identity of the studios in that state. They model the state space using a set of counting 
measures to index the number of studios in a particular state. However, titles differ 
vastly in appeal. In our model the state representation is much richer and allows for 
observable differences between titles. The identity of a title impacts not only the 
payoffs of the DVDs but also addresses the impact of the title on other DVDs 
available concurrently. The affect of the title on the profitability of other titles depends 
on the composition of the choice set in that week. 
4. Model Estimation 
4.1: Challenges in solving for the MPNE 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 The general forms of most extant dynamic models do not admit contemporaneous correlation as 
contemporaneous correlation biases estimates of the transition function. 
 74 
observe the equilibrium final release schedule, leading to an under-identified transition 
matrix. Identification of the transition matrix and the use of Nested Fixed Point 
approaches require knowledge of the current and future state vectors, and the actions 
taken by agents. To ensure identification of the transition matrix, extant dynamic 
models have considered research questions where the state and action vectors can 
either be observed or imputed. While in our model we cannot observe all states and 
actions due to data constraints, in many applications such data remains unobserved 
due to other institutional details. For instance, privacy laws may prevent a store from 
identifying prior behavior of customers, censoring information on past decisions and 
their current state. Thus, we generalize dynamic models to settings where the 
researcher is faced with the burden of estimating on a censored dataset. 
Second, while we prove the existence of a non-stationary MPNE in our model, we 
cannot solve for the general form of the MPNE as the state transition matrix is under-
identified in a non-stationary MPNE. In the Ericson-Pakes (1995) frame work, 
identification depends on inter-temporal decisions of studios following a stationary 
Markov process (for a discussion on identification, see Berry and Tamer, 2006). In 
this frame work, the best response of a studio depends only on the industry state, and 
the state transition matrix is identified by the responses of studios to different industry 
states. In appendix 1.2, we describe the assumptions required to identify the model 
when best responses of firms change over time, and the related change in convergence 
properties. 
Third, multiple equilibriums in a dynamic model require the specification of an 
equilibrium arbitration process over future equilibriums. The transition kernel and 
value function is unique to a particular equilibrium. Hence in a dynamic model with 
multiple equilibriums, agents in a period hold beliefs over which equilibriums will be 
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played in future periods, to form expectations of future payoffs from a strategy. 
Without a methodology to arbitrate between equilibriums, the expectation over value 
functions is poorly defined. In general, randomizing between candidate equilibriums is 
in advisable as it rules out all signaling mechanisms between firms, including those 
based on observed variables. For instance, firms may know to play a particular 
equilibrium in periods of peak demand, and a different equilibrium in periods of low 
demand. It is also computationally intractable to enumerate possible equilibriums in 
the model and hence solve for the expected value of an action to an agent. 
The presence of multiple equilibriums played in the data leads to inconsistent two step 
estimation (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007) due to 
the lack of a unique reduced form. A prior approach is to assume that while the 
researcher is unaware of the equilibrium selection process, and despite knowledge of 
the potential presence of multiple mixed and pure MPNE in the model, a unique 
equilibrium is played out in the data. This assumption is strong enough to both rule out 
equilibrium selection and inconsistent estimates of transition kernels (for instance, see 
assumption (5A) and (5B) in Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007). In our data such an 
assumption is overly restrictive as it implies that all potential entrants in the six years 
of the dataset play the same equilibrium, across different holiday seasons, and in fast 
growing markets. The non-homogenous Markov kernel and choice function described 
and estimated in this paper are flexible enough to allow for the presence of multiple 
MPNEs in the data.  
In the next section, we discuss a partial information estimation approach robust to all 
three issues described. 
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4.2: Solution Concepts 
We draw from the solution concept of Oblivious Equilibrium (OE). In OE, agents are 
“oblivious” to the state distribution in a period, and optimize using Perfect Bayesian 
beliefs over candidate states. In the literature OE has been proposed in three separate 
contexts. First, in a model with a continuum of agents, MPNE and OE have been 
shown to be equivalent (Chakrabarty, 2003). Second, Krusell and Smith (1998) 
described a related model where agent behavior is derived from a response to the 
distribution of aggregate wealth rather than the precise allocation of wealth across 
agents, defending the solution concept as a behavioral model of agents in large 
markets. Third, Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007) show that OE approximate 
MPNE models. They present error bounds for a model with a homogenous transition 
matrix and show that estimates of an OE converge to estimates from a MPNE in the 
context of large competitive industries where market shares decrease with the number 
of firms, particularly in a model using a logit market share function. In appendix 1.2 
we show that given our choice of a logit market share function, estimates in our model 
converge to MPNE estimates despite the non-stationarity of the Markov kernel. We 
validate the model estimation by comparing agent actions forecasted with observed 
behavior, and compute an upper bound on the difference between OE and MPNE 
predictions. 
Specifically, we replace the current state of the industry with a distribution over 
candidate state vectors that reflect the probability of observing the candidate vector in 
the time period. Rewrite the state vector as  
 { },t t tR URδ δ δ=  (11) 
where tRδ is the state vector for all movies released by time t, and 
t
URδ is the state 
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vector for all titles unreleased at time t. Thus, we replace tURδ , the unobserved state 
variables, with the distribution over candidate states consistent with Perfect Bayesian 
equilibriums. Equilibrium beliefs are neither imposed nor recovered from the data due 
to the under identified transition matrix. 
The non-homogenous first order transition matrix requires us to write a period-specific 
choice function. We integrate over next period choice functions using the current 
periods’ transition matrix  ( )|tψ δ δ′ for each candidate vector and over all possible 
candidate vectors for the current period. 
 
1| 1 ( 1)( , , , ; ) ( , , , ; ) ( , , ; )t t t
M M
t it t t t it it t t t t i t tV x s a x a E E E V x aδ δ δ υυ θ π δ υ θ β θ+ + += +  (12) 
(12) specifies a time-varying choice function in the model, due to  the time-varying 
transition matrix. A non-stationary Markov strategy in the model for the studio is a 
function :Mit Aσ ν∆× → . A non-stationary Markov strategy profile in model,
M
tσ is a 
set of non-stationary Markov strategies in the model, for each studio, period t. In the 
model, the necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions are 
 ( ) ( ); ; , , , , , , , ,M M M M M Mt t t it it itV V i t I Tδ σ δ σ σ δ σ−′ ′≥ ∀ ∈ ∆ Σ  (13) 
We draw on a strategy similar to extant static models of entry (eg. Bresnahan and 
Reiss, 1990) that use necessary conditions common to all equilibriums. The precise 
difference in strategic behavior of agents in our model and in a specific MPNE cannot 
be found without solving for the MPNE. Our model uses week-specific distributions 
over candidate state vectors without separating between MPNE equilibriums being 
played in the date or specifying the probability of playing a given equilibrium. 
In appendix 1.2, we discuss the difference between our model and a stationary 
Oblivious Equilibrium (OE). Weintraub et al (2007) derive a theorem that shows that 
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payoffs estimated using OE converge to payoffs estimated in a stationary MPNE. We 
discuss how to extend their results to our setting and show that payoffs found in the 
partial information estimator, converge to payoffs found in a full information non-
stationary MPNE. 
4.3: Model Estimation 
As stated before, the OE estimation methodology proposed by Weintraub, Benkard 
and Roy (2007) is not appropriate for our setting due to the censored state space, non-
homogenous Markov transition matrix and agent asymmetries in profit function. We 
first discuss an alternative characterization of the best response function and the 
resulting equilibrium, and then the use of these conditions in our estimation procedure.  
In appendix 1.3, theorem (T1) implies agent playing the best response (making the 
optimal release announcement) in a period equivalently ensures the choice of an 
optimal absorbing state (final release date and price), accounting for the competitor’s 
responses over the course of play. Hence (T1) shows that per period best responses 
can be translated into across period conditions on the choice of absorbing states. Note 
that the equilibrium description does not assume that other agents do not respond to 
the out-of-equilibrium actions of an agent. The assumption that actions, conditional on 
the path of play, are optimal across periods is a result of per period best response 
strategies of agents. 
The re-characterization is intuitive: the underlying purpose of release announcements 
in the timing game is to ensure a path to the optimal period and price of release. 
Formally, in maximizing payoffs in a period, an agent engages in play to ensure that 
the course of play leads to the maximum payoffs for the agent, across multiple 
periods. The variation in profits from different release dates and prices stems from the 
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seasonality of underlying demand and release costs, the endogenous evolution of 
competition as a response to the seasonal demand, and the effect of perishability on 
title profits.  
Identification in the model is driven by comparing payoffs from releasing the movie, 
an absorbing state in the Markov process, with continuing in the game. This 
identification strategy has parallels to the literature in single agent dynamic 
programming problems where the agent has to decide the optimal stopping time (Rust, 
1987), in an environment where payoffs from stopping vary over time. The optimal 
strategy in our model either prescribes releasing or deferring the release of the movie 
in a week, by maintaining a future release date, or choosing to postpone the release. 
An observed release indicates the studio found it optimal to maintain or choose the 
week and price as its announced release date and price respectively. Backtracking 
from the end of the finite planning horizon and recursively defining the value function, 
we implicitly construct the continuation value of deferring release. Hence, our 
estimator compares computed best response stopping points in the model and the 
decisions of studios to estimate trade-offs between equilibrium forces. 
Our estimation and identification strategy is different from extant methods. In extant 
models, agent actions in a period, conditional on the Markov density, are best 
responses at equilibrium. In our model, the under-identified Markov density cannot 
identify the precise best response of the agent in the period.  Instead, similar to prior 
Dynamic Stochastic Discrete Choice models (for a summary, see Ackerberg, Benkard, 
Berry, Pakes, 2007) we use a “two-step” method to calculate profits from conjectured 
releases. We forecast the industry evolution of the market, by modeling the evolution 
of the sufficient statistic. Titles that have been released have no further strategic 
decisions associated to them and are absorbing states in the Markov chain. The 
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presence of an absorbing state and the forecasts of future industry environments, allow 
us calculate optimal release dates and prices. Next, we use estimates from the first 
period to find optimal release dates and prices of studios and maximize the quasi-
likelihood.  
However, in our model, unlike extant optimal stopping time models, the stopping 
decision of a firm depends on actions of other agents. In our approach, an agent makes 
an optimal decision while accounting for the behavior of other agents under the 
oblivious assumption. Thus, agent behavior in our model may differ from agent 
behavior in a MPNE. The use of a distribution instead of the information of actual 
agent state and hence future behavior implies an increased uncertainty which is 
manifest in the model as the difference in equilibrium outcomes in the MPNE and our 
model. The long term variance of the forecast is the sum of the long term or average 
variance of the true forecast generated in the MPNE, the residual variance of the 
forecasting equation and the average variance of the difference between the partial 
information approach and a complete information MPNE specification. Thus, the 
average difference between our model and the MPNE is bound by the mean sample 
variance of forecast errors. 
While we can bound the degree of imprecision introduced by censored information 
(when compared to full information predictions), we cannot characterize the loss of 
efficiency in our model over a full information model. Our first stage estimates may be 
inefficient as they do not use the structural elements of the model. And we estimate 
the model without conditions on equilibrium actions, specifying the appropriate 
release announcement strategy, in each period. (T1) does not imply that our approach 
is econometrically efficient. 
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As the best response in our model is a unique strictly dominant strategy, the found 
equilibrium is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. Hence, 
econometrically an important difference between extant solutions of the MPNE model 
and our approach is that our estimators are econometrically complete in the presence 
of multiple equilibriums (Tamer, 2003). In extant dynamic MPNE models, multiple 
equilibriums make the MPNE model, even when the complete state and action space is 
observed, incomplete econometrically. In contrast, our estimators are consistent for all 
equilibriums and can be used without identifying equilibriums. 
The estimation method described in the next section, uses (T1) and is general enough 
for any game with accrual of payoffs in periods after the choice of the absorbing state. 
This is a natural assumption in a game of release timing, where payoffs accrue post 
entry, but may not be a valid assumption in other games. 
4.4: Estimation Algorithm 
Our estimation algorithm has 4 steps: 
Step 1: Market share Estimation 
Estimate the market share model to scale. Let dwts be the market share of dvd d in time 
t, in quantities. Define the geometric mean of in group market shares as
1ln( ) ln( )
t
g
t iwt
t i C
s s
N ∈
= ∑  . Then from (7):  
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Coefficients of the market share and residual sales models in our application are 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares28. Identification and regularity conditions of 
the market outcome function have been well established in the literature. Parameter 
estimates from the first step are consistent in release timing games, but may not be 
consistent in entry/exit games. For instance, Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2004), first 
estimate outcome values from exit decisions and then impute them in the second step 
of the estimation routine. The selective exit of firms in an entry/exit model may lead to 
a selection bias in the market outcome equation (first step), if estimated separately.29
We forecast a sufficient statistic to describe the effect of other agents on an agent’s 
profits from release. An infeasible estimator can use the iterated Markov kernel to 
compute the described profit values of an agent across periods, under the assumption 
of optimal play. The kernel is under-identified in our application. Hence, instead we 
 
In our release timing game, almost all titles released in theaters are released on DVD 
and hence are present in the first stage of estimation, ensuring consistency. 
Step 2: Forecast the sufficient statistic 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Clustering errors by week and using White’s correction for heteroskedasticity does not improve fits 
and/or predictions. 
29 Entry selection bias can be corrected by using a control function of consistent estimates of the timing 
decisions of firms. 
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form a reduced form forecast of the evolution of the industry and assess the optimality 
of actions of studios when faced with the evolution of the industry.  
A consistent forecast of a sufficient statistic can be formed in our research problem by 
looking at the seasonality of demand in a finite set of future periods. Inter-release 
perishability allows us to assume the existence of a finite end of the game, beyond 
which release is no longer profitable (see Lemma 2 in appendix 1.1). In our empirical 
application, we set nine months as the end of the release game and assume that titles 
which were not released nine months after theatrical release, exit the release game. By 
implication, agent decisions involve seasonality over the planning horizon, and the 
current level of the sufficient statistic. 
In our application, we use ( )exp
t
fs t it
i
s s δ
∈
= ∑

  and forecast ( ) | tt t URE Es δ   . The 
summary statistic is a measure of the number and strength of competitors, but is 
independent of the identity of competitors. Figure 3 shows empirical validation of the 
chosen summary statistic. In periods of peak DVD sales, the summary statistic is 
higher for released movies, indicating that the best movies were released. In contrast 
in periods of non peak sales, the summary statistic is higher for non released movies, 
indicating that the best movies were retained by studios for later release, in coming 
weeks of higher demand. The evolution of the industry is regressed on the current 
industry state, seasonality and future entrant vector: 
 ( )( 1)log( ) logdt fs d t t zs s zθ θ τ−= + +  (15) 
 84 
 
Figure 3: Total DVD Sales and Industry Evolution 
 
Market share parameter (step 1) estimates are root-n consistent. Hence, forecasts of 
the sufficient statistic in our model are root-n consistent, and converge in probability 
to the true sufficient statistic. 
Step 3: Compute sales from release dates and prices 
We construct the empirical analog of the conjectured profits when releasing in a 
period. Forecasts from step 2, allow us to define expected payoffs from future actions. 
Using the market share model and a forecast of sales, we can compute expected total 
quantities of products sold for every given choice of release date and price. Hence for 
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each agent, in every time period that the agent was in the timing game, we compute 
sales for feasible release date, price combination for the agent within the planning 
horizon. 
Step 4: Maximize the Quasi-Likelihood 
Our first stage estimates of the summary statistic are consistent, but in a finite sample 
are (with probability 1) not true parameter values. Using the sales estimated from step 
3, we specify a quasi-likelihood estimation approach using a parametric specification 
of the payoff shock. Regularity conditions and other assumptions for the estimation 
are discussed in appendix 1.4. We use Richardson simplification to find ( )ssA θ and 
the Eicker-Huber-White estimator for ( )ssB θ . If imputations of the summary statistic
fss  are heteroskedastic or autocorrelated, then standard errors of the sandwich 
estimator can be corrected by appropriately weighting the estimation function (Zeilies, 
2006).We choose to use a quasi-likelihood-based method to maximize efficiency and 
ensure consistency of the standard error estimates. In an under identified model, 
similar to Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) one can instead follow Chernuzhov, Hong 
and Tamer (2007). Their estimator uses set identification to find parameters that 
describe difference equilibriums supported by the data minimizing a criterion function 
that penalizes violations of the best response function. The likelihood based approach 
is more efficient in the point-identified model, and produces precise standard errors of 
estimated parameters. In general, finding equilibriums in dynamic game models is 
computationally demanding. Most MPNE solutions increase exponentially in 
computational complexity and cost, with the number of agents in the model. In 
contrast, we are able to estimate on sets of potential entrants (on the order of 40 
potential entrants in a period) larger than prior work on release timings as our model 
increases linearly in computational load, with the number of agents. The derived 
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quasi-likelihood in our application is globally concave with closed form derivatives, 
further reducing computational load. 
4.5: Identification 
While the general framework of the model admits under-identified models, our model 
specification is point-identified. The identification of release costs comes from the 
effect on release decisions, of inter-release time, seasonal industry demand, and 
revenue from the title post release. Comparing across titles that could achieve the 
same revenue, we can identify differences specific to the attributes of the title. 
Specifically, studio margins are a function of the movie’s characteristics (including 
inter-release time and time since release). The quantity sold in our model from a 
release date and price combination, is the product of the market share and the seasonal 
size of the market ( ) ( ),smwt smwt t wms x p f Q . A change in margins, affects profits 
depending on the revenue from the title. Hence the coefficients of studio margin are 
identified through the change in revenue with different choices of release strategies. 
Fγ is the vector of coefficients of the release cost function, identified through the 
change in industry sales of DVDs in the weeks post release. Studio differences in 
margins and release costs are identified in the model through differences in release 
behavior for similar titles in similar weeks, across studios.   
The underlying variation identifying release costs are the different market shares and 
seasonal market sizes across different weeks, for different release dates and prices. 
The variation is induced by the underlying seasonality of demand, endogenous 
evolution of competition (choices of other studios) and perishability. There are two 
limitations to this approach: we cannot identify any release costs that are constant 
across the different weeks as they do not figure into the release timing optimization, 
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and we are only identified to scale.30
We find that market share is well predicted by the print and ad spending of a movie, 
 Our specification is similar to specifications used 
in complete information models. The described model frame work is general enough 
to allow variables unobserved by the econometrician but observed by agents (common 
un-observables). Common unobservables lead to decisions of agents being 
contemporaneous correlated. Similar to complete information models (Gallant, Hong 
and Khwaja, 2008), our estimators remain consistent under the assumption that 
common unobservables are orthogonal to observables but potentially correlated with 
private information shocks. However unlike extant complete information models we 
maintain restrictions on unobservables and shocks being independent over time. A 
complete information model assumes away elements of pre-emption and learning. The 
presence of private information potentially correlated with the common un-
observables, implies that allowing serial correlation may lead to “learning” in the 
game described. The resulting model is beyond the scope of our research. Further, we 
restrict out attention to identification and estimation of our model in this paper for the 
parametric form. In future research, we plan to show that our model is semi-
parametrically identified, and can be estimated using an extension of the approach of 
Hong and Shum (2007).  
4.6: Results  
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 One can identify scale through the assumption on a discount factor that is less than 1. Identification to 
scale is adequate to build the counterfactuals and simulations that form the major substantive 
contribution of the paper. 
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which is positively correlated with larger box office revenues.  Larger number of 
weeks since theatrical release significantly decreases the attractiveness of the movie.31
Table 6: Coefficients of DVD Market Share
 
As in Lehmann and Weinberg (2000), we find that larger box office revenue and 
greater screen-weeks exposure predicts higher consumer utility. Similar to Luan and 
Sudhir (2007), we find that longer inter-release times between channels decreases 
consumer utility. (See Table 6) 
 
32
 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error 
(Intercept) -4.060 ** 1.347 
Price -0.199 *** 0.021 
log(Price) 1.674 *** 0.342 
Weeks Since Release (WR) -0.754 *** 0.026 
Inter-release (IR) -0.160 *** 0.019 
log(WR) 3.702 *** 0.077 
log(IR) 3.724 *** 0.496 
log(Box Office) 0.909 *** 0.018 
WR*IR -0.0008 0.0009 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 We try different time specifications and do not see a difference in fit across different specifications, 
including higher order polynomials of time spent in channel.   
32 Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*'0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.6019, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5871 
We suppress coefficients for movie characteristics, weekly fixed effects, distributor fixed effects. 
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We regress the residual sales (sum of revenue in week 13 to week 24 after DVD 
release) on industry and movie characteristics (see Table 7). While the DVD market 
share in the first weeks after release is negatively affected by better movies, residual 
DVD market share is positively affected by the release of better movies at the same 
time as the DVD. The measured complementarity of titles may arise due to better 
releases increasings store visits to DVD retailers, and hence the number of older titles 
sold. 
Table 7: Coefficients of Residual DVD Sales33
 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error 
(Intercept) 5.31E+00 ** 1.79E+00 
Industry Sales (week released) 9.39E-08 * 4.23E-08 
Industry Sales (11 weeks after release) -4.74E-08 4.79E-08 
Industry Sales (Average over weeks 13-23) 1.30E-07 ** 4.10E-08 
Industry Competition (week released) 1.63E-07 3.07E-07 
Industry Competition (11 weeks after 
release) 1.53E-06 ** 4.62E-07 
 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 We suppress coefficients for movie characteristics, weekly fixed effects, distributor 
fixed effects. Significance codes: 0 '***'  0.001 '**'  0.01 '*'0.05 ' .'  0.1 '  '  1 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.826, Adjusted R-squared: 0.809 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Unreleased Industry Competition (week 
released) 1.59E-05 ** 6.05E-06 
Unreleased Industry Competition (11 
weeks after release) 1.57E-05 1.22E-05 
Price -5.78E-02 * 2.64E-02 
log(Price) 8.21E-01 * 3.66E-01 
Inter-release (IR) -1.64E-02 2.58E-02 
log(IR) -3.60E-01 7.07E-01 
log(Box Office) 9.63E-01 *** 3.07E-02 
 
Estimates of DVD release costs (structural supply parameters estimated in the second 
stage) are in Table 8.34
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Due to the computational burden results have been estimated on data for 200-2002 for now. We will 
shortly estimate the model on the entire 2000-2005 data.  
  Our results indicate that release costs are seasonal, and are 
higher in weeks of peak demand. We find that movies that performed better at the box 
office, controlling for the increased sales on DVD, face lower net DVD release costs. 
We also find that movies that spend a longer time between the channels, have a longer 
inter release period, sell fewer copies due to the decreased market potential and incur 
higher release costs. Hence, a model ignoring release costs would overcluster optimal 
release predictions in weeks of peak demand, as it would ignore changes in release 
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costs. Finally, both marginal release costs and fixed release costs differ across studios, 
genres and ratings.  Our simulation results corroborate our prior explanation of the 
pricing anomaly. Regressing optimal release prices suggested by the model on 
seasonal demand variation shows that the model predicts lower prices for movies in 
weeks of peak demand. For every standard deviation increase in industry demand for 
the week of release, the simulation suggests a decrease of 16 cents in DVD release 
price. 
Table 8: Coefficients of Release Costs35
 
 
 
 Estimate Std. Error 
Margins 
Seasonal variation 14.58 *** 9.02E-01 
lg(Box Office) -2.65 *** 9.15E-02 
Inter-Release (IR) 23.37 *** 5.13E+00 
IR^2 -6.69 *** 1.04E+00 
Residual Sums 
Seasonal variation 0.11 *** 2.81E-02 
lg(Box Office) -0.008 . 4.74E-03 
IR 1.90 *** 1.22E-01 
IR^2 0.09 *** 2.49E-02 
 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*'0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
We suppress coefficients for movie characteristics, weekly fixed effects, distributor 
fixed effects. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Fixed Release 
Costs 
Seasonal variation 66.71 ** 2.32E+01 
lg(Box Office) -14.93 *** 2.52E+00 
IR -222 . 1.32E+02 
IR^2 42.92 * 2.11E+01 
IR 
Seasonal variation 26.68 *** 3.16E+00 
lg(Box Office) -2.72 * 1.12E+00 
 
IR^2 
Seasonal variation -4.29 *** 4.94E-01 
lg(Box Office) 0.39 * 1.80E-01 
 
4.7: Model Fit and Validation 
The estimators of industry evolution are fairly accurate, indicating a reasonable model 
fit. In both Figure 4 and Figure 5, residual variance and forecast error is limited. The R 
squared of the 10 week future forecast equation is 0.9267 and R squared of the 30 
week future forecast equation is 0.9114.  
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Figure 4: Forecasting 10 Weeks into the Future 
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Figure 5: Forecasting 30 Weeks into the Future 
 
 We compared our in-sample model fits, with two alternative specifications: 
i. M0: Reduced form model of prices and Theater-to-DVD window as a function 
of title characteristics 
ii. M1: Dynamic model with release costs set to zero. 
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Figure 6: Histogram of Release Date Forecast Errors 
 
The mean absolute error in predicting release dates for M0 is 4.73 weeks. Our model 
has a MAE of 4.05 weeks while M1 has a MAE of 4.27 weeks over the entire sample. 
Figure 6 is a histogram of absolute errors in release date prediction for our model, 
across the entire sample. For short term predictions (observed release in the coming 10 
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weeks), the model has a MAE of 2.86 weeks, while M1 has a MAE of 2.91 weeks. As 
expected the model performs better on nearer term than longer term predictions. We 
predict the release price with an accuracy of 52%36
Substantively, we are able to measure unobserved release costs, allowing for both firm 
and title heterogeneity in the release cost function. We contribute to the literature 
. 
5. Conclusion 
DVD sales are a major source of studio profitability. As weekly sales vary 
dramatically over the year and the majority of sales for a title are made in the first 
weeks post release, the timing and pricing of a DVD release is a major strategic 
decision for studios. In this paper, we model the dynamic game of pre-emption and 
coordination played by studios when deciding the joint decisions of release date and 
price on DVD. In particular, we study the impact of seasonally varying demand, 
competition and release costs on the evolution of competition and release timing and 
pricing decisions, in the industry. An issue in estimation is that when setting release 
dates, studios use weekly announcements to mitigate competition in setting release 
and pricing schedules. Not accounting for these announcements might lead to biased 
estimates of the release timing and pricing game.  We show how to account for these 
unobserved announcements to obtain robust estimates of this competitive timing and 
pricing games among DVD titles. 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 We use 7 levels of price: $0-$5, $5-$10, …$30 and above.  
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methodologically by developing estimation routines for models in which extant 
estimation methodology cannot solve for MPNE. We do not observe release 
announcements, and hence estimate the model on a censored state space. The policy 
functions of studios for determining release strategies change due to the variation in 
payoffs and the growth of the industry, leading to a non-stationary Markov process. 
Agent asymmetries prevent the use of counting measures for states to account for the 
impact of competition on studio profitability. Our estimators are econometrically 
complete, computationally tractable, and show reasonable predictive accuracy despite 
these constraints. 
A limitation of our paper is that we assume that firms seek to maximize profits on 
DVD, ignoring positive network externalities on future channels and optimization over 
multiple titles. While theoretically the model scales to both multiple channels and 
portfolio optimization, a lack of data on other channels and the accompanying 
dramatic increase in computational cost, limit the empirical application.  
A technical limitation of the model is that in using a simultaneous game of incomplete 
information, we are subject to the regret critique. Studios in our model make decisions 
on the basis of their own private information and beliefs on the actions of other agents, 
and cannot revisit their decisions. In contrast, in a sequential game, actions of rivals 
reveal private information, and hence may potentially lead to different best responses.  
These questions deserve further exploration in future research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MANAGING THE FORMAT TRANSITION FROM VHS TO DVD: 
THE CASE OF PRICING AND AVAILABILITY OF VHS VERSUS DVD 
 
 1. Introduction 
When industries find themselves at the cross-roads of technological changes, firms in 
the industry can make choices to speed along new technology diffusion or try to slow 
it down.  In this paper, I examine the various incentives that firms face to support the 
old versus the new technology; these incentives stem from demand, cost and 
competitive dynamics.  I address this question in the context of movie studios in the 
U.S. during 1997-2005 deciding whether to release movies or “titles” in the old 
platform of Video Home Disc (VHS), or the new Digital Video Disc (DVD) platform.  
DVDs provided better picture and sound quality than VHS tapes, and came with 
special features in addition to the primary programming content (movie). For 
simplicity and because of my current lack of data, I will abstract from the hardware or 
DVD player market in this paper.  Therefore, the key drivers of consumer adoption 
and hence studio profits and technology diffusion in my model are whether studios 
released titles in VHS or DVD, and how they priced them.   
To see how these firm choice variables influence their profits, for simplicity consider 
the incentive for any single firm in this industry, and consider two levels of prices- 
high and low- and two levels of product availability in the new format- high and low.  
If a studio releases several titles in DVD at low prices and its rivals continue to release 
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in VHS, this studio will capture short-term profits from customer adoption. A 
disadvantage of this penetration pricing scheme is that in the longer term, consumers 
might not be willing to pay higher prices, and therefore a low entry price might set up 
self-fulfilling expectations of low prices in the future.  An advantage of penetration 
pricing is of course a larger customer base.  The studio also could have scaled back the 
availability of titles at this low price, but that would have slowed adoption.   
Additionally, now consider competitive concerns a studio might face. The home video 
markets show indirect network externalities: customer adoption might have been faster 
if more studios had also released in this format. More studios releasing in this format 
also means direct cannibalization of demand.  Similarly, if rival studios also adopt 
penetration pricing to encourage adoption, it is harder to coordinate a future price 
increase.  Rival studios releasing many titles on a higher price might not help with 
adoption, or hurt this studio’s profits if consumers are willing to pay higher prices for 
rival (and even this studio) titles.  Therefore, rivals’ actions can be simultaneously 
both strategic substitutes and strategic complements in this game with indirect network 
externalities.   
Note too that there are asymmetries among studio incentives to push the new platform 
over the old one.  First, larger studios with more titles might be better able to spread 
the cost of promoting the new platform over more titles than smaller studios.  Also, 
some genres of movies (e.g. action movies) might benefit more from the new 
platform, whereas others do not (e.g. children’s movies due to the comparable 
indifference towards sound and video quality, and the simpler operation and 
robustness to rough handling of VHS tape).  
To understand this complexity of competitive interactions, I employ a dynamic games 
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framework to model studio pricing and platform choice for title releases.  This is a 
natural tool to study my research question for several reasons. Firm’s incentives when 
pricing and releasing titles depend on the current and future actions of competitors. 
Setting optimal prices and availability across multiple formats involves conjectures of 
present and future competition, adoption behavior (characterization of how many, and 
which consumers adopted), and industry support for the format.  In my dynamic game, 
these variables are considered as states. Firms may either cooperate: set strategies to 
ensure consumer adoption, or choose to free ride on the efforts of other firms. Hence, 
the conduct of the industry determines pricing policies.   
There are two challenges in estimating dynamic models with multiple equilibriums. 
First, extant dynamic models are econometrically incomplete when faced with 
multiple equilibriums, because the recovered estimate of the transition matrix is under-
identified in the model. Second, agents in games with multiple equilibriums, hold 
beliefs on future equilibrium choices that define the value of each action. Past research 
has taken two approaches to this issue.  First, researchers have assumed that the 
despite the potential presence of multiple equilibriums in the data, a single unique 
equilibrium is played in sample (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002). Second, researchers 
have constrained the strategy space in order to ensure the uniqueness of equilibriums 
estimated. Neither of these approaches is sensible for my application. In the presence 
of multiple possible equilibriums and especially in the presence of strategic substitutes 
and complements, outcomes observed will likely correspond to different equilibriums 
played out over the time period. Alternatively, to restrict strategic complementarity or 
substitutability requires demand function assumptions that are restrictive. This paper 
describes an admissible sub-game perfect selection mechanism that allows firms to 
arbitrate (choose) between equilibriums. The selection mechanism provides a 
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(probabilistic) mapping between equilibriums: for any history of actions or states, the 
mechanism defines the probability of firms choosing a particular equilibrium. I show 
that if a particular equilibrium is chosen by other firms, it is sub-game perfect for the 
firm to choose the same equilibrium (the mechanism is sub-game perfect). Knowledge 
of the sub-game perfect mechanism in turn allows a firm to choose appropriately 
between actions in a period, using rational beliefs on future equilibrium choices. 
Hence, econometrically, the selection mechanism allows me to write the probability of 
an action in a period, both by restricting the beliefs of agents and weighting the policy 
functions in a period. Using the likelihood of actions, I describe two estimators: an 
efficient but computationally expensive full information maximum likelihood 
estimator and an inefficient but comparatively computationally inexpensive pseudo-
likelihood estimator. Both estimators require Mathematical Programming with 
Equilibrium Constraints based optimization routines, which have been described in the 
recent literature (see Vitorino, 2008 for a summary). While my preliminary results 
support the estimation methodology, I limit the scope of this paper to a set of 
simulations to motivate the methodological contribution, and a description of the 
estimators. The simulations characterize the dependence of firm actions on key trade-
offs between competitive and cooperative forces, in and across periods. 
In future work, I intend to compare these estimators on both simulated and market data 
(described herein), to draw inferences on the dynamics of cooperative and competitive 
behavior in the industry. In particular the future goal is to look to answer: what were 
possible evolutionary paths for the industry? Which of these paths were chosen in the 
data and what governed these choices? What was the importance of cannibalization 
and substitution between formats, in determining the equilibrium actions? How would 
equilibrium pathways change if model primitives changed? 
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The equilibrium selection frame works, and suggested estimation techniques, are 
general enough to account for many other dynamic games with multiple equilibriums. 
My research question has direct parallels with the current format transition to Blue 
Ray (dominant high definition disc format) from DVDs.  Generalizing further, several 
other markets display similar features e.g. digital cameras, memory, etc where not all 
firms need to use one compatible format.  More broadly, the estimation methodology 
is useful for any industry where rivals both cooperate and compete.   
The rest of the paper is organized hence. In §2 I discuss the related marketing and 
economics literature. §3 describes the data and §4 informally presents the game being 
modeled. §5 extends the MPNE model to allow for a multiplicity of equilibriums, and 
the econometric analysis of the estimators proposed. §6 discusses simulations of the 
model, and results obtained. The last section concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
I discuss extant literature in the next three subsections. First, I discuss related literature 
studying the movie industry. Next I discuss the literature studying technology platform 
battles in markets, and the strategic decisions of firms in platform markets. Last, I 
discuss the dynamic games literature and focus on my methodological contributions to 
the MPNE solution concept. 
2.1: Movie industry 
The movie industry has invited considerable attention from several marketing and 
economics scholars (see Eliashberg, Elberse and Leenders, 2006, for a summary). I 
focus my discussion here on models of competition within a exhibition channel (e.g. 
theatrical) and across channels (e.g. theatrical and DVD) in this industry 
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Three papers have proposed static models of within-channel competition, looking at 
the direct effect of release timing decisions of competitors on sales. Swami, 
Eliashberg, and Weinberg (1999) study multiplex screen allocation decisions and 
formulate a model to optimize exhibitor scheduling to mitigate the substitutive effects 
of competing movies. Ainslie, Dreze and Zufryden (2007), build a market share model 
that extends the BOXMOD model to study the lifecycle of a movie at the box office, 
measuring the lifecycle substitution effects of competition within a channel. Einav 
(2007) presents an empirical analysis of release timings in the U.S. movie industry, 
studying both seasonality and competition which incorporates the effect of seasonality 
in the study of competition. In a companion paper, these estimates are used to study 
the timing game, and optimal timings calculated for the industry (Einav, 2003). My 
paper studies release timing and pricing decisions in a dynamic context, where profits 
in future periods depend on current period prices and releases. 
Competition across channels has typically been modeled for any single movie (see 
Lehmann and Weinberg (2000), Prasad, Bronnenberg, and Mahajan (2004) for 
theoretical models of such competition).  For example, Luan and Sudhir (2007) model 
the impact of cannibalization of sales and rentals of movies, on box office revenues, 
accounting for forward looking behavior of the consumer at the theatre.  My paper 
additionally studies strategic decisions for multiple titles across multiple channels, 
extending insights to settings with portfolio optimization. For instance, while it may 
be optimal for a single studio to deviate and shorten the theater-to-DVD window, as 
concluded in Prasad, Bronnenberg and Mahajan (2004), cheating on the industry 
compact may lead to other studios punishing the studio by releasing early in future 
games. Hence longer theater-to-DVD windows may be sub-game perfect equilibriums 
in a dynamic setting. 
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Two papers study movies in a multiple channel setting. First, Hennig-Thurau et al, 
2007, use individual level discrete choice data to study the effect on studio 
profitability of different configurations of sequential distributional channels, 
optimizing release timings across these channels. As their goal is to study hypothetical 
configurations vastly different from current market conditions, they use conjoint data 
to model channel substitution, without accounting separately for either 
complementarities or market expansion. Second, Chiou (2007) models seasonal 
demand variation in secondary channels, controlling for competitive interactions 
within the rental revenue channel and in DVD and VHS sales.  While both papers 
study the effect on demand of different product release strategies, my paper models 
the resulting supply side game due to the direct and indirect demand effects. 
2.2: Platform competition 
Diffusion models studying the adoption of platform products, or those with (direct 
and) indirect network externalities, have a rich history in marketing and offer an 
excellent way to capture competitive dynamics in a reduced-form way (for a review 
see Hauser, Tellis and Griffin, 2005). Other papers have explored consumer decision-
making in such markets. For eg: Basu, Majumdar and Raj (2003) measure the 
externality sensitiveness of attributes, and hence the difference in externality imposed 
on different products.  My paper differs from these by modeling the supply-side or 
competition among firms in a structural model and in more detail. 
The paper closest to mine is Gupta, Jain and Sawhney (1999) who use a latent class 
probit model to model a consumer’s adoption decision and then study the actions of 
competing firms in the High Definition Television market. Conceptually, they also 
seek to address the trade-offs between decisions supporting and hindering the adoption 
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of the new platform. They address their question at a new product, prior to launch and 
use stated preferences (firm responses captured through a modified Delphi method) to 
model the evolution of the industry. My research question examines industry behavior 
post hoc to understand the role of competition, substitution and complementarity 
dynamics in the decisions of firms. My model is richer in being extendable to more 
strategies and in explicitly modeling the role of exogenous fluctuations in both 
consumer demand and supply, on equilibrium firm actions. 
Other papers have proposed structural models of markets with platforms. In Nair, 
Chintagunta and Dube’s (2004) model, consumer’s adoption decision of a gaming 
console depends on the availability and prices of games (titles) in the current period. 
They specify a static supply-side game where they measure both the effect of software 
availability on hardware demand, and the effect of hardware demand on software 
availability.  They assume a symmetric equilibrium, unlike my model where the 
differentiation among products is reflected in their optimal price and release strategy. 
Nair (2007) models the game between forward looking consumers and forward 
looking firms, in a monopolistically competitive industry (the video game software 
industry).  He does not model demand complementarities, i.e. products do not 
contribute to the adoption of the format.  This assumption is not a good one for my 
industry where titles can be strong substitutes in consumption and complements in the 
adoption of the technology.  Dube, Hitsch and Chintagunta (2008) estimate their 
model on the video game industry, where hardware firms set the prices of consoles 
and hence determine adoption. Software firms are undifferentiated in their model, and 
provide software until the market is saturated. In contrast, the focus of my paper is the 
conflict in interests in a network-externality situation between short-term decisions to 
maximize adoption and long-term profitability of the platform in a market with 
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multiple firms. 
Hence my model addresses a gap in the extant structural literature in building a 
dynamic competitive model for portfolio optimizing strategic decision. I explicitly 
model the coexistence of strategic complementarity and substitutions in firm actions 
when firms play in both the old and new technology platform markets.   
2.3: Dynamic games 
Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium models have been used to study marketing strategic 
decisions, which depend both on current and future choices of competitors. Most 
extant papers have focused on extending the Ericsson and Pakes (1995) frame work 
for analyzing dynamic entry and exit decisions taken by multiple firms in an 
oligopoly. In the original application, entry of firms was assumed to have a negative 
effect on other firms (strategic substitutes). Since then, their framework has been 
extended with methodological advances, to cases where the strategic space is much 
richer. A summary is in Dorazelski and Pakes (2007). 
As mentioned previously, in models where strategies may be strategic substitutes or 
strategic complements, multiple equilibriums are a real possibility. The question of 
multiple equilibriums has remained unresolved for two reasons. First, extant dynamic 
models are econometrically incomplete when faced with multiple equilibriums: the 
transition matrix is under-identified (Tamer, 2003). The likelihood of an action 
requires accounting for choices in all equilibriums, and the likelihood of all 
equilibriums, and cannot be formulated in the extant framework. Second, agents in 
games with multiple equilibriums, hold additional beliefs on future equilibrium 
choices that define the value of each action. To ensure consistency, past approaches to 
multiplicity of equilibriums have either assumed that the despite the potential presence 
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of multiple equilibriums in the data, a single unique equilibrium is played in sample 
(Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007), or constrained the strategy space to ensure 
uniqueness (Ericsson and Pakes, 1995). Neither method of ensuring consistency is 
well-suited to my empirical context. In the presence of multiple possible equilibriums, 
one anticipates in datasets that stretch over the course of 6 years, outcomes observed 
will correspond to different equilibriums, leading to beliefs of agents on future paths 
of play, similar to the beliefs on the development and evolution of the future states in 
equilibrium. Alternatively, to restrict strategic complementarity or substitutability 
requires restrictive demand function assumptions. Therefore, to account for multiple 
equilibriums, I define a new framework that includes an equilibrium selection 
mechanism, and define consistent estimators that allow multiple equilribirums to be 
played in the data. 
3. Data 
In this section I discuss the data that motivates the paper, and will be used in future 
work to estimate the presented model. As mentioned earlier, the essay develops a 
frame work broad enough to capture the competitive dynamics of pricing and 
availability in the VHS to DVD migration. While the paper proposes a novel 
estimation strategy, and preliminary estimation results are encouraging, computational 
constraints limited its scope to a set of simulations the show the effect of key trade-
offs discussed in the paper. 
My data comprises release dates, quantities and prices of titles per week after release, 
as well as title-specific descriptors (e.g. box office revenue, etc.) for all VHS tapes and 
DVDs released in the United States between 2000 and 2005. I describe below the 
sources of these data and issues with them.  I also describe data I are unable to obtain, 
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and the restriction this places on my model formulation and estimation. 
Nielsen Videoscan collects VHS and DVD sales data from retailers at the point of 
sale.  I use the weekly sales and price of all VHS and DVD sold in the United States, 
aggregated nationally. Other researchers have used this dataset to study VHS and 
DVD sales (Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee, 2007).  The dataset does not include Wal-
Mart. In my period of interest, Wal-Mart was a major retailer of VHS and DVDs that 
carried a smaller inventory of possible titles than comparable national retailers. Hence, 
my sample may understate the importance of larger titles and overstate the importance 
of smaller titles. I supplement this dataset with estimates of print and advertising 
expenditure on movies at theatrical release from SNL Kagan. I lack data on print and 
advertising expenditure (P&A) by studios on VHS/DVD. Therefore, I use production 
cost, P&A in the theatrical channel and box office revenue that are likely to be closely 
correlated with VHS/DVD P&A. 
I do not observe release costs in my dataset. Costs in the motion picture industry are 
comprised predominantly of the production costs of a movie and P&A. Production 
costs are borne upfront prior to release of a movie in the theatrical channel, and do not 
affect the release  timing of the movie. In my model, I assume that release costs may 
be incurred by a studio both as a fixed fee for in-store promotions, and through retailer 
margins. For instance, the fixed release costs of releasing titles on VHS/DVD include 
the cost of in-store promotions in the post-release weeks. I assume titles do not face 
distribution constraints; this assumption is clearly more appropriate for this market 
than for the theatrical release market. More importantly, for reasons of tractability, I 
assume that the retailer plays no strategic role.  
Similar to Luan and Sudhir (2007), I restrict my study to titles released in theatrical 
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channels prior to release on VHS/DVD to reduce computational load. I don’t consider 
older titles released prior on VHS and re-released on DVD. Some titles with smaller 
revenues, either low production cost sequels or children’s titles, may be released 
direct-to-VHS/DVD and are also not considered in the simulations. 
4.  An Informal Outline of the Model 
4.1: Description of the dynamic model 
Studios are the agents in my model, and they choose whether or not to release a title 
on VHS/DVD and the price of the title if it is released.  Each week, studios decide 
(simultaneously) on each title in their portfolio that has already been released in the 
theater, for potential entry in the VHS/DVD channel. Studios maximize profits by 
choosing optimal release dates and prices.  As mentioned prior, studios managing 
multiple titles may choose to delay VHS/DVD releases to mitigate the effect of 
cannibalization and substitution, and/or choose to release more VHS/DVDs to lower 
costs. However, the model does not disentangle between all sources of the payoff 
variation: substitutability with the theatrical channel, changes in future revenue 
streams, etc. While the framework and estimation methodology could allow for many 
of these issues through the use of a richer consumer demand model, the additional 
computational burden is overwhelming in my application.  Additionally, I ignore the 
role of the retailer, and model the studio as the profit-maximizing agent responsible 
for release strategy choices. 
Incumbents face no strategic decisions in my model. Once a title enters the VHS/DVD 
channel, it becomes part of the absorbing state of the Markov process in the release 
timing game. In my dataset, a VHS/DVD on average collects 75% of revenue in the 
first 20 weeks post release with post release. In this period, the price remains 
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remarkably steady, decreasing by less than 10% of the release price. Hence, it is 
sensible to model only release price setting.  
4.2: Payoffs and Incentives 
In the model, players choose actions variables in each period, contingent on the 
observables that affect their profits and the state of the world. To reduce the state 
space and make the model realistic, the evolution of future states is then additionally 
allowed to depend on the actions of consumers and realizations of exogenous shocks 
unforeseen by agents. I formalize this intuition by specifying two components of the 
model: 
4.2.1: Consumer Adoption 
The consumer adoption function tracks the adoption of DVDs by consumers as a 
function of studio strategies. For instance, the current price of DVD titles sets 
consumer expectations of future prices. I draw from the generalized Bass model to 
write adoption in time t as a function of the covariates (including firm actions) x(t), 
cumulative adoption until t, and the total potential market size, M:37
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37 I use a(t) for DVD hardware player sales, s(t) for DVD sales. x(t) includes state variables including 
price. 
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4.2.2: Studio Profits 
State variables in a dynamic model summarize the effect of past strategic actions of 
firms, on current period profits and choices. That is, the state variable in the model is 
the link between choices across periods. In the model I use proxy for the effect of past 
release and pricing decisions on the market, in defining the current number of players 
and the mean price level.  
# * mean priceon DVDAdoptionindex of DVD players
mean priceonVHS
=  
I utilize a sufficient statistic for the adoption model: 
(A1) Effects of actions are described by an industry summary statistic set ( fss ). 
There exists a consistent estimator :
fs fs fs
as
s s sµ µ µ→
  , where 
fssµ is the true 
distribution of the summary statistic in a future period. 
Assumption (A1) is similar to assumptions made in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). 
Instead of assuming a finite parameter vector in the first stage of estimation, I assume 
the forecasted adoption rate from the first-stage converge to the rational beliefs of 
agents.38
I specify a parametric specification of the payoff shock, and similar to Bajari, Benkard 
and Levin (2007), to reduce computational load assume: 
  
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 Additional rate of convergence and local smoothness assumptions are required if using a criterion 
function for estimation as in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). 
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(A2) The profit function, conditional on the demand function defined, is linear in 
unknown parameters. ( ) ( ), , , ; | , , , |fs fsit it it t t s i it it t t sx p a x p aπ δ θ µ ψ δ µ θ=  , where 
( )iψ •  is a finite dimension vector of “basis functions” (including polynomial and 
interaction terms). 
Assumption (A2) allows me to approximate the payoff function locally. A violation of 
(A2) does not prevent estimation or affect identification of the model.  The described 
estimation methodology is robust to the use of a non-linear specification. As observed 
in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), having a payoff function that is linear in 
unknown parameters implies that the constructed value functions are also linear in 
unknown parameters, simplifying estimation.  
4.3: Mixing between equilibriums 
Dynamic empirical game theory frameworks are useful as they provide a generalizing 
theory of oligopoly behavior (Fisher, 1989). The folk theorem shows that static 
demand and supply do not construct all equilibrium paths, as threats governing 
maximum deterrents (punishments) can support choices unavailable in static 
equilibrium. For instance, in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, strategies can be sustained 
which would not be sustainable in single episodal (static) game. In marketing, the 
substantive interest in dynamic games stems from the ability of dynamic game theory 
models to simulate the evolution of an industry. When a large number of equilibriums 
are often possible in these dynamic games then the recovery of the selection criteria is 
essential to forecast, and to test counterfactuals. 
Why might firms mix between equilibriums? Different equilibrium outcomes lead 
different payoffs (profits). Hence, firms most likely would favor one equilibrium 
outcome over another. For instance, the largest player in the game may ensure that its 
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most profitable equilibrium is played (Jia, 2008). Changing common unobservables, 
such as capital market pressures, may lead to changes in industry behavior. 
Alternatively, firms may try to equitably shape the industry profits, and ensure that 
they do better than the worst equilibrium for each. 
Example 1: 
Example 1 demonstrates the intuition behind profit sharing between equilibriums. 
Suppose players are 1 and 2. Player 1 chooses between {R,L}, and player 2 chooses 
between {A, B}. Table 9 shows the payoff matrix. Let {r,l} represent the probability 
of 1 playing R and L respectively, and {a,b} represent the probability of 2 playing A 
and B respectively. The two Pure Strategies Nash Equilibriums (PSNE) are 
{{1,0},{1,0}} and {{0,1},{0,1}}. The Mixed Strategies Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) is 
{{3/5, 2/5}, {1/7, 6/7}}. Write payoffs at the equilibrium as { }1 2,π π where 1π  is the 
payoff to 1 and 2π is the payoff to 2. Equilibrium payoffs are in Table 10 below. 
Table 9: Payoffs for Example 1 
 
 2 
A B 
1 
R 30,10 0,0 
L 0,0 5, 15 
 
Table 10: Equilibrium Payoffs in Example 1 
 
{{1,0},{1,0}} {30,10} 
{{0,1},{0,1}} {5, 15} 
{{3/5, 2/5}, {1/7, 6/7}}. {30/7, 6} 
The MSNE in this example has profits lower than each of the PSNE. However, it is 
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unclear as to which PSNE will be chosen. {{1,0},{1,0}} favors 1, while {{0,1},{0,1}} 
favors 2. Hence, suppose firms decide to make equal profits by coordinating on 
{{1,0},{1,0}} with probability p, and {{0,1},{0,1}} with probability 1-p. Solving for 
equal profits, I find that p = 2/7. The equilibrium selection of equitable profit sharing 
makes economic sense because the profits at equitable sharing are 2/7*30 + 5/7*5 = 
170/14, higher than 1’s profits in the MSNE and in {{0,1},{0,1}}. And 2 is better off 
than in the MSNE and in {{1,0},{1,0}}. 
The researcher cannot observe which equilibrium is being played in a period. Then the 
data will suggest that players played {{2/7, 5/7}, {2/7, 5/7}}, as a MSNE39 in the 
model. However, If 1 plays R with probability 2/7 then 2 is strictly better off choosing 
B. If 2 plays A with probability 2/7 then 1 is strictly better off choosing R. Hence, 
{{2/7, 5/7}, {2/7, 5/7}} is not a MSNE in the game.40
a. Randomizing (conditional on state or action vectors): This mechanism might 
allows firms to share profits. 
 Other mechanisms for selecting 
equilibriums may include: 
b. Pareto-dominance, risk dominance, payoff dominance: Firms facing risk loving, 
risk averse, and risk neutral capital markets would prefer pareto-dominant, risk 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 The ability to separate between equilibriums in the computed example is an artifact of mixing 
between two PSNE in which players assign all probability mass to different actions in different 
equilibriums. 
40 Mixing between MSNE and PSNE can be similarly confounded in the data as a MSNE. 
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dominant, and payoff dominant equilibriums respectively. Choosing accordingly 
between equilibriums allows firms to play in a period, the equilibrium most 
favored by their lenders and shareholders. 
c. Equilibrium favoring dominant player (Jia, 2008): In this mechanism, market 
power is used to ensure that the chosen equilibrium is most favorable to the most 
powerful player. 
In essay 3, I model the selection mechanism to compare the policy function in 
equilibrium with actions taken in the data. In essay 2, identification was driven by 
optimality across multiple periods, not in a period, using the solution concept of an 
Oblivious Equilibrium. The presence of multiple equilibriums in a dataset implies the 
transition kernel is time-varying: equilibrium choice determines state transitions. The 
non-homogenous transition kernel defined (§5.1, A7) is agnostic on the source of the 
time in-homogeneity and hence broad enough to allow for the effect of multiple 
equilibriums on state transitions. 
When identifying off current period actions, the model is incomplete when I do not 
explicitly model the equilibrium selection mechanism. The extended form of the game 
corresponds to the actual decisions taken by firms. Current MPNE models imply the 
decisions require taking expectations over rational beliefs due to a unique equilibrium. 
Different equilibriums lead to different beliefs. Hence the agent must also resolve the 
uncertainty over which equilibriums will be played in the future to understand the 
future implications of an action.  If a unique long run equilibrium is played in the data 
then the specification of the stationary MPNE (with a time homogenous transition 
kernel) is complete without specifying additional beliefs on equilibrium arbitration. 
However if firms play different equilibriums in different periods, then the extant 
model is incomplete. The remainder of this paper develops an extension of the extant 
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MPNE model that allows multiple equilibriums to be played in the data. 
5.  Model 
In this section I first define a model that assumes the existence of a unique 
equilibrium. This model is similar to the model discussed in essay 2. In §5.2 I discuss 
signaling, and in §5.3 extend the MPNE model to a multiple equilibrium setting. §5.3 
describes problems with extant estimation methods, while §5.4 and §5.5 describe the 
two novel estimation approaches proposed. §5.7 concludes with a discussion on 
identification. 
5.1: Unique Equilibrium MPNE Model  
I assume model primitives are common knowledge to potential entrants and 
incumbents: 
 { }( , , , )( , , ,:), ( | , ,:), , iti it it i x a I Ax a a δπ δ δ δ ν β ∈ ×ℵ×∆×′Ψ  
Following prior empirical work (Doraszelski and Pakes, 2007), I restrict my attention 
to symmetric and anonymous equilibriums. A set of functions, is symmetric if
( ) ( ), , , , , , ,i i i i i j i i i if x x f x x i jδ δ δ δ− − − −= ∀ . Hence I abstract from the identity of the 
agent in the payoff function, and write ( )f  . The function, ( )f  is anonymous if
( ) ( )( ) ( ), , , , , ,i i i i i perm i i perm if x x f x xδ δ δ δ− − − −= , where ( )perm i− is any permutation 
of the indices of other studios. Note that symmetry and anonymity restrictions do not 
assume that studios are identical, but instead that studio and product differences are 
observed. Reduced-form game payoffs for all agents at equilibrium are a function of 
its characteristics, state vector and competitive set. 
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The state space is I ×ℵ×∆  where the set of agents is I +∈ , ℵ is the Cartesian 
product of observed title characteristics and ∞+∆ ⊂  is the set of agent states. 
( , , ,:)i it t tx aπ δ is the profitability of agent i when it has characteristics itx ∈ℵ ,  tδ  is 
the state vector at time t and ta is chosen by agents
41 ( | , ,:)t aδ δ′Ψ. is the transition 
function that determines state transitions. I adopt the convention of using primes to 
denote subsequent period variables, e.g. δ ′  to denote 1tδ + , δ ′′ to denote 2tδ + . In an 
abuse of notation, I also use agent subscripts to denote the partition of the state and 
action vector describing an agent, e.g. iδ to denote the state of agent i. 
Incomplete information models simplify the analysis of the equilibrium (Seim, 2007), 
and are more likely to accurately represent the industry (e.g. given the non-standard 
contracts for sharing revenue and for deciding the promotional expenditure). Hence, 
similar to entry models, I assume that prior to making a decision studios receive a 
vector of private payoff shocks itν , drawn independently over time, from a distribution 
( | , )t itG xν δ  with support on t
E
 , and tν  the collection of private shocks for all titles 
in period t. Private information shocks describe payoffs variations from strategic 
decisions, including changes in the costs of advertising, promotional expenditure and 
the manufacturing cost for the DVD/VHS. Finally I specify a discount factor β . 
I impose further restrictions on the model primitives. 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 My notation for action space is consistent with Molinari et al (2008) but inconsistent with some 
extant models. I refer to the action space as 1 ... IA A A= × ×  whereas other papers may reserve the term 
action, for the specific action space of a particular player, iA . 
 121 
(A3) The state space is finite ( ; , ; ; ,I x x T δ δ< ∞ < ∞ ∀ ∈ℵ < ∞ < ∞ ∀ ∈∆ ).  
(A4) Profits are bounded ( ( )itπ π π< <∑  ).  
(A5) Studios discount future payoffs ( )0,1β ∈ . 
(A6) Private information appears additively in profit function
( , , , , ,:) ( , , , ,:)it it it t t t it it it t t itx p a x p aπ δ ν π δ ν= + . Fν  is distributed absolutely 
continuous to the Lebesgue measure. 
(A7) State transition, follows a non-stationary42
( | , ,:)t aδ δ′Ψ
 first order Markov process with 
time in-homogenous transition function . In general, future states are a 
time varying stochastic function of past states and actions
( ) ( ) { }, , . . , Cst t tf a s t aµ δ δ δ δ′ ′= ∀ ∈∆ ∈∆ ∃ with ( ) ( ), 0st tf aµ δ δ′ = > . 
Assumption (A3) stipulates the finiteness of the state space. First, as I restrict my 
attention to titles released in movie theaters and ignore direct-to-DVD sales, my set of 
agents is always finite. Second, in practice, characteristics of a title have finite range. 
Third, perishability implies that in any time period, a firm only considers a finite 
number of future periods for release. Correspondingly, I restrict the decision vector 
and action vector of potential entrants to be finite. Assumptions (A4), (A5) and (A6) 
are features of commonly-used profit functions in empirical studies. The second part 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 A time in-homogenous Markov process does not have a stationary long term distribution of states and 
actions. I use the phrase non-stationary MPNE and time inhomogenous MPNE interchangeably to refer 
to the model outlined. 
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of (A3) is appropriate in a game of release timing where the agent can only make 
profits post release of the title, or sale of the player.  
Assumption (A5) describes the stochastic monotonicity and continuity requirements 
on payoffs, fundamental to the existence of MPNE. Relaxing distributional 
assumptions on private information increases the number of mixed MPNE supported 
in the model.  Assumption (A7) requires the state of the world to evolve in a first order 
Markov process. The evolution of the next period’s states, conditional on the actions 
and states of agents in the current period, is stochastic. In keeping with extant papers, I 
require states in future periods to be accessible from continuation states. (A6) and 
(A7) are implicitly equivalent to requiring additive separability and conditional 
independence of controls and errors. Finally my state space is finite (unlike Ericsson 
and Pakes (1995), who study a problem with an infinite state space), and hence, I do 
not require agent payoffs to be bounded at the extremums of the state space. 
Assumptions (A3 – A7) lead to the following lemma: 
Best Response Lemma (L1): Generically, the best response function is a unique 
mapping from I A×∆→ , referred hereafter as :BR I A×∆→ . 
Proof: (L1) follows naturally under assumptions (A3), (A4), (A5), (A6), (A7) and the 
solution concept of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In a PBE, a studio 
considers expected profits from each strategic choice. The expectation on the profit 
function includes probabilities on the decisions of incumbents and potential entrants in 
future periods, described by the transition kernel specified in (A7). When taking 
expectations, indifference between two actions, making the best response function a 
correspondence occurs on a set of measure zero due to the continuity restrictions 
imposed in (A6). 
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-- 
Corollary (CL1): 
If a firm is in a continuation state, Ci iδ ∈∆ , then all future states of the firm have 
positive probability. ( ) ( )| , 0
t
st a
a
a aµ δ δ µ′ >∫  
Proof: (A6) implies that from each state, all actions are played with positive 
probability. (A7) implies that generically, all future states are achievable from 
continuation states. 
-- 
For a particular equilibrium, (L1) implies a unique mapping from a combination of the 
state vector and observables to a future state. If agent actions lead to stochastic state 
changes, then agent beliefs in the PBE are rational, as (L1) implies (A7). 
A stationary Markov model assumes that best responses depend only on the current 
state of the agents. Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007), prove the existence of a 
MPNE, and under certain conditions, the existence of a Pure Strategies MPNE. 
Assuming a stationary MPNE, they write the choice value function as 
 { }1 1| ,( , , , ; ) ( , , ; ) ( , , , ; )t t tt t t t t t t taV x a x a E E V x aυδ δδ υ θ π υ θ β δ υ θ+ += +  (14) 
where expectations on future value functions are taken over possible next period 
states, using the transition matrix.  
A stationary Markov strategy for a studio is a function :i Aσ ν∆× → . A stationary 
Markov strategy profile σ  is a set of stationary Markov strategies for each studio in a 
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period. The necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions in a stationary MPNE are 
 ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ; ; , , , , , ,i i iV V i Iδ σ δ σ σ δ σ−≥ ∀ ∈ ∆ Σ  (15) 
A non-homogenous first order transition matrix requires me to rewrite the choice 
value function. I write (15) as a period-specific choice value function, taking 
expectations over the next period choice value functions using the current periods’ 
transition matrix 
 { }1 1 1| ,( , , , ; ) ( , , , ; ) ( , , , ; )t t tt t t t t t t t t t taV x a x a t E E V x aυδ δδ υ θ π υ θ β δ υ θ+ + += +  (16) 
(15) specifies a time invariant choice value function, while (16) specifies a time-
varying choice value function43
tV
. Time-varying choice value functions, particularly 
when lacking estimates of the transition matrix, cannot be analyzed using extant 
methods without arbitrary restrictions on . As current decisions are affected by 
future seasonality, for instance to control for the effect of seasonality one would need 
to make tV a function of future periods. 
A non-stationary Markov strategy for a studio is a function :it Aσ ν∆× → . A non-
stationary Markov strategy profile tσ is a set of non-stationary Markov strategies for 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 Blackwell’s theorem does not apply to the general class of non-stationary Markov Perfect Nash 
Equilibriums. For instance, consider an infinite period game in which the market grows faster than the 
discount rate. I assume an upper bound on the profit function and implicitly a starting condition where 
no DVDs have been sold. These two conditions used with backwards induction arguments, guarantee 
the existence of the choice value function. 
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each studio in period t. In a non-stationary MPNE, the necessary and sufficient 
equilibrium conditions are 
 ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ; ; , , , , , , , ,t t t it it itV V i t I Tδ σ δ σ σ δ σ−≥ ∀ ∈ ∆ Σ  (17) 
Assumption (A8) formalizes the intuition behind the chosen modeling functions 
described in §4.2 being time-homogenous. Similar to Essay 2, I assume the integrated 
value function ( )| |( , , ; ) ( , , , ; )t it t t t t t VE V x E V x tδ δ δ δδ υ θ δ υ θ′ ′ ′= ℘  and the Markov 
kernel, ( )( )( | , ,:) | , , ,:t t ta t aψδ δ δ δ′ ′Ψ = Ψ ℘ , are stochastic functions of ( )tψ℘ and 
( )V t℘ , finite cardinality function vectors. For a discussion on identification of time 
inhomogeneous (non-stationary) MPNE, see Appendix 1. 
Time Homogeneity Assumption (A8): Firm profits are time homogenous conditional 
on state and independent variables. 
(A8) requires that profits in a period can be modeled using the state of the industry 
(adoption rate, price elasticity or any other measure of demand) and exogenous 
variables (such as seasonality). In DVDs, studio profits in a period are a function of 
the titles released (and their prices), and the adoption of DVDs until the period, 
satisfying the assumption. The assumption would be violated if there exists a structural 
break in the dataset (for eg, if the adoption function changed form in the middle of the 
study). 
5.2: Signaling 
In general, an infinite number of selection mechanisms (probability distributions) are 
admissible in this problem. The selection mechanism model used empirically allows 
all previously outlined situations. My formulation is more general than that in the 
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extant literature. For instance the equilibrium drift model (Binmore and Samuelson, 
1999) cannot handle the alternating equilibrium model. Even relaxing their Lipschitz 
continuity requirement does not allow the model to track the “pure best response 
dynamics” of the industry, the goal of my approach. 
This paper modifies the definition of admissibility presented in Beresteanu et al 
(2008). Aumann expectations are expectations over probability mappings, using the 
probability of the mapping being played in the data. In equilibrium the policy function 
is a probability vector that defines equilibrium actions, while the selection probability 
governs the probability of selecting the equilibrium. Hence the expected policy 
function is the Aumann expectations over the set of policy functions. 
As in Beresteanu et al (2008), I define admissibility through the set of probabilities on 
observables generated by the mechanism. Intuitively I seek to allow (admit) 
mechanisms which generate the conditional probabilities of actions and states 
observed in the data. The definition assumes the selection mechanism is common 
knowledge, with agents having rational beliefs on how the future will evolve. The 
admissible mechanism weights likelihoods derived from policy functions (of different 
equilibriums) to match the probability of the data, while maintaining rational belief 
structures of agents. More formally:44
DEFINITION: An Admissible Selection Mechanism in the dynamic game satisfies: 
 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 I refer the reader to Molinari et al (2008) for a more formal discussion and approach (using random 
closed sets). 
 127 
a. The probability of observing an action conditional on the information set tI
at t is ( ) ( ) ( )Pr | | , |et ta I a x e Iωσ δ µ
Ω
= ∫ , the integral of the policy function
( )| ,e a xσ δ , over all equilibriums using the selection probability
( )| ,te I e Eωµ ∀ ∈ . The calculated probability ( )Pr | ta I is equal to the 
observed conditional probability of actions, given the information set. 
b. Beliefs of future equilibriums resulting from the selection mechanism are 
Perfect Bayesian. 
To ensure an admissible mechanism can be defined in my model, I further assume: 
Exogeneity Assumption (A9): There is an exogenous mapping between states and 
actions, unaffected by the equilibrium generating actions. 
( ) ( )| , ,E E x aδ δµ δ µ δ δ′ ′=       , implying that the unconditional distribution of 
future states can be modeled in the data. 
I assume that all actions relevant to the evolution of the dynamic game are observed, 
and modeled as being endogenous to the game. Formally, (A9) states that after agents 
in the model have chosen their actions, the evolution of (states in) the model is 
stochastically well defined. In most applications of game theory, states are a history of 
past actions. If the state is a stochastic (or deterministic function) of past states and 
actions, then (A9) is trivially satisfied. If state changes are affected by current period 
exogenous observables, for eg. adoption being a function of the economic 
environment in the period, then (A9) requires that once agents have chosen their 
pricing and release strategies, states evolve stochastically as a function of choices and 
the exogenous observables. 
Drawing from the correlated equilibrium literature (Aumann, 1974), I assume ω  is a 
coordinating common information shock that aids equilibrium selection (ω  is visible 
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to all players at the beginning of the period, prior to actions being taken). The 
remainder of this section shows that the coordinating/selection equilibrium for ω is 
stable in the sense of a sub-perfect equilibrium (SPE), and allows us to construct 
equilibrium selection probabilities. 
Considerω∈Ω such that ( )| Iωµ ω′ is the conditional probability measure describing 
a probability density on the common information shockω′ . Assume that Ω is 
equipped with a partition of { }eω such that ( )|e Iωµ ω ω′∈ = probability of 
equilibrium e, conditional on the information set { }, , ,I x a eδ= .  
Signaling Lemma 1 (SL1): For the game to be in equilibrium, the equilibrium 
selection rule must be a mapping from ω to the set of possible equilibriums: on seeing 
ω agents play a particular equilibrium with probability 1. 
Proof: Suppose no selection rule can exist:  on seeingω  agents face uncertainty over 
the equilibrium to be played, with no equilibrium played with probability 1. Hence, 
more than one equilibrium is played with positive probability, conditional onω , 
implying agents face an expected policy function, integrated over the probability of 
each equilibrium: 
 [ ] ( )Pr |ei i
E
E eσ σ ω− −= ∫  (18) 
(18) is the Aumann expectations of the policy function, using the conditional 
probability of each equilibrium, ( )Pr |e ω . From (L1) I know that the agent has a 
unique best response to the expected policy function ( )Pr |ei
E
BR eσ ω−
 
 
 
 
∫ . However, 
as no selection rule exists, the expected policy function cannot be the policy function 
of any of the equilibriums. Hence, the response function of the agent violates the 
 129 
necessary conditions (15) for the model to be in equilibrium. That is
( ) ( )Pr | , Pr | ,e e ei i
E E
e BR e e Eσ ω σ ω σ− −
    ≠ ∀ ∈      
∫ ∫ . 
Now suppose that on seeing ω agents play a particular equilibrium with probability 1, 
implying ( )Pr | 1e ω =  for some e. Hence, ( )Pr |e ei i
e E
eσ ω σ′− −
′∈
′ =∫  and
( ) ( )Pr | , Pr |e e ei i
E E
e BR eσ ω σ ω σ− −
    =      
∫ ∫ . Thus, on seeing the signal all competing 
agents play according to the policy function of a particular equilibrium. As the best 
response of the agent is to play the action described in the policy function, a deviation 
is not profitable, implying that the model is in equilibrium. 
-- 
Signaling Lemma 2 (SL2): If ω is unobserved, then the signaling rule is under-
identified. 
Proof: Consider an augmented state vector{ },δ ω . Identifying the selection rule 
requires observing or imputing the equilibrium played in each period. By (CL1), I 
know that all states are reached with positive probability in all equilibriums, implying 
that I cannot impute the choice of equilibrium played in a period. As in equilibrium, 
all actions are played with positive probability I cannot impute the equilibrium played 
in a period from observed states and actions.  
-- 
Instead assume: 
Signaling Assumption (A10) The equilibrium selected in a period only depends on 
the state and action history until that period: ( ) ( )| | , ,I x aω ωµ ω µ ω δ′ ′= . 
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(A10) implies that in the model firms can signal intent through their actions, ensuring 
competitive and coordinated choices. 
Signaling Lemma 3 (SL3): A mapping from state to state ( A∆× → ∆ ) is formed 
(implicitly throughω ). 
Proof: (SL1) and (L1) together imply that in each period there is an equilibrium 
mapping from A A∆× → , conditional on ω . The transition kernel implies (SL3). 
-- 
Signaling Lemma 4 (SL4): The data can be represented by a single selection rule 
between equilibriums, in any dynamic game with a SPE. 
Proof: (SL1) implies that at least one admissible selection rule exists in the data. Proof 
by contradiction: suppose two different selection rules (mappings) are required to 
model the game played in the data. For agents to take rational decisions there must be 
an arbitration rule between the mappings. Define a meta-rule using the chain rule of 
probabilities between the arbitration rule and selection rules. Then this is a single 
selection rule which represents the game played in the data, contradicting the initial 
assumption. 
-- 
Signaling Lemma 5 (SL5): States and signals are jointly Markov. 
Proof: (SL3) implies that states are Markovian, conditional on the equilibrium 
selection rule andω . From (A10), I know that the conditional probability of ω
depends only on the last period’s actions and states. Hence I get A∆×Ω× → ∆×Ω . 
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-- 
5.3: Multiple Equilibrium MPNE Model 
This section first defines the complete MPNE model, and then characterizes existence 
of equilibriums in the model. Last, it explores the needed assumptions and frame work 
extension. As the selection mechanism expands the scope of the model, the complete 
model primitives are: 
{ }
( , , , )
, ( , , ,:), , , ( | , ,:),
it
i it it e e i x a I A
x a a
δ
µ π δ ν β δ δ ∈Ε ∈ ×ℵ×∆×
′Ψ  
The complete model specifies different transition kernels across equilibriums (due to 
different policy functions) and an arbitration process between equilibriums. 
Existence Theorem (ET): Given assumptions (A1 – A10), the following hold: 
i. Beliefs are rational (PBE). 
ii. An MPNE exists in the model. 
iii. Any equilibrium, conditional on the private information shock, is a PSNE 
with probability 1.  
iv. Multiple equilibriums (with different policy functions), but with a unique 
selection rule, may be played in the data. 
Proof:  
i. (SL1) restricts agent beliefs to Aumann expectations over (different) policy 
functions, using the selection rule. Hence, agent beliefs are rational 
expectations over future outcomes. 
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ii. From (SL5), states and equilibriums are Markovian. The model hence fits 
conditions described in Essay 2 (with ω as the censored state variable). 
From Essay 2, a MPNE exists in the model but that the general transition 
kernel remains under-identified in the data.45
iii. (L1) implies that given a set of policy functions, the best response mapping 
is generically unique; with probability 1, conditional on the private 
information shock, the agent has strict preferences. Hence, conditional on 
the private information shock, equilibriums are PSNE with probability 1. 
 
iv. The game may have multiple equilibriums. (SL4) implies the selection rule 
is unique. 
-- 
Existence Lemma (EL1): The Markov chain has a unique recurrence class of states 
and equilibriums. 
Proof: Define the augmented state vector{ },eδ . The model then matches Pakes and 
McGuire (2001), who showed that the (augmented) Markov process describing the 
state vector has a unique recurrent class. 
(EL1) implies that in the long run, when describing the future states through the PML 
estimator, I remain in the recurrent class of states and equilibriums. Pakes and 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 The proof is based on Dorazelski and Pakes (2007), who discuss and show the existence of MPNE in 
an infinite horizon model with uncountable states.   
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McGuire (2001) show that with probability one, forward simulations of the model land 
in the recurrence class. (EL1) hence implies that I can forward simulate multiple 
periods of information, instead of a single period, when estimating the non-structural 
components of the PML estimator. 
-- 
Existence Lemma (EL2):  
i. Beliefs are Martingale and converge.  
ii. The integrated value function is well defined and not a function of the 
equilibrium. 
Proof:  
i. The Bayes map between states is well defined in the model. As the industry 
evolves, with continued diffusion of DVD technology, firms update their 
beliefs using the Bayes map. As shown in Easley and Kiefer (1988), firm 
beliefs are hence Martingale and converge. 
ii. (SL3), (SL4) and (SL5) imply the integrated value function is unique 
across equilibriums. Proof by construction: any chosen action implies a 
distribution on future states. Conditional on the action and current states, I 
obtain a distribution over future equilibrium choices. Conditional on future 
states and current actions, define the Aumann expectations over all future 
action choices. From (i) I know that the beliefs converge despite industry 
evolution. Hence there is an integrated value function which only depends 
on current period actions and states. 
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-- 
(EL2) allows us to write a likelihood function for each action, in which the integrated 
value function is unique across all equilibriums.46
i. The selection rule is Markov. 
 The PML estimator builds a non-
structural analog of the unique integrated value function, thereby reducing the 
computational burden of the estimation process. Further details are discussed in §5.6. 
If beliefs are Markovian then the equilibrium selection mechanism is Markovian. This 
is more stringent than only admissibility: there may be admissible mechanisms that are 
not Markovian. The rationale for restricting attention to Markovian belief structures is 
provided by (RET), which shows that any Perfect Bayesian Markov belief structure 
requires a Markovian selection mechanism. 
Reverse Existence Theorem (RET): Suppose a MPNE model with multiple 
equilibriums played in the data. Then: 
ii. States and equilibriums are Markov. 
Proof:  
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 States in my model follow a pseudo-finite Markov process. Pseudo-finite processes can be shown to 
converge to a Markov process (Rosenthal, 1992). However, the likelihood of an action remains mis-
specified despite the convergence result, if multiplicity of equilibriums is ignored in an extant MPNE 
model. In specifying a selection mechanism, the paper defines the weights of the pseudo-finite Markov 
process and hence defines the likelihood of each observed action. 
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i. Suppose not. Then the beliefs of the future would either involve more than 
the current information set, and hence not be rational, contradicting the 
assumption of a MPNE, or require knowledge of past states and actions 
(not just current states and actions), contradicting the Markov assumption 
on the transition kernel. 
ii. Suppose not. From (i) the selection mechanism must be Markov. (SL5) 
shows that this implies the states and equilibriums must be jointly Markov, 
contradicting the initial assumption. 
-- 
Hence (RET) shows that restricting to the Markovian signaling mechanism is 
consistent with the idea of a MPNE. A MPNE both leads to and relies on the 
Markovian structure of signaling. As one can only have a MPNE if the selection rule 
is Markovian, modeling Markov admissible mechanisms is consistent in the model. A 
limitation of the model is to assume that equilibriums evolve through the action space. 
(SL2) shows the full model to be under identified, and hence (A10) allows for 
estimation, while retaining the flexibility of the model.  
5.4: Inconsistency of extant approaches 
Often the researcher can define a set of inequalities that can be used for estimation 
even if from the observable and a realization of the unobservable, more than one event 
are possible. Beresteanu et al (2008) presents the efficient estimator for the sets of 
parameters that can support the data: the smallest set of parameters which solve the 
difference equations implied by the model (through the inequalities). Other common 
static multiple equilibriums papers build a series of inequalities that do not rely on a 
selection mechanism. 
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A dynamic model cannot be estimated in this way because of the extended form 
incompleteness. How does incompleteness impact estimation if one ignores 
multiplicity? In each equilibrium, the policy function is a different probability vector. 
From the same observables and un-observables multiple equilibriums and hence 
multiple policy functions are possible. The selection mechanism defines an 
appropriate method to weight between policy functions, and hence builds a consistent 
likelihood function. 
While the nature of bias generated in extant models is hard to classify as the 
incompleteness either implies that the model makes unrealistic assumptions or is 
econometrically mis-specified, it is instructional to study the source of the bias. In 
particular, two estimation strategies have been used in extant papers: 
a. Some papers restrict strategies to be either strategic substitutes or strategic 
complements. This approach is often theoretically appealing when considering non 
portfolio decisions, as in the extant literature. In my application, the assumption is 
unrealistic and would lead to mis-specification bias.  
b. Other papers assume a unique equilibrium is played in the data. Either these papers 
use a: 
i. 2 step estimator (PML estimator): in the first stage, the policy function, state 
transition functions are estimated from the data. The first stage estimates are 
inconsistent when mixing between equilibriums, as shown in Example 1, as the 
observations do not represent mixed equilibrium observations. 
ii. Nested Fixed Point approaches (NFXP): the policy function and transition 
kernel is built from structural elements of the model. When using NFXP, the 
researcher assumes multiple periods have the same policy function, implicitly 
assuming the selection probability remains constant over time. The MLE is 
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inconsistent as the likelihood function does not incorporate the multiple policy 
functions, and hence is mis-specified in the model. 
5.5: Defining a maximum likelihood estimator 
Drawing from Vitorino (2008), and using (EL2), the probability of seeing an action 
can be written as: 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )
|
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(19) 
I build the probability of seeing the data (actions) by integrating the likelihood of the 
data in a potential equilibrium over all potential equilibriums. Hence, (19) leads to the 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator: 
 ( ) ( )ˆ arg max | , , , ; | ;fsFIML s t
d
l d x Iω
ϑ
θ δ µ ω ϑ µ ω ϑ
∈Θ
Ω
= ∏ ∫  (20) 
(20) integrates the likelihood over all values of the common information shockω . As 
agents choose between (discrete) finite strategies, I know that the model can only 
support finite PSNE. Hence, (SL1) implies (20) can be re-written as: 
 ( ) ( )ˆ arg max | , , , |fsFIML s t
e Ed
l d x e Iω
ϑ
θ δ µ ω µ
∈Θ ∈
= ∑∏  (21) 
I estimate the model by maximizing likelihoods. I model ( )| te Iωµ with iid Gumbel 
errors leading to a finite mixture logit model. Computationally, the difficulty stems 
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from finding an integrated value function consistent with all best response strategies. 
In FIML, the solution requires a nested fixed point as shown in Pakes and McGuire 
(2001), and is a generalization of the FIML estimator described in Vitorino (2008). 
The value of the nested fixed point is different for each conjecture of the parameter 
vector. While a non-linear optimization routine (such as Knitro) builds shadow 
functions across the binding equalities, reducing the computational burden, the routine 
is not practical in problems with large state spaces and asymmetric agents. 
To use a likelihood estimation approach, additionally I assume the following 
regularity conditions: 
(R1) θ ∈Θ is a compact subset of θℜ and true value 0 intθ ∈ Θ . 
(R2) The pseudo-likelihood function ( )| µϒ • is uniquely maximized at 0θ , and 
( )| µϒ • is twice continuously differentiable in θ ∈Θwith probability 1.  
(R1) and (R2) are common regularity conditions for pseudo-likelihood estimation, met 
by the iid Gumbel specification of payoff shocks in my application. Under (A8), the 
argmax of the pseudo-likelihood function is a consistent estimator of the structural 
parameters. From (A4), the likelihood function ( )| µϒ • is continuous, leading to
( ) ( )| |pµ µϒ • →ϒ • . Maximizing the pseudo-likelihood yields second stage 
structural parameters (θ ) whose variance is the sandwich estimator
( ) ( ) ( )1 1A B Aθ θ θ− − , where ( )A θ is the Hessian of the log pseudo-likelihood and 
( )B θ is the variance of the pseudo-score.  
For completeness I discuss the endogeneity of observables and a method for correcting 
for the endogeneity bias. Formally, I assume: 
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(A11) ( ) 0it itE xν ν =  
A violation of (A11) would bias the coefficients estimated due to endogeneity. To 
correct for endogeneity bias in my model, when recovering the estimates of the 
adoption function, follow instrumental variable estimation methods. In the supply side 
game, violation of (A11) implies that both individual agent errors and forecast errors 
are correlated with agent observables. Grouping the error terms leaves a single error 
term correlated with observables. To estimate the model, I define a set of moment 
conditions by matching the best response with calculated best responses and interact 
the conditions with instrumental variables. While this method corrects for any 
potential endogeneity bias, it is econometrically less efficient than maximizing the 
best response pseudo-likelihood. One can use Richardson simplification to find ( )A θ
and the Eicker-Huber-White estimator for ( )B θ . If imputations of the adoption, choice 
or are heteroskedastic or autocorrelated, then standard errors of the sandwich estimator 
can be corrected by appropriately weighting the estimation function (Zeilies, 2006).  
5.6: Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML) estimator 
As the FIML estimator is computationally very expensive, this paper follows a PML 
approach. My method is a generalization of PML estimator described in 
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), hereafter AM. The difference between the FIML and 
PML estimator is that the integrated value function found as a nested fixed point in the 
FIML estimator for each conjectured parameter guess, is found using recovered 
probabilities in the PML estimator. The assumption in the PML estimator is the same 
as in the FIML, but the observed probabilities forces the likelihood for non true values 
to optimize using the optimal observed distribution. At true parameter estimates, both 
PML and FIML coincide. 
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Allowing for multiple equilibriums implies that I cannot use the PML estimator 
defined in AM. In AM, they use the policy function recovered from the data in the 
first step, to build the pseudo likelihood function. As the policy function is different 
across equilibriums, in my problem, a mixed policy function exists in each period 
(through the selection mechanism). Instead the described PML is a hybrid estimation 
strategy that uses results from AM. 
AM describes an alternate representation of the fixed points in probability space. This 
alternate representation of the equilibrium uses the equilibrium probabilities of actions 
(Representation Lemma, AM). Both best response mappings { },Λ Ψ lead to identical 
fixed points. In a particular equilibrium there is a unique policy function of agents; 
conditional on ω  I have a unique mapping ( ) ( )| , , , | , ,fs fses sa x a xσ δ ω µ σ δ µ . To 
ensure notational equivalence with AM, define the integrated value function of the 
alternative mapping as:  
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where ( ), ,e i ie a x δ∗ is the conditional expectations on the private information shock, if 
ia is picked as an action in the next period. Define 
( ) ( ) ( )( ), , | arg max , , ,
i
e e
i i i i i i i i
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∈
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. Then re-arrange (22) as 
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The profit function is linear in basis vectors (due to assumption (A2)). As errors are 
logit, I get ( ) ( )( ), , ln , ,e ei i i ie a x Euler s constant P a xδ δ∗ ∗′= − . Stacking(23), I get 
A × ∆ equations for the value function. To find the value function across equations, 
pre-multiply with the probability of the equilibrium, to get: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ; , , ; | , ,e e ei i
e E
V a x P V a x P e a xωδ δ µ δ
∗ ∗ ∗
∈
= ∑   (24) 
In FIML, the algorithm has to solve for (24) explicitly. Both terms in (24) are defined 
through the econometric structure: the policy function and the selection mechanism 
are identified in the problem. To establish a parametric estimator, consider the stacked 
up set of equalities, and notice that I can solve equalities for all equilibriums. Pre-
multiplying and adding, I get a stacked set of equations47
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
1 1*
, , ; , , ,
, , ; , , ,
e
e e
e e
a e i
e e
a e e i
I F V a x P E E a e a x
V a x P I F E E a I F E E e a x
δ σ
δ σ σ
β δ π δ
δ β π β δ
∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
− −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 ′− = + 
 ′⇒ = − + −    




: 
 
 
As, 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 *aF δ is the expected probability of actions a, and states δ : elements of 
*
aF δ are bounded between 0 
and 1. As the discount factor is strictly less than 1, ( )*aI F δβ− has an inverse. 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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, , , |
, , , |
, , ; ,
e fs
e fs
e fs
fs
e
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a e i it it t t s
a e i it it t t s
a a i it it t t s
e e
a e i
I F E E x p a
I F E E x p a
I F E E x p a
I F F x p a
V a x P I F E E e a
δ σ
δ σ
δ σ
δ
δ σ
β π δ µ
β ψ δ µ θ
β ψ δ µ θ
β ψ δ µ θ
δ θ β
∗
∗
∗
∗
−
−
−
−
−∗ ∗ ∗
 −   
 = −   
 = −   
= −
′⇒ =Μ + − ( ),x δ  
 
using ( ) ( ) ( )1* , , , ,e ea e i iI F E E e a x e a xδ σβ δ δ∗
− ∗ −   
48
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
, re-write (19) as 
( ), ,e e i iE e a xσ δ∗
∗ 
   is the conditional entropy of action a, in equilibrium e when using logit 
errors. ( ), ,e ee i iE E e a xσ δ∗
∗ 
   is hence the expected conditional entropy. The other terms discount 
and adjust for equilibrium probabilities of the action in the next period. Thus, the likelihood has the nice 
interpretation of being the logit probability of the sum of discounted expected payoffs in current and 
future periods, minus the expected conditional entropy, of any action. 
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( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
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| , , ,
ex p ( ) ( ) , , | , , ,
ex p ( ) ( ) , , | , , ,
| , , , | , , , ,
, , , ,
fs
i fs
i fs
i i
fs fs
i
i s
i i s
i i s
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s i s
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l a x
E G a G a e a x x
E G a G a e a x x
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V a x e a x
σ
σ
δ ω µ
ψ β θ β δ δ ω µ
ψ β θ β δ δ ω µ
σ δ ω µ δ ω µ
δ θ δ
−
−
∈
∈
∗
 + Μ + =
 + Μ + 
=
= Μ +
∑
∏

 
(25) 
where ( )G a  is the extractor matrix that has dimensions 1 A× and has a 1 in the 
column of a, and 0s elsewhere. The (valuation operator construction) matrix
( ), fssx µΜ  is found through the equilibrium mixed policy response function and the 
state transition function from the first stage. While AM uses the policy function in 
both the current and the future periods, I use the mixed policy function estimates (from 
the data) only in the second period to constructΜ . From AM, I know that the two 
value functions are analogues. Using(25), I write the PML estimator49
 
: 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆarg max | , , , , ; | ;fsPML s t
d
l d V x Iω
ϑ
θ δ µ ω ϑ µ ω ϑ∗
∈Θ
Ω
= ∏ ∫  (26) 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 The likelihood function is time homogenous with (25) defined for all observed actions. (26) is written 
generally to allow d to be defined for a single game, or on a panel dataset where multiple games played 
are played in multiple markets. 
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I choose to use a pseudo-likelihood-based method to maximize efficiency and ensure 
consistency of the standard error estimates. In an under identified model, similar to 
Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) one can instead follow Chernozukhov, Hong and 
Tamer (2007). Their estimator uses set identification to find parameters that describe 
difference equilibriums supported by the data minimizing a criterion function that 
penalizes violations of the best response function. The likelihood based approach is 
more efficient in the point-identified model, and produces precise standard errors of 
estimated parameters. 
5.7: Estimation Algorithm and Identification 
 The model can be estimated in two stages. First estimate the adoption equation. The 
Generalized Bass Model (Bass, Jain and Krishnan, 2000) can be estimated using a 
range of well studied methods. Second estimate the profit functions from the 
restrictions implied by the theorems and lemmas presented earlier. The step-by-step 
estimation algorithm for the game theory based estimations is: 
a. Using the estimates of the adoption model, build the state vector of the firm in 
every period. 
b. Recover the expected (unconditional) policy function *aF

 from the data (model 
and recover (18) parametrically or non-parametrically from the data). If the 
equilibrium selection mechanism puts point mass on an equilibrium, is the 
recovered expected policy function, a unique equilibrium policy function. The (i,j) 
entry in *aF is the probability that action j will be played in the next period if action 
vector i is played in the current period. In the FIML estimator, *aF is calculated for 
any policy function and selection probability conjectures, while the PML estimator 
uses the recovered policy function. 
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c. Recover the expected state transition function ( *Fδ

) implied by (A9), conditional 
on period actions from the data.  
d. Build the valuation operator matrix50
 
, defined using 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1*
1* *
, , , |
, , , |
e fs
fs
t a e it it it t t s
a a it it it t t s
M I F E E x p a
I F F x p a
δ σ
δ
β δ µ
β δ µ
∗
−
−
 = − Ψ  
= − Ψ
 
 
 
e. Let ( )1 be a matrix of 1s, of dimension 1A × . Define the expected errors matrix51
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1* * *lg 1a e a ae ee I F E F Fδβ
−  = −   


  
In the unique equilibrium model ( ) ( )* *a aeF F=
 
, while in the multiple equilibrium 
model ( )*a eF has to be computed in the estimator. 
f. Non-linearly maximize the PML equation (26) for a conjectured numbers of 
equilibriums52. Note the estimator involves maximizing the likelihood of the 
action vector, and not the individual action likelihoods53
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 The time subscript identifies that the matrix (due to the payoff basis) is dependent on the state of the 
industry, and hence changes over time. 
51 For very small true values of
: 
( )Pr , ,a x δ , the first stage estimates may suggest ( )Pr , , 0a x δ = .  In 
this case lim ln( ) 0
h
h h
→∞
= implies ( ), , 0e
i
e
e i iE E e a xσ δ∗−
∗  =  . 
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
 
g.  Increase the numbers of equilibriums in the optimizer and maximize, till there is 
no increase in the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).54
Multiple mappings from the independent variable and the shock to potential dependent 
  
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 ( )G a is the extractor matrix with a 1 in the column of a, and 0s elsewhere. 
53 Let Pr( )ia be the probability of an action of i. We want ( ) ( )Pr Pr i
i I
a a
∈
=∏ . In a unique 
equilibrium model, extant models maximize individual actions of agents. In the PML estimator I instead 
maximize the joint probability of the entire agent action vector, since the probability of the joint 
(mixed) actions is not the likelihood of the mixed actions. As:
( )
( )( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
Pr( , | ) Pr( ) Pr( , | ) Pr( )
Pr( | ) Pr( | ) Pr( ) Pr( | ) Pr( | ) Pr( )
Pr( | ) Pr( ) Pr( | ) Pr( ) Pr( | ) Pr( ) Pr( | ) Pr( )
i j i j
i j i j
i i j j
a a e e a a e e
a e a e e a e a e e
a e e a e e a e e a e e
+
= +
≠ + +
 
54 I am optimistic that infinite equilibriums can be modeled using a continuous function for selection 
probability. The math for the infinite model should be similar with a mixed logit replacing the finite 
mixture logit likelihood. 
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variables exist in the model. If a unique mapping exists between these variables, the 
inversion of that relationship allows us to write the probability of seeing the data. With 
multiple mappings, I define the likelihood of an action by integrating over all 
mappings. The model is identified parametrically because of differences in the 
probability of an action vector, in each equilibrium regime55
In this section I describe simulations based on my MPNE frame work. My framework 
generalizes dynamic games to allow cooperation and competition both within a game, 
and in the selection mechanism between games. The simulations present cases where 
cooperation amongst firms in equilibrium selection increases firm profits. These 
simulations serve several purposes. First, they outline and motivate a case for trade-
offs discussed prior. Second, similar to Dube, Hitsch and Manchanda (2005), the 
simulations illustrate which policy prescriptions are supportable as a MPNE. Third, 
. To identify parameters 
within equilibriums, I set profits from not releasing any titles as zero. I cannot identify 
parameters of selection mechanism to scale, but recover equilibrium selection 
probabilities. If N equilibriums are played with positive probability, then the BIC for 
models with more than N equilibriums should be lower than the BIC for N 
equilibriums. A lower BIC with increasing N would imply that either a larger number 
of equilibriums do not exist for the model primitives, or certain equilibriums are not 
played with significant probability in the data. 
6. Simulation and Results 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 Action vector probabilities must be different across equilibriums; else they are the same equilibrium. 
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they illustrate the effect of mixing across equilibriums on the equilibrium behavior of 
firms, the adoption behavior of consumers and the profits of firms. In future work, I 
plan to measure the rate of convergence of the estimation algorithm, and the extent of 
small sample bias due to sequential estimation. I will also estimate the model on 
market data described in section 3 and recover the true primitives. 
Simulation 1 is a generalization of example 1 that focuses on the competitive 
advantage conferred by winning. Simulation 2 studies the effect of the market 
evolution on payoffs similar to the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. Simulation 3 
focuses on the application of the frame-work to a game between studios. It requires 
firms to choose between maximizing current period profits and supporting the 
adoption of the new format.  
For any action, model primitives imply a market outcome in the current and future 
periods. To capture this, I specify a payoff matrix (and in Simulation 3 an adoption 
function). I simulate the equilibrium behavior of firm for different selection rules, 
plotting the evolution of the industry and measuring payoffs to the firms. In each 
simulation, I specify the mean payoff and iid gumbel private information shocks. I use 
the payoffs to derive the equilibrium policy function, by analytically deriving fixed 
points in the equilibrium policy functions, conditional on a selection rule in the 
simulation. I then simulate per period choices of firms (using the derived policy 
functions).  Last, I plot equilibrium behavior of players, and show the effect of the 
selection rule on firm payoffs. 
6.1: Simulation 1: accruing advantages 
Simulation 1 addresses the question of what advantages accrue in the game through 
equilibrium play. The firm with greater payoffs in an equilibrium may find a 
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sustainable advantage in future equilibriums, leading to a first mover advantage. 
The simulation extends Example 1 to a dynamic game. 1 chooses between {R,L}, and 
2 chooses between {A, B}. Let the state of the game be the last action played
{ } { } { } { }{ }, , , , , , ,R A L A R B L Bδ = . Suppose payoffs conditional on state are defined 
as: 
Table 11: Payoffs in Simulation 1 
 
 2 
A B 
( ) { }| ,a R Aπ δ =  
1 
R 30, 10 0, 0 
L 0, 0 5, 15 
( ) { }| ,a L Bπ δ =  
R 5, 15 0, 0 
L 0, 0 30, 10 
 
For 1, playing an equilibrium changes future payoffs to increase Player 1’s payoffs 
from the same equilibrium. Hence Player 1 accrues advantages through an 
equilibrium. 2, on the other hand, prefers continuously switching equilibriums. Let 
{r,l} represent the probability of 1 playing R and L respectively, and {a,b} represent 
the probability of 2 playing A and B respectively. The two PSNE (written as 
{{r,l},{a,b}} are {{1,0},{1,0}} and {{0,1},{0,1}} (as highlighted in the table). 
Potential gains are significantly larger for a dominant firm. For instance, if 1 forces the 
players to choose {{1,0},{1,0}} in every period, then 1 will get a payoff of 30 in every 
period. Similarly if 2 forces the players to switch equilibriums in every period, then 2 
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gets a payoff of 15 in every period. Write payoffs at the equilibrium as { }1 2,π π where
1π  is the payoff to 1 and 2π is the payoff to 2. Equilibriums payoffs are in Table 12.  
Table 12: Equilibrium payoffs in Simulation 1 
 
Equilibrium Profit vector { }1 2,π π  
{{1,0},{1,0}} always {30, 10} 
{{0,1},{0,1}} always {30, 10} 
Continuous switching between 
{{1,0},{1,0}} and {{0,1},{0,1}} 
{5, 15} 
 
6.1.1: Results from Simulation 1 
The equilibrium selection rule most favorable to player 2, involves switching 
(alternating) between the equilibriums56
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 For instance, firms may benefit from switching if consumers are variety seeking; they may see higher 
profits when changing strategies. 
. I simulate the second strategy for equitable 
payoffs, where to make equal profits the studios can decide to play the last PSNE 
played with probability p and the other PSNE with probability 1-p. As the equilibrium 
coordination probability p increases, the average probability, and the variance of the 
probability of playing the most favored equilibrium for any player, remains constant 
(see Figure 7).  
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Total payoffs to the players vary with coordinating probabilities, with player 1 
benefiting from larger probabilities, and player 2 benefiting from smaller values. 
Figure 8 plots total payoffs received by either player over 100 periods. With p=0.33, 
the two players receive identical expected payoffs of 13.33. In the data, we may not 
necessarily see firms play the equitable (profit sharing) selection rule. If player 1 
wields more market power, then a rule preferred by player 1 maybe played in the data. 
Figure 7: Probability of the favored equilibrium 
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6.2: Simulation 2 
Simulation 2 tests responses of firms to different levels of adoption. Suppose there are 
different rules for different levels of adoption: when adoption is low, an equilibrium 
selection rule is used to select between equilibriums, and an alternative selection rule 
is used when adoption is high. Consider a game in which player 1 chooses between 
{R, M and L}, and player 2 chooses between {A, B and C}. Table 12 lists payoffs 
from the equilibrium. 
 
Figure 8: Total payoffs for player 1 and 2 
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Table 13: Payoffs in Simulation 2 
 
 2 
A B C 
1 
R 10, 10 0, 25 0, 35 
M 25, 0 50, 25 0, 10 
L 35, 0 25, 0 10, 50 
The two PSNE are at {M, B} and {L, C}. The two equilibriums lead to asymmetric 
non pareto-dominant payoffs: 1 prefers {M, B} and 2 prefers {L, C}. Both players 
have asymmetric min-max punishment strategies to deter deviations. 1 can punish 2 to 
receiving 25 forever by playing M, keeping the equilibrium at 1’s favored PSNE. 2 
can punish 1 to receiving 10 forever by playing C, keeping the equilibrium at 2’s 
favored PSNE. 
6.2.1: Results from Simulation 2 
Suppose two adoption levels, la and ha, with a different probability {lape1, hape1} of 
playing {M, B}. Lape1 characterizes the probability of playing {M, B} when the 
adoption level is la, and hape1 when the adoption level is ha. Let the adoption level 
change with uniformly increasing probability over time. In Table 14, I report profits 
for different lape1 and hape1 values. With increasing pe1 probability, firm 1 sees 
larger payoffs. If firm 1 has greater strategic power, potentially from the stronger 
punishment strategy in the game, then higher values of pe1 will be chosen. 
Conversely, if firm 2 exerts greater power, then lower values of pe1 would be chosen, 
and the payoffs of firm 1 reduced. In the frame-work, to model market power arising 
from asymmetric payoffs, I allow equilibrium selection probabilities to be a function 
of the total adoption till date, and the last actions and states of firms. 
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Table 14: Equilibrium payoffs as function of selection probabilities 
 
lape1 hape1 Total payoff 1 Total payoff 2 
0.1 0.9 1712 4555 
0.3 0.7 2354 4153 
0.5 0.5 3012 3742 
0.7 0.3 3546 3409 
0.9 0.1 4190 3006 
 
6.3: Managing format transitions 
Simulation 3 formalizes arguments made prior in the paper regarding the transition 
between VHS and DVD, to the mathematical frame-work. The aim of the simulation is 
to (a) show the frame-work, and in particular selection mechanism, is general enough 
to allow for discussed effects, and (b) to show the importance of the selection 
mechanism in defining the outcome of the game. Hence the simulation specifies mean 
payoffs to the studios taking an action: the specified payoff matrix is a reduced form 
capture of the market outcomes of studio actions. Similar to the frame-work, I assume 
agent payoffs also receive private information shocks, revealed prior to choosing 
actions in a period, and show the effect of different selection rules. 
In simulation 3, I assume 2 studios choose between 3 levels of actions. For the 
discussion, assume these actions reflect three DVD availability levels, low (LA), 
medium (MA) and high (HA). These actions could instead reflect different mean 
prices or any joint pricing and availability decisions. Next suppose Table 15 reflects 
the action payoffs with{ }1 2,m m , where ( , ) ( )iprofits i t m Adopt index t=  . This 
corresponds to a market share based model, where payoffs would be similar with the 
adoption index reflecting the total consumer base interested in purchasing DVDs in a 
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period, and the matrix payoffs, a reweighting of the market share of the studios. I 
assume the adoption index follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5( ) ( 1) i i j jAdoptionindex t Adoptionindex t HA MA HA MAγ γ γ γ γ γ= + − + + + +  
with { }0 1 2 3 40.8, 0.15, 0.05, 0.15, 0.05,γ γ γ γ γ= = = = = . 
 
Table 15: Availability and payoffs 
 2 
HA MA LA 
1 
HA 5, 4 3, 2 5, 4 
MA 2, 3 4, 5 6, 3 
LA 4, 5 3, 6 5, 5 
6.3.1: Industry conduct in Simulation 3 
My primary research question is motivated by the trade-off between supporting 
adoption for future periods, and playing the Nash Equilibrium that leads to the highest 
current payoffs, when studios have asymmetric payoffs from promoting adoption. 
Hence I specify a game where the equilibrium at {HA,HA} leads to a higher mean 
adoption index in future periods, and hence is preferable to both players in the long 
run, but where player 2 prefers {MA,MA} in the short run. 
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Figure 9 shows the adoption levels as a function of the equilibrium chosen. Player 2 
gets a lower (immediate) payoff at {HA,HA} and may entirely prefer {MA,MA} at 
certain discount rates. Instead players may randomly select between equilibriums to 
ensure greater adoption than at {MA,MA}. Further, firms may choose to change the 
mixing probability when the market reaches a certain adoption level (threshold), as in 
simulation 2. If studios initially choose equilibriums in which they price (or release 
DVDs) more aggressively then more consumers adopt into the model in later periods. 
Hence it may be profitable for firms to cooperate choosing competitive equilibriums 
that increase adoption while equitably sharing resulting profits. The threshold rule 
allows the two firms to reach higher levels of adoption without leveling off (Figure 
Figure 9: Adoption rates (without threshold) 
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10) at the adoption levels for {MA,MA}.  Table 16 shows that both players prefer the 
mixing rules over playing {MA,MA}. However, Player 1 prefers the threshold mixing 
rule to the pure mixing rule, whereas player 2 prefers the pure mixing rule. For a high 
enough discount rate, player 2 prefers the pure mixing rule to {HA, HA}. Table 16 
lists total payoffs from different selection mechanisms. 
Table 16: Payoffs from different selection mechanisms 
 
 Player 1 Player 2 
Player 1 
(Discounted 
@0.75/period)57
Player 2 
(Discounted 
@0.75/period)  
{HA,HA} only 715 429 9.375 5.65 
Random mixing 380 407 5.71 5.82 
Random mixing 
(with threshold) 
609 390 6.62 4.97 
{MA,MA} only 144 240 2.25 3.75 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 Discount rate used in the simulation was 0.99.  
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The key take-away from the simulations is that studio actions (industry support for the 
format), and hence adoption and studio profits, differ across equilibriums. The 
observed actions in a dataset depend on the selection rule used to choose between 
equilibriums. These selection rules may be chosen based on a number of factors 
including the market power of different studios and difference in payoffs across 
equilibriums. While firms thus have incentives to ensure that they use appropriate 
selection rules, a priori it is difficult to specify the selection rule applicable to a 
particular market. 
In the paper, to model equilibrium selection, I develop a frame-work that extends the 
extant MPNE frame-work. My specification of the selection rule allows for 
dependencies on past period actions and states, and admits each case simulated and 
Figure 10: Adoption rates (with threshold) 
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discussed. The describe estimators account for equilibrium selection and remain 
consistent when different equilibriums are played in the data, recovering both model 
primitives and the selection rule, while nesting the base case of a unique equilibrium 
being played in the data. 
7. Conclusion 
Essays 1 and 2 study title specific managerial issues, and focus on forecasting demand, 
timing release and pricing. Essay 3 studies format and studio level managerial issues, 
looking at the allocation of an assortment/portfolio of titles of a studio across formats. 
In essay 3, I model the release and pricing of new titles on DVD and VHS at the end 
of the VHS technology lifecycle. In my model, studios are forward looking and 
strategically use release timing and pricing strategies to influence adoption. Studios 
face conflicting short-term and long-term profit interests when deciding pricing and 
assortment in the old VHS and new DVD format. Competitive dynamics are especially 
important, when studios have to both coordinate with rivals as well as face the 
temptation to free-ride off rivals. The resulting trade-offs are examined using a 
dynamic model that calculates the total value of a strategic choice, including its effect 
on future demand. Thus, I endogenize the efforts of firms to drive adoption of newer 
formats, and study the evolution of formats in competitive markets with substitution 
and complementarity effects. To model these issues in format adoption, I develop 
estimation methods for a dynamic Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) with 
multiple equilibriums. As firms could coordinate strategies to drive adoption or free 
ride, strategies in my model could be strategic substitutes or strategic complements, 
leading to the multiple possible equilibriums.  
I describe two estimators: an efficient but computationally expensive full information 
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maximum likelihood estimator and an inefficient but computationally inexpensive 
pseudo-likelihood estimator. I limit the scope of the paper to a description of these 
estimators. In future work, I will compare these estimators to draw inferences on the 
dynamics of cooperative and competitive behavior in the industry.  
There are several directions in which this work can be enhanced in future research. 
First, the FIML and PML estimators can be compared for convergence and efficiency, 
for different model primitives. The model can be extended to relax the full information 
assumption (no learning) implicit in the equilibrium selection mechanism. The general 
framework described is broad enough to be applied to other problems in which firms 
must make trade-offs between competitive and cooperative decisions, in a dynamic 
setting. Hence, substantively the study can be extended to other home video and 
theatrical channels, and additional adoption decision variables (eg: advertising). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: Non-Stationary MPNE Framework 
This appendix describes the model primitives and resulting equilibrium in Chapter 2. 
It shows the conditions for identifying the non-stationary MPNE and discusses the 
flexibility of the model when describing multiples equilibriums played in the data.  
1.1: Model Description 
Following prior empirical work (Doraszelski and Pakes, 2006), we restrict our 
attention to symmetric and anonymous equilibriums. A set of functions, is symmetric 
if ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,i i i i i j i i i if x x f x x i jδ δ δ δ− − − −= ∀ . Hence we abstract from the identity of 
the agent in the payoff function. The function, ( )f  is anonymous if 
( ) ( )( ) ( ), , , , , ,i i i i i perm i i perm if x x f x xδ δ δ δ− − − −= , where ( )perm i− is any permutation 
of the indices of other studios. Note that symmetry and anonymity restrictions do not 
assume that studios are identical, but instead that studio and product differences are 
observed. Reduced-form game payoffs for all agents at equilibrium are a function of 
its characteristics, state vector and competitive set. 
We assume model primitives are common knowledge to potential entrants and 
incumbents: 
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 { }( , , , , , )( , , , ,:), , ( | , ,:), , i iit it it t t t t t it i x p t a I T Ax p a E a δπ δ δ δ ν β ∈ ×ℵ×Ρ× ×∆×′Ψ  (27) 
We describe these objects and then present the assumptions required for the model. 
The state space is I T×ℵ×Ρ× ×∆ , where I +∈ is the set of all titles ever released in 
movie theaters, ℵ is the Cartesian product of observed movie characteristics, ∞+Ρ ⊂   
is the set of prices, T ∈ is the set of time periods over which the game is played, 
T∞∆ ⊂ ×Ρ  is the state vector describing announced release dates and prices and 
A T∞⊂ ×Ρ is the announcement vector58 { },C A∆ ∆. is a partition of ∆ such that C∆ is 
the set of continuation states and C∆  is the set of absorbing states. ( , , , ,:)it it it t tx p aπ δ
is the profitability of title i, in time period t, when it has characteristics itx ∈ℵ ,  price 
itp ∈Ρ , tδ  is the state vector at time t and ta is chosen by agents. tE is set of all 
potential entrants, and ( | , ,:)t aδ δ′Ψ is the transition function that determines state 
transitions. As mentioned previously, we assume this function is time-varying. We 
adopt the convention of using primes to denote subsequent period variables, e.g. δ ′  to 
denote 1tδ + , δ ′′ to denote 2tδ + . In an abuse of notation, we also use agent subscripts to 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 The lack of an announcement, or its withdrawal, is encoded as the origin. 
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denote the partition of the state and action vector describing an agent, e.g. iδ to denote 
the state of agent i. 
Incomplete information models simplify the analysis of the equilibrium (Seim, 2007), 
and are more likely to accurately represent the industry (e.g. given the non-standard 
contracts for sharing revenue and for deciding the promotional expenditure). Hence, 
similar to entry models, we assume that prior to making a release decision studios 
receive a private payoff shock itν , drawn independently over time, from a distribution 
( | , )t itG xν δ  with support on t
E
 , and tν  the vector of private shocks for all titles in 
period t. Private information shocks (in a timing game) describe payoffs variations 
from different announcements and capture seasonal and studio specific differences in 
release costs across periods, including changes in the costs of advertising, promotional 
expenditure and the manufacturing cost for the DVD. We formalize this intuition in 
(T1) in section 4.3. Our formulation of private information allows shocks to be 
correlated across the industry, and heteroskedastic over time. Finally we specify a 
discount factor β . We impose further restrictions on the model primitives. 
(A1) The state space is finite: 
( ); , ; , ; ; ,I x x p P p T δ δ< ∞ < ∞ ∀ ∈ℵ < < ∞ ∀ ∈Ρ < ∞ < ∞ ∀ ∈∆  
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(A2) Profits are bounded ( ( )itπ π π< <∑  ). Profits accrue post release (entry) of 
the title. 
(A3) Studios discount future payoffs ( )0,1β ∈ . 
(A4) Private information appears additively in profit function
( , , , , ,:) ( , , , ,:)it it it t t t it it it t t itx p a x p aπ δ ν π δ ν= + . Fν is distributed absolutely continuous 
to the Lebesgue measure. 
(A5) State transition, follows a non-stationary first order Markov process with non-
homogenous transition function ( | , ,:)t aδ δ′Ψ . In general, future states are a time 
varying stochastic function of past states and actions
( ) ( ) { }1 , , . . , Cst t t t tf a s t aµ δ δ δ δ+ ′= ∀ ∈∆ ∈∆ ∃ with ( ) ( ), 0st f aµ δ δ′ = > . 
Assumption (A1) stipulates the finiteness of the state space. First, as we restrict our 
attention to titles released in movie theaters and ignore direct-to-DVD sales, our set of 
agents is always finite. Second, in practice, characteristics of a movie have finite 
range. Third, perishability implies that in any time period, a firm only considers a 
finite number of future periods for release. Correspondingly, we restrict the decision 
vector and action vector of potential entrants to be finite. Assumptions (A2), (A3) and 
(A4) are features of commonly-used profit functions in empirical studies. The second 
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part of (A2) is appropriate in a game of release timing where the agent can only make 
profits post release of the title.  
Assumption (A4) describes the stochastic monotonicity and continuity requirements 
on payoffs, fundamental to the existence of MPNE. Relaxing distributional 
assumptions on private information increases the number of mixed MPNE supported 
in the model.  Assumption (A5) requires the state of the world, dates and prices chosen 
by studios in every week, to evolve in a first order Markov process. The evolution of 
the next period’s states, conditional on the actions and states of agents in the current 
period, is stochastic. In keeping with extant papers, we require states in future periods 
to be accessible from continuation states. In our application, the state space is a history 
of past actions, and evolves deterministically conditional on past states and actions. 
(A4) and (A5) are implicitly equivalent to requiring additive separability of controls 
and errors, and conditional independence. Finally our state space is finite (unlike 
Ericsson and Pakes (1995), who study a problem with an infinite state space), and 
hence, we do not require agent payoffs to be bounded at the extremums of the state 
space.  
In appendix 2, we describe an extension to the model that allows us to model price as 
a continuous variable. Thus, we extend the model to both continuous and discrete 
controls, from discrete controls. As the extension is computationally more expensive 
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and requires additional assumptions (A11) and (A12), we maintain the assumption of 
discrete controls for the remainder of this paper. Assumptions (A1 – A5) lead to the 
following lemma: 
Lemma (L1): Generically, the best response function is a unique mapping from
I T A×∆× → . 
Proof: (L1) follows naturally under assumptions (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5) and the 
solution concept of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In a PBE, a studio 
considers expected profits from each strategic choice. The expectation on the profit 
function includes probabilities on the decisions of incumbents and potential entrants in 
future periods, described by the transition kernel specified in (A5). When taking 
expectations, indifference between two actions, making the best response function a 
correspondence occurs on a set of measure zero due to the continuity restrictions 
imposed in (A4). 
Corollary (CL1): 
If a firm is in a continuation state, Ci iδ ∈∆ , then all future states of the firm have 
positive probability. ( ) ( )1 | , 0
t
s t t t a t
a
a aµ δ δ µ+ >∫  
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Proof: (A4) implies that from each state, all actions are played with positive 
probability. (A5) implies that generically, all future states are achievable from 
continuation states. 
For a particular equilibrium, (L1) implies a unique mapping from a combination of the 
state vector and observables to a future state.  In our model, the state vector is the 
history of past agent actions, making the evolution of the state space conditional on 
agent actions, purely deterministic. In general, if agent actions lead to stochastic state 
changes, then agent beliefs in the PBE are rational, as (L1) implies (A5). 
Our non-stationary formulation extends extant frameworks of dynamic games, to 
allow for multiplicity of equilibriums played in the data. If a particular equilibrium is 
played in the data, then the specification of the stationary MPNE (with a time 
homogenous transition kernel) is complete without specifying additional beliefs on 
equilibrium arbitration. If multiple MPNEs are possible in a model, then different 
equilibriums may lead to different transition kernels. The presence of multiple 
equilibriums in a dataset means that the transition kernel is time-varying: equilibrium 
choice in a particular period determines state transitions in the period. The non-
homogenous transition kernel defined in (A5) is agnostic on the source of the non-
stationarity and hence is broad enough to allow for the effect of multiple equilibriums 
on state transitions. A stationary Markov model assumes that best responses depend 
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only on the current state of the agents. Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007), prove the 
existence of a MPNE, and under certain conditions, the existence of a Pure Strategies 
MPNE. Assuming a stationary MPNE, they write the choice value function as 
 { }1 1| ,( , , , ; ) ( , , ; ) ( , , , ; )t t tt t it t t t t taV x a x a E E V x aυδ δδ υ θ π υ θ β δ υ θ+ += +  (28) 
where expectations on future value functions are taken over possible next period 
states, using the transition matrix.  
A stationary Markov strategy for a studio is a function :i Aσ ν∆× → . A stationary 
Markov strategy profile σ  is a set of stationary Markov strategies for each studio in a 
period. The necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions in a stationary MPNE are 
 ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ; ; , , , , , ,i i iV V i Iδ σ δ σ σ δ σ−≥ ∀ ∈ ∆ Σ  (29) 
A non-homogenous first order transition matrix requires us to rewrite the choice value 
function. We write (29) as a period-specific choice value function, taking expectations 
over the next period choice value functions using the current periods’ transition matrix 
 
{ }1 1 1| ,
( , , , ; ) ( , , , ; )
( , , , ; )
t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t ta
V x a x a t
E E V x aυδ δ
δ υ θ π υ θ
β δ υ θ
+ + +
=
+
 (30) 
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(29) specifies a time invariant choice value function, while (30) specifies a time-
varying choice value function59
tV
. Time-varying choice value functions, particularly 
when lacking estimates of the transition matrix, cannot be analyzed using extant 
methods without arbitrary restrictions on . As current decisions are affected by 
future seasonality, for instance to control for the effect of seasonality one would need 
to make tV a function of future periods.  
A non-stationary Markov strategy for a studio is a function :it Aσ ν∆× → . A non-
stationary Markov strategy profile tσ is a set of non-stationary Markov strategies for 
each studio in period t. In a non-stationary MPNE, the necessary and sufficient 
equilibrium conditions are 
 ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ; ; , , , , , , , ,t t t it it itV V i t I Tδ σ δ σ σ δ σ−≥ ∀ ∈ ∆ Σ  (31) 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 Blackwell’s theorem does not apply to the general class of non-stationary Markov Perfect Nash 
Equilibriums. For instance, consider an infinite period game in which the market grows faster than the 
discount rate. In our problem, we assume an upper bound on the profit function and requirement the 
existence of an absorbing state. These two conditions, used with backwards induction arguments, 
guarantee the existence of such a function.  
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1.2: Proof of Existence of a Non-Stationary MPNE 
To prove the existence of a non-stationary MPNE, we assume: 
(A6) Let et be the time an agent enters the game. Agent payoffs ( ), ,et tπ   are a 
strictly decreasing function of t ( ), ,et tπ  with ( ), . . , , 0et t s t t t tπ∃∞ > > ∀ > < . 
Assumption (A6)60
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 Without (A6), the existence of the equilibrium can be proven by defining the extended model using 
countable states. Such a model with countable states is harder to identify than the extended model 
presented.  
 is stronger than the standard waiting costs assumptions in extant 
frameworks due to underlying market growth; firms in markets growing fast enough 
may prefer to defer release indefinitely despite convex waiting costs. Estimates of 
inter release perishability from the market share model in our application, support 
(A6) with longer inter release periods leading to a sharp decline in movie appeal.  
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Lemma (L2): Agents have a finite planning horizon MF < ∞ , where M is the number 
of periods in which profits accrue, post release. 
Proof: Define 
1
0
min, . .
M
M n
t t in i
f s t Mβ π π
−
+
=
= < ∑  where sup im
m t n
π π
> +
= . The left hand side 
of the inequality decreases geometrically indicating Mtf < ∞ . By construction,
M
tt t f′ > + ,
1 1
0 0
M M
t t
t i t i
i i
Mβ π π π
− −
′−
′+ +
= =
< <∑ ∑  as (A6) implies a decreasing profit 
function. If firms never receive more profits in periods beyond Mtf than in the current 
period, then they have a finite planning horizon ( Mtf ) for the current period. 
min MM tt T
F f
∈
= < ∞ is the finite planning horizon for the agent across all periods. 
Following Dutta and Sundaram (1994), define an extended state space, { },tλ δ= and 
an extended transition matrix, ( )|ι λ λ′ . Firms within a period only consider a finite 
number of future periods for release. A game in each period can be replaced with an 
equivalent finite game if we drop unconsidered states (strictly dominated states) from 
the extended state space creating a finite extended state space. Assumptions A1 – A5, 
translate in the extended state space to a stationary Markov chain. The conditions in 
the extended model match those in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007), proving the 
existence of a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. As the extended model notation is a 
one to one re-parameterization of the original model with each week and state in the 
original model corresponding to a state in the extended model, an equivalent 
equilibrium exists in the original model. 
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While the extended state-space notation is useful for proving the existence of non-
stationary MPNE, it is not helpful to the econometrician because by construction, the 
cardinality of non-zero elements of the state transition matrix is always larger than the 
number of observations in the data. Thus, the transition matrix remains under-
identified in the re-parameterization as in the original model. 
We cannot compare the unidentified general non-stationary MPNE with our partial 
information model.  Hence we assume: 
(A7) The integrated value function ( )| |( , , ; ) ( , , , ; )t t t t t t t VE V x E V x tδ δ δ δδ υ θ δ υ θ′ ′ ′= ℘ , 
and the Markov kernel, ( )( )( | , ,:) | , , ,:t t ta t aψδ δ δ δ′ ′Ψ = Ψ ℘ , are both stochastic 
functions of a ( )tψ℘ and ( )V t℘ , finite cardinality function vectors of the effect of 
time t. Define the augmented characteristics vector as ( ) ( ){ }, ,At t Vx x t tψ= ℘ ℘ . 
Assumption (A7) limits the effect of time varying payoffs to a sufficient statistic of 
any finite cardinality, and integrates these vectors into the vector of descriptive 
characteristics. While the MPNE specified in section 3 is not identified due to the non 
stationarity of the transition function, the augmented model (defined above) is 
identified. Identification requirements from the data scale with the length of the 
sufficient statistic used. A longer sufficient statistic remains identified in population, 
but increases the data requirements of the empirical implementation. 
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(A7) is reasonable in our model, where each agent has a finite planning horizon with a 
finite number of payoff periods post release. The integrated value function is well 
approximated in our model using the projected seasonal demand in the near future. 
The Markov kernel, using Perfect Bayesian restrictions, in turn is well approximated 
by exogenous shocks in a finite number of future periods, fulfilling the second half of 
the requirement. In general, non-stationary MPNE may not be well approximated by 
these assumptions.  
Additionally, we make assumptions presented in section 5.1 (assumptions on 
sequences of profit functions) in Weintraub et al (2007). The demand models 
discussed prior (logit share, nested logit share and random coefficient logit share) are 
consistent with these assumptions. We get 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )lim ,: ,: 0n A A A An t n tn E V x V xδ→∞  − =   (16) 
where ( )( ) ,:A An tV x is the model approximation to the identified augmented model using 
state distribution assumptions outlined earlier, for a market with size n. Assuming 
light tail conditions, as specified in section 5.4 of Weintraub et al (2007), leads to the 
main observation in their paper that the discounted sum of differences between actual 
and oblivious single period profits, converges to zero. 
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Non-stationary MPNE that follow (A10) may not possess a recurrent class of states, a 
property required for many well known (and popular) extant MPNE algorithms. For 
instance, approximating MPNE using the method of Pakes and McGuire (2001), 
requires the presence of a recurrence class for the adaptive updates to converge to true 
values. As the long term distribution of a non-homogenous Markov process is not well 
defined, adaptive learning processes may never converge to the true value, when 
modeling a non-stationary MPNE. However, capturing the effect of time in the finite 
vector may allow the use of popular two-step estimation processes, such as Bajari, 
Benkard and Levin (2007). 
Last, (A10) generalizes the convergence result for Oblivious Equilibriums to games 
with multiple equilibriums played in the data, and an equilibrium arbitration process 
on future play. A multiplicity of equilibriums played in the data can be described by a 
finite family of homogenous Markov kernels, driving a non-homogenous Markov 
process. Our non-stationary MPNE representation is a sufficient descriptor of such a 
game. The game admits (A10) as an appropriate assumption, if the equilibrium 
arbitration mechanism (refer to Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007 for a discussion) is 
driven by observed strategic and descriptor variables. 
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1.3: Alternative Representation of Equilibrium 
For ease of exposition, we focus on the partial information model. Formally, first 
define the iterated (non-homogenous) unconditional Markov density as 
( ) ( ) ( )1 | | ,t t a
a
a aψ δ δ ψ δ δ µ′ ′= ∫ and 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1| | | ,n nt t t n a
a
a a
δ
ψ δ δ ψ δ δ ψ δ δ µ− + −
′∈∆
′′ ′′ ′ ′= ∑ ∫ for 2n ≥ . Within the 
equilibrium for a specific state vectorδ , the iterated kernel ( )|ntψ δ δ′  reflects beliefs 
on the state distribution n periods into the future. The iterated Markov density in the 
partial information model  ( )|ntψ δ δ′  reflects agent beliefs of the evolution of the 
industry, n periods into the future. Within the partial information model, integrating 
the iterated kernel over the beliefs on the current period’s state distribution  ( )tURς δ , 
gives us future state distributions. This distribution ( )  ( )
{ }
| ,
t
UR
n t t t
t UR R UR
δ
ψ δ δ δ ς δ′∫  is a 
function of past states and past actions due to the Perfect Bayesian restrictions on
 ( )tURς δ . 
Lemma (L3): 
( ){ }
( ){ } ( ){ }
( ){ }
( 1)
( )
1
,
, , , ,
..., ,
it i
a a
it i t
M
Ma
i t FM
t it
a A
t t
a A a A
F
t F
A
Max EV a
Max E a Max E a
Max
Max E a
δ
π β π
β π
+
+
∈
+
∈ ∈
+
∈
 
  =  
 
  

 

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where aitA are actions leading to absorbing states for agent i, and 
c a
it itA A A= − , and 
expectations are taken over the equilibrium state distribution in the period,  ( )tς δ  and 
private information shock in each period. 
Proof: By definition the two partitions of the action space { },a ct tA A are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Hence we get 
 ( ){ } ( ){ } ( ){ }, , , ,
a c
it i it t it t
t it t it t it
a A a A a A
Max EV a Max Max EV a Max EV a
∈ ∈ ∈
 
=  
 
    (32) 
 By continuing in the game, a firm obtains no profits in the current period, but gains 
the ability to either release in the next period, or choose a different announcement 
strategy. In a current period, the expected choice value of releasing is the present value 
of profits in the next periods. Hence, we get 
 
( ){ }
( ){ }
( ){ }
( ){ }
( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1)
1
1
1
,
,
, ,
,
c
it it
i t i t
a
i t i t
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i t i t
t it
a A
t it
a A
t it
a A
t it
a A
Max EV a
Max EV a
Max EV a
Max
Max EV a
β
β
β
+ +
+ +
+ +
∈
+
∈
+
∈
+
∈
=
=
 
  
 
 
  




 (33) 
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Implicitly the iterated Markov density allows us to take expectations over candidate 
states in a period. At the end of the planning horizon, a firm chooses between release 
in that period and continuing in that game. Substituting iteratively (33) into (32) 
recursively until the planning horizon we get the expression of the lemma with an 
additional term in the choice set of the continuation value past the horizon. For each 
absorbing state, the continuation value is the profits from releasing the movie. 
Substitute the profit function for the continuation value. From (L2) we know that 
profits past the horizon are lower than current period release profits, and hence can 
never be the argmax. Hence, (32) leads to (L3). 
(L3) formalizes the earlier discussion. In expectation, the search for the maximizing 
release announcement strategy in a period is equivalent to a search for optimal 
stopping points across periods. Agents seeking to maximize expected revenues post 
release, maximize expected payoffs from strategic choices in a period.  
In our game, this equivalence as stated is not useful as a private information shock is 
defined for each potential action. The search for the maximizing strategy in a period is 
the search for the choice value of each action including the private information shock. 
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Theorem (T1): 
Let υ be the vector of payoff shocks, of cardinality
1
0
MF a
it
i
A
−
=
∑ , to the expected payoffs 
from choosing an absorbing state. These shocks are distributed with a density πµ , 
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Then: 
(i) Private information shocks υ can be considered to be a linear combination ofυ  
(ii) A search for the optimal absorbing state across periods is equivalent to a search 
for the optimal strategy in a period 
Proof: 
The choice of an action influences the transition of states in the period. The state 
density n periods in the future conditional on the action vector is
 ( ) ( ) ( )  ( )11| | | ,
t
n
t n t t t ta a
δ δ
ς δ ψ δ δ ψ δ δ ς δ−+ +
′
′′ ′ ′= ∑ ∫  . Note that payoffs in the model 
accrue to the firm post release. Hence, the choice value of an action
( )  ( )
( )
1
0
( ) , |
M
abs
i t j
F
t t t j t j
j
V a a
δ
π δ ς δ
+
−
+ +
= ∈∆
 
 =   
 
∑ ∫   is the expectation over resulting future 
absorbing states, distributed  ( )|t n aς δ + . The iterated Markov kernel has full rank and 
can be inverted. We can write ( ) ( )t t tV a EV a υϕ ν= +
 , where the mean choice value of 
the absorbing state is perturbed by payoff shocksυ . tυϕ is the matrix defined through 
the inverse iterated Markov kernel integrated over the state density in future periods. 
The mapping is unique allowing us to compare with (A4) and get t tυν ϕ ν=
 . 
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In (L3), consider the case where υ is added to the expected choice value of each 
absorbing state. Using (T1i), the resulting change in expected choice value can be 
captured by the private shocks to the choice value of actions in the current period. 
Hence, we get 
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 (34) 
Define :n n n nit Aσ ν∆ × → as the n-period non-stationary MPNE strategy of an agent, 
for any finite n. A n-period non-stationary Markov strategy profile ntσ is a set of non-
stationary n-period Markov strategies in period t. The non stationary MPNE 
equilibrium conditions (31) can be rewritten as 
 ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ; ; , , , , , , , ,n n n n nt t t it it itV V i t I Tδ σ δ σ σ δ σ−≥ ∀ ∈ ∆ Σ  (35) 
(35) states that the equilibrium condition of agents  choosing a maximizing strategy in 
each period subject to the strategies of others, is equivalent to agents seeking the 
maximizing n period strategy subject to equilibrium n-period strategies of others. 
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From (L2), we know a finite planning horizon exists for the firm. Set MF  as n and 
substitute in(35). The equilibrium MF -period strategies can be considered equivalently 
to be those leading to the payoff maximizing absorbing state in the planning horizon. 
Hence, the per period equilibrium conditions of the MPNE are equivalent to agents 
choosing the MF period strategy which leads to the payoff maximizing absorbing state 
in the finite planning horizon. Intuitively, agents searching for a strategy to maximize 
the choice value are searching for the MF period strategy that leads to the maximizing 
absorbing state. 
1.4: Estimation 
Similar to Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), to reduce computational load we assume: 
(A8) The profit function, conditional on the demand function defined, is linear in 
unknown parameters ( )( ) ( )( ), , , ; | , , , , | ,it it it t t it it it it it t t it itx p a q x p x p a q x pπ δ θ δ θ= Ψ 
where ( )itΨ •  is a finite dimension vector of “basis functions” (including polynomial 
and interaction terms). 
(A8) allows us to approximate the payoff function locally. A violation of (A7) does 
not prevent estimation or affect identification of the model and the described 
estimation methodology is robust to the use of a non-linear specification. As observed 
in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), having a payoff function that is linear in 
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unknown parameters implies that the constructed value functions are also linear in 
unknown parameters, simplifying estimation.  
To calculate the payoffs post release, we utilize a sufficient statistic for the impact of 
the evolution of the industry and require: 
(A9) Competition in the industry is described by an industry summary statistic set (
fss ). There exists a consistent estimator ( ) ( ) ( ): pfs fs fss s sµ µ µ→  , where ( )fssµ is 
the true distribution of the summary statistic in a future period. 
Assumption (A9) is similar to assumptions made in Bajari, Benkard and Levin 
(2007).61 Instead of assuming a finite parameter vector in the first stage of estimation, 
we assume the forecasted variables resulting from the first-stage converge to the 
rational beliefs of agents.62
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 In non-stationary MPNE, (A8) implicitly requires (A7). The sufficient statistic in (A8) can only be 
predicted if the non-homogenous Markov process can be modeled as a homogenous Markov kernel and 
exogenous time varying variables. 
62 Additional rate of convergence and local smoothness assumptions are required if using a criterion 
function for estimation as in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). 
 (A8) can be used in other two-step dynamic models to 
allow the first stage regression to be non-parametric, as the summary statistic set is not 
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limited in scope (and may be uncountable). For instance, the summary statistic vector 
may include the transition kernel and policy functions defined in Bajari, Benkard and 
Levin (2007). (A8) also naturally follows when a consistent parametric first stage 
estimator is used to estimate both, the transition kernel and the policy functions as in 
most dynamic game estimation methodologies. 
We assume the following regularity conditions: 
(R1) ss SSθ ∈Θ is a compact subset of ss
θℜ  and true value 0 intss SSθ ∈ Θ . 
(R2) The quasi-likelihood function ( )( )| fssµϒ • is uniquely maximized at 0ssθ , and 
( )( )| fssµϒ • is twice continuously differentiable in ss SSθ ∈Θ with probability 1.  
(R1) and (R2) are common regularity conditions for quasi-likelihood estimation, met 
by the iid Gumbel specification of absorbing state payoff shocks in our application. 
Under (A8), the argmax of the quasi-likelihood function is a consistent estimator of 
the second stage structural parameters. From (A4), the second stage quasi likelihood 
function ( )( )| fssµϒ • is continuous, leading to ( )( ) ( )( )| |pfs fss sµ µϒ • →ϒ • . 
Maximizing the quasi-likelihood yields second stage structural parameters ( ssθ ) 
whose variance is the sandwich estimator ( ) ( ) ( )1 1ss ss ssA B Aθ θ θ
− − , where ( )ssA θ is 
the Hessian of the log quasi-likelihood and ( )ssB θ is the variance of the quasi-score. 
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For completeness we discuss the endogeneity of observables and a method for 
correcting for the endogeneity bias. In our research question, endogeneity is not a 
concern as observables in our payoff function are lagged variables, not affected by 
current private information shocks. Formally, we assume: 
(A10) ( ) 0it itE xν ν =  
A violation of (A10) would bias the coefficients estimated due to endogeneity. We can 
correct for endogeneity bias in our model using two-step estimation. In the first stage, 
bias correction follows methods for instruments in discrete choice models. In the 
second stage, violation of (A9) implies that both individual agent errors and forecast 
errors are correlated with agent observables. Grouping the error terms leaves a single 
error term correlated with observables. To estimate the model, define a set of moment 
conditions by matching the best response with calculated best responses and interact 
the conditions with instrumental variables. While this method corrects for any 
potential endogeneity bias it is econometrically less efficient in the second stage than 
maximizing the best response quasi-likelihood. 
Appendix 2: Modeling Title Price Choices as a Continuous Variable 
In our model we make the simplifying assumption that prices are discrete. In this 
section, we discuss how to model a continuous strategic variable in conjunction with 
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release date timing. Profitability in a week is given by (10) and (11).  To model prices 
as being continuous we make two assumptions: 
(A11) ( ),smwt smwq x p and ( )( ),smwt smwt smwf q x p are continuous and differentiable 
function of smwp . 
(A12) ( ),smwt smwq x p and ( )( ),smwt smwt smwf q x p are quasi-concave in prices. 
(A11) and (A12) are common assumptions on the profit function of a firm, which 
allow the researcher to formulate first order optimality conditions, and guarantee the 
existence of a unique maximum. Hence, they are more restrictive than (A1-A5), which 
lead to (L1). The assumed parametric demand function in our model satisfies both 
(A11) and (A12).  
Under (A11) and (A12), the objective function of the firm is continuous in mixed 
strategies. As the strategy space is bounded, mixed strategies are a compact subset of a 
Euclidean space. Hence by Glicksberg’s Theorem (Glicksberg, 1952), a Nash 
Equilibrium exists in mixed strategies. 
Estimators for the model can be formulated by either maximizing the probability of 
joint decisions or by minimizing a criterion function. The probability of seeing a joint 
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decision can be found by using a closed form analytical solution, or through numerical 
simulation. To specify the criterion function, first take derivatives of (9): 
 ( ) [ ] ( ),, smwt smwsmwt smwt smw smw smwt
smw smw
q x p
E q x p p x
p p
π
λ λ γ
∂∂
= + −
∂ ∂
 (17) 
To obtain first order conditions, take derivatives of (10) and substitute results of (17): 
 ( )
w M
j w M
smw smwj sm
smw smw smwj w
E E E w
p p p
π β π β κ
+
−
=
∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂∑  (18) 
A studio maximizes profits by setting release timing dates and prices. If we assume the 
existence of an interior solution, conditional on a set of dates, the first order conditions 
allow us to specify a Lagrangian using (18) to find the maximizing price. The 
difference in criterion function estimators when using only discrete controls versus 
joint controls, is that while the best response function for the discrete levels problem 
requires the researcher to enumerate value functions of all strategies, for a continuous 
control, the researcher first enumerates possible choices of the timing variable, and 
then conditional on each choice of the timing variable, solve the first order conditions 
of the problem to find the maximizing price. Neither approach implies a decision 
hierarchy; the continuous controls algorithm is identically to jointly considering all 
joint strategic decisions. To allow for boundary solutions, one has to consider solving 
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the relevant Kuhn-Tucker conditions instead of specifying a Lagrangian. 
It is computationally expensive to simulate the probability of a release strategy and to 
solve using (18) in our model. The derivative of the demand function is non linear in 
prices and hence requires numerical minimization. As the maximizing price is found 
in the inner loop for every conjecture of parameters and for every choice of release 
dates, the computation costs outweigh benefits of implementation in our model. 
